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A C K N O W L  E D G M E N T S
Like the scientific research on pandemic influenza that it follows, this book is 
the product of a journey filled with displacements.
The journey began in New York, where Stephen J. Collier introduced me to 
the anthropology of the con temporary. I was then fortunate to participate in 
discussions on biosecurity and preparedness that Stephen or ga nized with An-
drew Lakoff, along with Carlo Caduff and Frédéric Keck, which helped shape 
the research prob lems and questions I address  here.
During my gradu ate studies at University of California, Berkeley, Paul 
Rabinow inspired  every aspect of this proj ect, particularly the vision of an an-
thropology that goes to the field not only to find something but also to make 
something, and remains open to displacements in unexpected directions. I am 
always grateful for the conceptual and ethical equipment.
At Berkeley this proj ect developed  under the influence of wonderful teach-
ers, including Aihwa Ong, Liu Xin, Dorothy Porter, Vincanne Adams, Law-
rence Cohen, and Massimo Mazzotti.
During my fieldwork I incurred incalculable debts to my interlocutors at 
the fao, in Beijing, and around Poyang Lake. I am particularly grateful for the 
displacement of my research plans that followed from my early meetings with 
Vincent Martin at the fao Emergency Center.
In the drafts through which this book slowly took shape, many  people pro-
vided crucial insights and commentary. I am grateful to my fellow gradu ate stu-
dents in the Department of Anthropology at Berkeley; my former colleagues 
at the History and Sociology of Science Cluster, Nanyang Technological Uni-
versity; and my current colleagues in Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences at 
Singapore University of Technology and Design (sutd). Nicholas Bartlett, Le-
ticia Cesarino, Ruth Goldstein, Bruno Reinhardt, Anthony Stavrianakis, Hal-
lam Stevens, Laurence Tessier, and Bharat Venkat read drafts both early and 
late. Emily Chua gave crucial comments and encouragement at many turning 
points. Warwick Anderson introduced a good number of edge effects to the 
manuscript from the borderlands of history and anthropology.
It was truly unexpected good fortune to meet Michael M. J. Fischer in Sin-
gapore, as he was hard at work cultivating anthropological sts in Asia. Mike 
provided detailed commentary on the draft manuscript and incredible support 
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for the proj ect over the past several years. I am delighted to be included within 
the Experimental  Futures series that he edits with Joe Dumit.
At Duke University Press, Ken Wissoker provided a sharp eye for synthe-
sis and impeccable clarity during the pro cess of review and revision. Joshua 
Tranen gave insightful and timely advice. Tim Stallman created the dynamic 
maps of the 1957 pandemic and Poyang Lake. The book also greatly benefited 
from the commentary of two anonymous reviewers, whom I would like to 
thank  here.
I am grateful to the institutions that supported this proj ect with grant 
funding. During my fieldwork in China, I was supported by a Fulbright- Hays 
Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Grant. During the writing of my dis-
sertation, I was supported by a Chiang Ching- kuo Foundation Doctoral Fel-
lowship. The writing of the book manuscript was supported by an sutd Start-
 Up Research Grant.
Portions of chapter 3  were previously published as “ After the Livestock 
Revolution: Free- Grazing Ducks and Influenza Uncertainties in South China,” 
Medicine Anthropology Theory 5, no. 3 (2018): 72–98. Portions of chapter 4  were 
previously published as “Wild Goose Chase: The Displacement of Influenza 
Research in the Fields of Poyang Lake, China,” Cultural Anthropology 30, no. 1 
(2015): 12–35.
Most impor tant of all, I have been inspired and sustained throughout by 
the vision, sincerity, and love of my parents, Marie and Neill; my  brother,  Will; 
and my three Es: Emily, Eliotte, and Edith.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
“Is China Ground Zero for the Next Pandemic?”
— Smithsonian Magazine, November 2017
With a striking per sis tence, scientific publications and mass media reports 
identify China as the pos si ble source of  future pandemics. The trope of ori-
gins gives the anticipation of  future outbreaks a spatial form: suggesting that 
the seeds of the next pandemic already exist, perhaps hidden, waiting, some-
where in China.1 The peculiar temporality of pandemic preparedness— focused 
on potential catastrophic outbreaks rather than already prevalent illness—is an 
impor tant theme in critical discussions of global health.2 But what are the spa-
tial consequences of anticipation? How does pandemic preparedness transform 
the geography of global health research and intervention? And, in par tic u lar, 
how does preparedness differ in  those regions of the world marked as sources 
of disease, instead of the countries that seek “self- protection” from foreign epi-
demic threats?3
To address  these questions, this book provides an anthropological accompa-
niment to the scientific search for the origins of influenza pandemics in China. 
Adopting the narrative form of the journey or quest, I follow virologists, vet-
erinarians, and wild- bird trackers into the farms and fields of the hy po thet i cal 
source of flu pandemics. Yet this quest did not result in  simple moments of sci-
entific discovery or a definitive arrival at a point of origin. Instead, I show how 
China’s landscapes of intensive livestock farming and state biopolitics created 
ecologies of influenza that exceeded global health models and assumptions, 
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forcing scientists to reconsider their objects, their experimental systems, and 
even their own expertise. The search for origins was constantly pushed to the 
outside,  toward new questions about cause and context; knowledge changed 
when experiments moved along a vector of displacement.
The search for the origins of influenza pandemics is closely intertwined 
with the idea of world health and related plans for governance of disease across 
a global scale.  After World War II, the newly formed World Health Organ-
ization (who) set up an international network of laboratories to monitor “the 
appearance and spread of influenza” across the planet. In 1957, tested for the 
first time by a new influenza strain, the who’s World Influenza Programme 
traced the so- called Asian flu pandemic to an origin somewhere in China 
(see figure I.1). Chinese scientists  later confirmed that the pandemic began 
in China, although  because of cold war politics China was excluded from the 
United Nations— including un agencies such as the who— during this period. 
Eleven years  later, the who reported that the first cases of the Hong Kong 
pandemic  were identified in refugees fleeing the Cultural Revolution for the 
British colonial city, again indexing a source in China. However, the who’s 
identification of China as a point of origin for pandemic influenza viruses 
immediately opened new questions: How did the new virus appear? And why 
did it originate in China and not elsewhere?
In the early 1980s, Hong Kong University virologist Kennedy Shortridge 
answered that South China could be a “point of origin of influenza pandem-
ics”  because of the distinctive ecosystem created by “age- old” farming prac-
tices, animal husbandry systems, and wet- rice- paddy landscapes. Shortridge 
drew closely on laboratory studies, including his own, that suggested  human 
influenza pandemics begin from an animal reservoir. Lab experiments showed, 
for example, that new strains of influenza could be artificially created by co- 
infecting a lab animal with two virus strains derived from distinct animal spe-
cies (such as birds, pigs, or  humans). Inside the animal host the two virus strains 
exchanged ge ne tic material in a horizontal transfer known as reassortment, 
creating a wholly new strain. Transposing the laboratory model onto China’s 
landscapes, Shortridge argued that South China’s farms and fields provided 
plentiful opportunities for cross- species infections and, therefore, reassortment 
events: “The closeness between man and animals could provide an ecosystem 
for the interaction of their viruses.” To capture this new ecological concept of 




















Month rst case appeared














Probable origin of epidemic
Countries shown approximate 1958 boundaries. Site locations are approximate. 
Impacted sites
Japan
MAP I.1.  The origin and spread of the 1957 influenza pandemic. Map by Tim Stallman, 
based on WHO’s reconstruction of pandemic origin and spread.
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Less than fifteen years  later, Shortridge’s epicenter hypothesis seemed to 
be coming true, though not exactly in the way anyone expected. In April 1997, 
the Hong Kong University laboratory isolated a novel strain of influenza from 
chickens  after disease broke out on three poultry farms in the New Territo-
ries, close to the border with the  People’s Republic of China, sickening and 
killing thousands of birds. Using tests known as inhibition assays, lab workers 
identified the hemagglutinin (ha) and neuraminidase (na) protein subtypes 
of the strain, enabling them to classify the virus as h5n1.  Because h5 viruses 
are known to be highly pathogenic in domestic poultry, they immediately re-
ported the results to the World Organ ization for Animal Health (oie). But h5 
viruses had never been isolated from  humans or even any mammals, so the lab 
did not report the finding to the who.4
Then, in May, a three- year- old boy fell ill with what seemed to be a typical 
cold.  After trips to the local doctor and community hospital did no good, he 
was admitted to the Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Kowloon. In the hospital’s 
intensive- care unit, his breathing prob lems increased  until, despite mechani-
cal ventilation and antibiotic treatment, he died.  Because of the severity of the 
case, a sample was taken from the boy’s throat and sent to the Department of 
Health (doh). The doh identified influenza virus in the sample but could not 
identify the subtype with existing reagents in its lab. Instead, it sent the virus 
to the better- equipped who reference labs in London and Atlanta, as well as 
the laboratory of Jan de Jong at the Dutch National Institute of Public Health. 
Two months  later, de Jong called the chief virologist in Hong Kong’s Depart-
ment of Health, Wilina Lim, and told her he was flying to Hong Kong. He had 
identified the sample as the first known  human case of h5 influenza.5
As new  human cases accumulated, laboratory tests conducted by Short-
ridge and other researchers showed that the chicken and  human viruses  were 
nearly identical. Challenging previous assumptions about interspecies viral 
transmissions, the virus had apparently jumped directly from birds to  humans, 
prob ably amid the visceral interspecies exchanges of live- poultry markets. 
In interviews with the media, Shortridge reiterated his claim that “southern 
China is the influenza epicentre.” News reports began to herald a threatening 
“bird flu” that could cause the next pandemic. The outbreak was a “pandemic 
warning,” announced a team of virologists that included de Jong and Robert 
Webster.6
On December 27 the Hong Kong government ordered Leslie Sims, assistant 
director of agriculture quarantine, to kill and destroy all poultry in the terri-
tory. Vendors slaughtered chickens at wet markets and left them for govern-
ment workers to collect in black garbage bags. On farms, government workers 
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gassed entire flocks in their sheds. When I spoke with him a few years  later, 
Sims told me he “prob ably slept about twelve hours” during that week. He 
described to me the complex challenges of organ izing his staff to go out and 
kill millions of chickens, especially when many of them, though working in 
a livestock department, had never even been to a poultry farm before. How 
to ensure they wore face masks and gloves at all times? Where to dispose of 
the entire poultry stock of Hong Kong? In total, they killed approximately 1.2 
million chickens and 400,000 other birds.  After the poultry massacre, no new 
 human cases appeared. The rapid global response seemed to have contained an 
emerging disease at its point of origin, preventing a potential pandemic.
In fact, the h5n1 virus never dis appeared. As Sims explained to me, “Virus 
continued to circulate in China all through from 1996 to 2004 and the ab-
sence of reports of disease does not reflect the true infection status. . . .  It is 
clear from basic biology that disease must have been occurring in the main-
land but for what ever reason was not being reported.” In 2003 the h5n1 virus 
reemerged in Hong Kong, in a slightly diff er ent molecular form. This time, it 
quickly spread throughout Southeast Asia, striking Thailand, Vietnam, Cam-
bodia, and Indonesia in quick succession.  Later, the virus moved north and 
west, reaching Egypt and sub- Saharan Africa, Bangladesh, India, and Eu rope.
As fears of a pandemic grew, a new vision of global health “beyond the 
 human” took shape. In January 2004 the who (historically focused on  human 
health), the Food and Agriculture Organ ization (fao, historically focused on 
food security), and the World Organ ization for Animal Health (oie, histori-
cally focused on animal health) issued a joint statement calling for “broad col-
laboration” and appealing for international funds in response to the “unpre-
ce dented spread of avian influenza.” Defining avian influenza as a “serious 
global threat to  human health,” the statement explained that if avian influ-
enza “circulates long enough in  humans and farm animals,  there is increased 
risk that it may evolve into a pandemic influenza strain which could cause 
disease worldwide.”7 Within several years the fao/who/oie would together 
develop a new strategy for interagency collaboration based on the princi ple of 
“One World, One Health,” which holds that  human health and animal health 
are “intimately connected,” particularly by the zoonotic diseases that spread 
chains of infection among wildlife, domestic animals, and  humans. Proponents 
of One Health argue that this common vulnerability to disease requires a uni-
fied medical, scientific, and governmental response,  going beyond the modern 
disciplinary “silos” of  human and veterinary medicine.8
Despite the initiation of new interagency lines of communication, however, 
the who continued primarily to fund virus surveillance, vaccine development, 
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and preparedness planning. The fao, on the other hand, put forward a com-
pletely new strategy to control the emerging virus “at source.” In an appeal 
to funders, the fao declared: “Control of highly pathogenic avian influenza 
(hpai) at source means managing transmission of the virus where the disease 
occurs—in poultry, specifically  free range chickens and in wetland dwelling 
ducks— and curbing hpai occurrence in . . .  Asia before other regions of the 
globe are affected.”9 In this adaptation of the search for origins, the fao defined 
a “source” of pandemics as both a geographic region and a species reservoir, 
overlaying ecol ogy on geography. With funding secured from donors, the fao 
began to build new regional veterinary networks, redeploy staff members, fund 
scientific studies, and invent new institutional collaborations in Asia and in 
China. In order to understand and contain the source of emerging influenza 
viruses, global health moved into the epicenter.
ENTRY POINTS
I began to accompany this movement into the epicenter when I met Vin-
cent Martin, a French livestock veterinarian and  career official with the fao, 
at the Beijing office of the fao’s newly formed Emergency Center for Trans-
boundary Animal Diseases (ectad). Martin established the ectad China of-
fice (hereafter “the Emergency Center”) in 2006 and remained its se nior tech-
nical director during the main period of my fieldwork (2010–12).
The existence of the Emergency Center and its focus on “transboundary 
disease” reflected significant internal change within the fao. “We are a very 
old, very slow organ ization,” Martin told me, “but the bird flu  really forced 
us to change some  things.” The fao had been established  after World War II, 
along with the un and other agencies such as the who, with a special mandate 
to solve world hunger. Over the years the agency had shifted from provision 
of food aid  toward technical assistance in agricultural development, includ-
ing some work on disease outbreaks and pest emergencies. Martin himself had 
many years of experience with control of infectious animal diseases, but the 
fao’s concern had previously focused on diseases that posed a threat to food 
security, such as rinderpest or foot- and- mouth disease (fmd). The fao was not 
an organ ization that typically came up in discussions of international or global 
health, or  human pandemics.
 After the reemergence of the hpai h5n1 virus in 2003, all of this began to 
change. The fao began to reposition animal health work as a crucial compo-
nent of pandemic preparedness, a kind of cordon sanitaire at the bound aries 
of species. “Where animal disease poses a threat to  human health,” states an 
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fao position paper, “fao’s role is to advise on the best methods to contain the 
disease at the level of animals, prevent its recurrence and undertake research 
to identify ways of eradicating the disease. . . .  The current state of play is that 
avian influenza is an animal health issue and the focus must be on attacking 
the prob lem at source—in animals.”10
Martin helped to draft the original concept note for the ectad system. By 
collecting information about disease outbreaks from around the world, ectad 
aimed to provide new analytics and advice to both the fao and member states 
on emergency response and biosecurity intervention. Initially, ectad con-
sisted of a handful of expert analysts based within the Rome headquarters of 
the fao, which expanded to hundreds of staff as the avian influenza outbreak 
spread across the world. However, Martin and  others soon ran into a prob-
lem: how to validate and interpret the information they collected. As one staff 
member explained, “We quickly reach the limit of our system. We need ex-
pertise in the corridor to recognise what is  going on.” Some countries offered 
detailed reports, but  others only reported when “every one already knows.”11
In 2005 the fao established the ectad Regional Office for Asia Pacific 
(ectad- rap) in Bangkok. This office became a crucial base for conducting re-
search on avian influenza in southeast Asia, which by that time had spread 
to Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Indonesia. But Martin was not 
satisfied by this regional presence. He began to travel to China to lobby for 
establishing an office in Beijing, fi nally getting approval from China’s Ministry 
of Agriculture in 2008  after one year of meetings with government officials. As 
he  later explained to me, he had been “pushing for having an ectad office also 
in China  because I thought that it was meaningless to work in all the surround-
ing countries, trying to curb the spread of disease, while the epicenter—if we 
can say so— was in China in a way and it was not good just to have remote 
collaborations with them, but I thought it was also impor tant to establish an 
office  there.” China “was also quite difficult to get in, to have such a close rela-
tionship . . .  as we had with other countries,” he acknowledged. Nevertheless, 
Martin’s arrival in Beijing was the beginning, rather than culmination, of his 
global health diplomacy.
When I arrived in September 2010, I found the Emergency Center in a sleek 
high- rise tower on the edge of the Sanlitun diplomatic district, just beyond the 
East Gate of Beijing’s ancient center city.  After the formation of the  People’s 
Republic of China in 1949, the government had moved foreign embassies from 
the Legation Quarter, a small hutong alley with European- style buildings, to 
Sanlitun, outside the second ring road. Wide, tree- shaded streets are lined with 
buildings in a socialist modernist style of gray concrete terrazzo, housing 
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embassies, offices of international organ izations,  hotels, and residences. Armed 
military guards in green uniforms are stationed outside each embassy build-
ing, adding a subtle hint of contained vio lence to the peaceful streets.  There 
are also many restaurants catering to expatriate clientele, popu lar bars and 
clubs, and tourist- oriented shopping areas such as the so- called Silk Market. 
Sanlitun is a cosmopolitan space but with a diplomatic cast, reflecting both 
opportunities of exchange and the sober po liti cal negotiations often needed 
for their enactment. Inside the Emergency Center on the fifteenth floor, the 
six- person national staff of Chinese veterinarians, statisticians, and program 
officers worked on desktop computers at cramped cubicles. In Martin’s corner 
office, a large desk with a pc was juxtaposed with a bright red modernist couch. 
Floor- to- ceiling win dows looked out over Old Beijing.
The location of the Emergency Center in Sanlitun reflected the complex 
international diplomacy that lay  behind the movement of global health pro-
grams into the epicenter. Looming over every thing Martin attempted in China 
was the recent controversy over China’s management of the severe acute re-
spiratory syndrome (sars) outbreak. In late 2002 an “aty pi cal” pneumonia 
caused by an unknown virus had spread across southern China’s Guangdong 
Province. But China’s government did not inform the World Health Organ-
ization of the outbreak  until February 2003,  after cases of disease had already 
spread to Vietnam, Hong Kong, and Singapore.  Because of the government’s 
continued reluctance to acknowledge the scale of the outbreak, China was 
widely described as a “global pariah.” In response, the who announced an 
unpre ce dented advisory against travel to affected countries. According to in-
ternational  legal scholar David Fidler, the controversy over reporting led to a 
“governance revolution” that helped drive the transition from international to 
global public health. For the who and  others, sars demonstrated that control 
of emerging epidemics should be considered a form of “global public good” 
that exceeded sovereign state interests.12
The sars crisis also drove a pro cess of administrative and technical reform 
in China’s public health sector. As Fidler has put it, “China was the epicen-
ter of the sars outbreak; thus, it was the governance epicenter.”13 Once the 
discrepancy between China’s official reports and the  actual scale of the epi-
demic became clear— notably  after a whistle- blower, a Beijing military doctor, 
revealed the number of cases in Beijing hospitals to the international media— 
China’s government reversed course, began cooperating closely with the who, 
built new sars isolation hospitals, and directed mass campaigns for hygiene 
and health communication. In the summer of 2003 the outbreak was con-
tained, and China was now considered a “global hero,” in part  because of 
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the  “draconian techniques” used to control the disease.14 In the aftermath of 
the outbreak, China realigned public health institutions with international 
standards of pandemic preparedness, including reconfiguring Mao- era anti- 
epidemic stations (fangyizhan) into Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(cdcs), based on an American model.15
Although China’s public health sector was increasingly seen as a techni-
cally able and cooperative partner with global health agencies, Martin encoun-
tered a diff er ent set of challenges as he implemented the fao’s plan to control 
pandemic influenza “at source.”  Because avian flu primarily infected animals 
rather than  people, epidemic response was largely managed by the Ministry 
of Agriculture, not Health. “hpai was just like sars,” Martin complained to 
me, “but the Ministry of Agriculture  hasn’t changed.” In 2005, for example, 
the who publicly issued a request for timely and comprehensive sharing of 
virus samples, noting that “from more than 30 reported outbreaks in animals 
in 2005, no viruses have been made available so far.”16 Much like Indonesia’s 
more famous refusal to share influenza virus samples with the who, China 
continued to assert what Aihwa Ong calls its “national biosovereignty” against 
global health norms of transparency and sharing.17
The movement of experimental systems into the epicenter encountered 
the legacies of  these disputes, leading to the displacement of research  toward 
new forms of scientific communication and collaboration. “Veterinarians 
 don’t want to work with medical doctors, and Chinese scientists  don’t want to 
share viruses,” Martin complained to me in the same breath at our first meet-
ing at the Emergency Center. He described how an initial proposal to sample 
flu viruses at a lake in southern China was rejected by the ministry, requiring 
him to work for months to cultivate the right relationships with ministry of-
ficials before the proposal was eventually approved. Despite the optimism of 
the catchphrase “One World, One Health,” the world was neither unified nor 
flat: the geopolitics of territorial sovereignty still governed the pathway to the 
pandemic epicenter.
The pandemic epicenter carved out a distinctive space where scientific 
experiments intersected geopo liti cal territories, reconfiguring knowledge and 
politics around an exceptional site. On the one hand, the scientific meaning 
and value of the epicenter  were marked as global,  because the epicenter was 
considered the source of pandemics that might spread across the world. On 
the other hand, the location of the epicenter was inherently singular, a point 
of origin, and this point was located within China’s sovereign territory. The 
global urgency of pandemic preparedness could be compared to the interven-
tions of humanitarian groups, in which a planetary humanity provides an 
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ethical imperative for constituting “spaces of exception” to the sovereign rule 
of nation- states.18 However, the negotiations over access and exchange that I 
observed led me instead to consider the epicenter as a zone of “differentiated 
sovereignty,” or what Michael Fischer has called a “switching point” between 
national politics and transnational knowledge cir cuits,19 particularly when the 
objects that Martin and other scientists sought  were not as easy to isolate, ex-
tract, and transport across borders as influenza viruses.
THE NONVIROLOGICAL
Scientific and popu lar accounts of the search for the origins of emerging 
pandemics— including influenza, sars, hiv/aids, and Ebola— are typically 
narrated as epic tales of heroic virus hunters. In  these stories, eccentric and 
obsessed experts travel to remote and obscure regions of developing nations, 
particularly sites at the “fringes of the nonhuman world,” in order to sample 
viruses from wild animals, farmed livestock, or the local  people. Dressed in 
full- body hazmat suits, they enter dark bat caves or dense poultry markets, 
risk bodily contamination, extract viruses, and contain outbreaks. The chaos 
of the pandemic epicenter, where abominable mixtures give birth to danger-
ous pathogens, is contrasted with the pure and clear space of the laboratory, 
where bound aries are preserved, objective knowledge is produced, and danger 
is controlled.20
But when I followed fao scientists as they moved experimental systems 
into China in search of the origins of influenza pandemics, what I observed 
looked nothing like virus hunting. For as scientists got closer and closer to 
the hy po thet i cal influenza epicenter, the purview of their search expanded 
in a centrifugal trajectory far beyond the influenza virus to encompass the 
bodies and be hav iors of ducks, traditional techniques of duck husbandry, the 
geography of rice- paddy landscapes, wild- bird migration flyways, the socio-
economy of live- bird markets, and many other objects inscribed within the 
ever- widening circles of the ecol ogy of influenza.21 Rather than traveling to the 
epicenter in order to bring samples back to the lab, it seemed that scientists felt 
the need to turn aside and look around, tracing the circumstances and condi-
tions of viral emergence. Their search for the influenza epicenter followed a 
double movement into China and beyond the scale of the virus, during which 
research objects shifted from the molecular structure of the virus  toward wider 
zones of virulence.22
A few weeks  after our first meeting, Martin invited me to a meeting of 
a United Nations interagency working group, “One Health in China,” that 
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he had or ga nized. The meeting took place in the who China offices, also 
in Sanlitun, and included participants from China cdc, China’s State For-
estry Administration, the Red Cross, and several embassies. In his opening 
remarks, Martin made an unusual turn of phrase that caught my attention. 
As he described the global spread of the h5n1 virus from China to Southeast 
Asia, Africa, and Eu rope and decried the failure of global institutions to con-
trol the outbreak, he pointed to the importance of “nonvirological  factors” in 
the emergence of the h5n1 strain. Migrations of wildlife species, rapid popu-
lation growth, and an explosion in livestock production, he argued, played 
crucial roles in the initial appearance and subsequent spread of the new in-
fluenza virus. I was struck by this idea of the nonvirological  because the term 
implicitly indexed the predominance of virus- based research in pandemic 
preparedness. Yet the concept of the nonvirological did not substitute a dif-
fer ent causal agent in place of viruses, but outlined a relational approach to 
viral agency, a virology of the in- between.23 This concept directs scientific 
inquiry and global health intervention  toward the specific environments of 
the influenza virus or, put another way, the viral habitat. Instead of studying 
the virus in the experimentally constructed milieu of the laboratory, Martin 
highlighted the importance of understanding the  actual living environment 
of the virus in order to understand how, why, when, and where new diseases 
emerge.24
But where could this viral habitat be observed? How could the context of 
viral emergence be made into a scientific object? At our first meeting in his 
office, Martin had briefly mentioned the complex negotiations he had under-
taken in order to conduct a field research trip at a place called Poyang Lake. 
I had never heard of the lake before, and I badly misspelled the name in my 
fieldnotes. Now, in his talk, he referred to Poyang Lake again, this time as an 
example of the nonvirological  factors driving the emergence of influenza vi-
ruses. China’s largest freshwater lake, Martin explained, is both an overwinter-
ing site for hundreds of thousands of migratory birds and a large- scale duck- 
producing region. With a bucolic photo graph of white cranes landing near a 
duck farm projected  behind him, Martin argued that the extensive interface 
between wild and domestic birds at Poyang Lake could promote the transmis-
sion of avian influenza viruses across species and therefore drive the emergence 
of new, more virulent strains. I soon realized that this was not the last I would 
hear of the birds at the lake. Over the next few months, almost every one I met 
who was working on pandemic influenza in China mentioned Poyang Lake. 
“Poyang Lake is a perfect storm,” warned Scott Newman, a wildlife biologist 
specializing in the health of migratory birds.
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Martin  later told me that just as he had begun working to establish the 
Emergency Center in China, he had read an article written by “Chinese sci-
entists” that brought his attention to Poyang Lake. The main finding of the 
article reported the establishment of multiple sublineages, or substrains, of the 
h5n1 virus in southern China. In passing, though, the article also mentioned 
that the research team had isolated hpai h5n1 viruses from six “apparently 
healthy” wild birds at Poyang Lake. Linking the finding with the influenza 
epicenter hypothesis, the researchers suggested that the birds could be long- 
distance vectors transporting viruses out of China. And if wild birds  were vec-
tors radiating new influenza viruses out of China, Martin knew, Poyang Lake 
could be a pandemic epicenter.
In the spring of 2006, Martin visited China to make the case for establish-
ing an Emergency Center, and in his pre sen ta tion he “talked a lot about the 
Poyang Lake and the potential interest we had in conducting research.” By 2010, 
the Emergency Center already supported a broad range of research initiatives 
at Poyang Lake, including viral sampling, wild bird tracking, poultry surveys, 
free- grazing duck movement studies, and satellite image analy sis of land use. I 
was especially interested to hear that many of the scientists traveled to Poyang 
Lake to conduct  these studies. At the lake they captured and tagged wild birds 
with satellite transponders, counted chicken farms, and mea sured rice fields. 
They spoke of Poyang Lake as a fully developed experimental field or, as one 
ecological modeler put it, as a “geo graph i cal unit where we have a critical mass 
of data to address a question in a new way.”25 The pandemic epicenter was no 
longer the distant object or objective of a search for the origins of pandemics. It 
was also becoming the site and venue where that search was conducted. When 
the chance came, I went, too.
EMBANKMENTS AND INTERFACES
The twenty- seat bus bounced over a high levee and dipped sharply down, 
following a rough dirt road across bright green wetlands before bounding up 
another embankment and into Wucheng, a small town on a island in Poyang 
Lake. Spilling below the south bank of the Yangtze River about halfway be-
tween the Three Gorges Dam and the sea at Shanghai, Poyang Lake is China’s 
largest freshwater lake (see figure I.2). Or at least it is during the rainy season. 
In the wet, summer months, when the lake’s vast catchment area swells with 
rain and the Yangtze rises, the high river pushes  water back into the Poyang 
basin, sometimes causing dangerous floods. But in the winter, when the Yang-
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MAP I.2.  Map of Poyang Lake. I conducted most of my fieldwork in the intensive  
rice- and duck-farming counties between Nanchang and the lake. Map by Tim Stallman.
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Through  these complex hydraulics, the depth of the lake fluctuates as much as 
fifteen meters, and the surface area covered by  water during the flood doubles 
that of the dry season. The dirt road that my bus followed to cross the wet-
lands, built several years  earlier, is passable only during the dry season. In the 
wet season, Wucheng is an island.
The lake’s peculiar expansion and retraction support a distinctive ecosys-
tem. When the  water retreats in late autumn, an enormous green meadow 
slowly emerges, filled with the exposed roots of  water plants and the young 
shoots of wetland grasses. By November,  these green fields attract the eyes of 
migratory birds flying south from breeding grounds in Mongolia and Siberia. 
According to estimates, more than 350,000 birds from 105 species overwinter at 
the lake, including the critically endangered snow crane (Grus leucogeranus).26 
Since ancient times, the lake has been a famous site for poetry and landscape 
painting, often featuring images of soaring wild birds and rising mist. More 
recently, government decree designated a section of the lake as one of China’s 
first wild- bird refuges and placed the refuge headquarters— including offices, a 
museum, and a  hotel—in Wucheng.
But the lake region is also a “working landscape,” a place where centuries of 
land reclamation and irrigation works have rerouted flows of  water and farm-
ing systems have transformed ecological communities of plants and animals.27 
Some of the earliest archaeological evidence of rice cultivation in the world 
comes from sites near the lake, and integrated rice–duck farming dates back 
centuries. In the 1950s and 1960s, rural residents built enormous embankments 
during mass mobilization campaigns, reclaiming agricultural land and con-
structing new irrigation networks.28 More recently, Poyang Lake has also been 
caught up in China’s “livestock revolution,” a term introduced by fao analysts 
to describe the growth and intensification of animal production across the 
developing world. Much like the  earlier Green Revolution, modern strategies 
of technology transfer— including hybrid breeds, manufactured animal feeds, 
and phar ma ceu ti cals— have begun to disembed livestock farming from envi-
ronmental constraints, driving intensification of production and enormous 
growth in outputs.29
In both quantitative and qualitative terms, China’s livestock sector is per-
haps the most dramatic instance of revolutionary change, in part  because Chi-
na’s livestock revolution coincided with the country’s shift from a planned to 
a market economy.  After the Communist Revolution in 1949, the government 
or ga nized rural  house holds into production brigades and communes, and 
smallholder market farming more or less dis appeared. Along with rice fields, 
the commune took over the raising of draft animals and livestock, including 
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pigs and poultry.30 During po liti cal campaigns such as the Cultural Revolu-
tion, the state even “forced through reductions in the size of private plots [and] 
implemented very strict limits on the number of ducks and chicken farmers 
could raise,” according to historian Jonathan Unger.31 But in 1978, China’s po-
liti cal leadership outlined a policy of “reform and opening up” to the planned 
economy. In rural areas, collective farming was ended and the use rights for 
cultivation of land distributed to individual  house holds. The state also legal-
ized rural markets, which began to supplant the centralized state procure-
ment system. Poultry was among the first rural products opened up for  market 
trade, along with fish.32 According to fao statistics, annual production of meat 
chickens grew from around 600 million in 1970 to almost 10 billion in 2017, 
while duck production increased almost fifteenfold, from 150 million to 2.25 
 billion during the same period. China now accounts for roughly three- fourths 
of ducks produced in the entire world (see figures I.1 and I.2).33
The impact was soon felt at Poyang Lake. In the early 1980s, Jiangxi Prov-
ince designated the lake region as a “production base” for rice and commercial 
waterfowl. As villages disbanded collectively farmed land and distributed land- 
use rights to  house holds, many farmers turned to noncrop activities, such as 
fish or duck raising. From 1978 to 1998, livestock and fish farming grew from 
around 10  percent to nearly half of agricultural production in the lake region 
(by value), and this while overall farm production itself increased tenfold.34 
According to recent data collected from agricultural yearbooks,  there are more 
than fourteen million ducks raised around the lake  today— almost half as many 
as in the entire United States.35
When the bus pulled into Wucheng, I walked out of town and along one of 
the many roads that run atop the embankments. I marveled at  these twisting 
earthwork lines that separate wetlands from gridded rice fields, wild from do-
mestic space. Yet I knew that for influenza scientists,  these peaceful embank-
ments could also be understood as dangerous interfaces where wild and domes-
tic birds interact and viruses spread. As Diann Prosser, a wildlife scientist from 
the U.S. Geological Survey and an fao research collaborator, has described it, 
Poyang Lake is a “mixing bowl of  people and wildlife and birds.” When a virus 
is transmitted from wild to domestic birds, as Prosser explains, it can reassort 
or mutate and gain virulence; if the new virus is transmitted back to wild birds, 
they may “carry it thousands of miles away,” seeding a global pandemic.36
At the end of the road I found the gated entrance to the Poyang Lake Migra-
tory Bird Refuge. On my first visit to the refuge a few months  earlier, Yu, the wiry 
and gregarious army man who both ran the  hotel and led inspections against 
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out to the refuge to catch a last sight of the migratory birds before they flew 
north. This time, however, I told him I wanted to see the birds on the other side 
of the embankment: Poyang Lake’s duck farms. The next day we woke up early 
and,  after a quick breakfast in town, Yu drove the white refuge van out along the 
road back to the mainland, crossing the low passage across the lake. Reaching 
the end of the lake- bed crossing, Yu drove up the embankment and took a hard 
right so that we  were now driving along the embankment. Pointing out of the 
driver’s- side win dow, Yu explained that the refuge’s core zone was on our right, 
where only scientific and touristic activities are allowed, and wetlands stretched 
as far as the eye could see. On the left of the embankment a checkerboard of rice 
fields and small homes indicated a nearby village within the Experimental Zone, 
where some economic and production activities could take place.
As we followed the embankment around, a flock of white farmed ducks ap-
peared in a patch of  water to our right, swimming inside the boundary of the 
protected core zone. Immediately ahead of us, I saw two small tents perched 
on the embankment, and Yu  stopped the van so we could get out. Inside one 
of the tents, on a small raised platform, sat Tang, who greeted us and joined us 
in the shade of the van to chat. Tang explained he was not the boss who owns 
 these ducks, but a hired technician. The boss, Tang said, had bought about five 
thousand ducklings, but something like five hundred or more had died from 
disease. Lacking experience and knowledge of duck diseases, he had hired Tang 
to take care of the birds. On that par tic u lar day, Tang had sent the boss into 
Nanchang, the provincial capital, to buy medicines.
Tang told me he had raised ducks for over thirty years, first in his home 
province of Anhui and then in Jiangxi, where he moved when he was twenty- 
two. I asked him about what had changed about duck raising over the past 
three de cades. He said the biggest change is that back then  there  weren’t so 
many diseases. Nowadays you  really have to raise the birds well, or  else they 
 will get sick and die. The prob lem is pollution. The challenge is that  there’s no 
space for duck raising.
Indeed, throughout the Poyang Lake region, the density of duck raising is 
remarkable. In some villages, nearly  every  house hold has a duck shed. As one 
farmer explained, raising ducks in this lowland area is entirely traditional: “My 
 father raised ducks; my grand father raised ducks.” Yet since the 1980s the scale 
had changed, he added: rather than ten or at most one hundred birds,  today 
each  house hold raises one thousand, two thousand, or as many as ten thousand 
ducks. Moreover, the sheds are often clustered around a common  water body 
or along a roadside canal, together creating an even greater scale and density 
(see figure I.3).
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China’s livestock revolution created enormous growth in animal produc-
tion but also brought new risks.37 On the one hand, the increasing quantity 
and density of animal populations created new opportunities for disease emer-
gence and transmission, leading to widespread outbreaks of porcine repro-
ductive and respiratory syndrome, brucellosis in  cattle, and both Newcastle 
disease and influenza in poultry. On the other, market saturation, increasing 
cost of inputs, and the industrial restructuring of poultry production intensi-
fied market- based uncertainties for farmers, contributing to the growing strug-
gles that in China are referred to as the “three rural issues”: an interrelated 
and multifaceted crisis of countryside, agriculture, and peasantry. Afflicted by 
flock infections and fluctuating markets, some farmers have abandoned duck 
raising, leaving empty, ruined sheds  behind.  Others, like Tang and his boss, 
have sought out open space, less polluted and at or beyond the very margins 
of  legal land use, including the farming of ducks in the wild wetlands of the 
refuge.
Faced with new uncertainties, farmers are innovating coping strategies, in-
cluding the use of phar ma ceu ti cals, relocation of farm sites, and the husbandry 
of new breeds. As a result, just as scientists moved experimental systems to 
Poyang Lake and began studying how the “interface” of wild and domestic 
FIGURE I.3.  Duck sheds near pond.
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drove the emergence of new flu viruses, farmers  were busily reconfiguring the 
relationships between wild and domestic birds. The interface, one might say, 
as much as the disease, was emerging. As scientists reckoned with  these un-
expected changes to their research objects, epistemological assumptions  were 
put in motion, experimental systems  were adjusted, and norms of scientific 
practice  were modified: a pro cess that I call scientific displacement.
SCIENTIF IC DISPLACEMENTS
By describing the movement into the epicenter as a pro cess of displace-
ment, I am extending a spatial meta phor developed in historical and anthro-
pological studies of scientific practice. The concept of displacement has been 
used to describe the unique trajectory of scientific knowledge production and 
its transformative effects, and in par tic u lar the ways that scientific practice 
makes new knowledge. As Hans- Jörg Rheinberger explains, experimental sys-
tems are characterized by an “economy of epistemic displacement, such that 
every thing intended as a mere substitution or addition within the confines of a 
system  will reconfigure that very system.” The production of scientific knowl-
edge is neither a pro cess of discovery, unveiling something that is waiting 
“out  there,” nor a pro cess of architectural design in which scientists construct 
their results according to plan. Rather, scientists create experimental systems 
that produce “surprises.” Experimental systems, Rheinberger argues, produce 
“unpre ce dented events” that, although made to happen, also “commit experi-
ments to completely changing the direction of their research objects.”38
Bruno Latour extends the idea of scientific displacement across a broader 
anthropological scale. For Latour, displacement is a synonym for meta phor or 
translation: “the creation of a link that did not exist before and that to some 
degree modifies two ele ments or agents.”39 For example, Latour shows how 
French bacteriologist Louis Pasteur’s vaccine for anthrax disease relied on “the 
displacement of the laboratory” into  actual  cattle farms, where he conducted 
field experiments and tests, and then the subsequent “transform[ation] of the 
farm back into the guise of a laboratory.”40 Successful scientific practice “dis-
places” or redirects the interests of other actors so that scientific research ob-
jectives gain the support of power ful allies.41 Laboratories create displacements 
through mastery of scale, as when Pasteur re- creates a  cattle farm in miniature 
inside his lab in order to make microbes vis i ble. In the end the movement of the 
world through the lab changes the world as well.  After Pasteur’s demonstration 
of the microbial cause of disease, for instance, all sorts of prob lems, from medi-
cal practice to urban planning to military strategy, become microbial prob lems: 
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“French society . . .  has been transformed through the displacements of a few 
laboratories.”42
The concept of scientific displacement has been developed primarily based 
on historical and ethnographic studies of laboratories, prominently includ-
ing  those of Rheinberger and Latour.43 The choice of laboratories as sites for 
conducting ethnographic and historical “micro- studies” of scientific practice 
was in part strategic,  because laboratories offered contained spaces where sci-
entific practice and pro cess are readily observable. However, as Karin Knorr- 
Cetina points out, the laboratory also came to carry a certain “weight” as a key 
“theoretical notion in our understanding of science.” The laboratory came to 
be understood as “itself an impor tant agent of scientific development”  because 
laboratory displacement enabled observers to explain “the success of science” 
in terms of everyday practices, rather than theory- driven change or individual 
discovery.44 As a result, the model of laboratory practice has subsequently been 
extended far beyond the “site which  houses experiments.”45 In this view, science 
undertaken in other settings, such as farms and fields, requires the displace-
ment of natu ral objects onto a controlled or purified site that allows for the “re-
production of favourable laboratory practices.”46 As Latour puts the point most 
forcefully, “For the world to become knowable, it must become a laboratory.”47
As I followed the movement of experimental systems into the pandemic 
epicenter, however, I began to see the contours of another trajectory of sci-
entific displacement that did not begin and end in the laboratory. Julien Cap-
pelle, a gradu ate student working with the fao Emergency Center on spatial 
ecol ogy models, recalled to me his first visit to Poyang Lake:
The scale was crazy. I mean it was huge, the productivity of the area; the 
rice, it was, you know, trucks loaded with rice coming from the paddy 
fields, and in the other way it was trucks loaded with fertilizers and pesti-
cides at a crazy scale. The domestic birds, poultry, it was crazy also; it was 
like thousands of them  every five hundred meters. I’ve never seen some-
thing like that before. What was another  thing that was  really striking, was, 
I think it was a farmer that we discussed with, and,  because  after a while 
of driving  there we saw ducks ducks ducks ducks ducks but no chicken. 
Which is  really surprising  because usually you see chicken a lot and ducks 
less often, and they told us that, uh,  there  were no more chicken  because 
when you put chicken outside they die. So  you’re just like, wow, so  there’s 
rice everywhere, ducks everywhere, and virus everywhere.
Again and again, when scientists arrived at Poyang Lake, the assumptions 
under lying their experimental systems  were displaced. Scientists quickly 
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recognized that their research objects  were also objects of other forms of prac-
tice. Farmers  were experimenting, too, and at scales that outstripped models or 
experience. In the laboratory, displacements are “made to happen” by the con-
trolled practices of scientific researchers. But at Poyang Lake, poultry farmers 
reproduced and changed the objects of scientific research, displacing scientific 
inquiry into new directions. “Unlike laboratories,” historians Henrika Kuklick 
and Robert Kohler note, “natu ral sites can never be exclusively scientific do-
mains.”48 The “tracks” that scientists follow in the field are laid in advance, as 
Cori Hayden puts it, well- worn and “ever- deepening,” by the historical and 
cultural legacies embedded in the landscape.49 Latour has written that in order 
to produce scientific facts, researchers should extend their laboratory systems 
to farms and fields, and make sure not to abandon the protocols of laboratory 
practice: “never go outside” is the mantra. But at Poyang Lake, it was only 
when scientists left the lab, looked around, and listened to farmers that they 
 were truly surprised.
At stake is not only a diff er ent trajectory of scientific change but also a dif-
fer ent account of the scientific subject and scientific agency. Displacement is 
si mul ta neously a spatial and a social pro cess.  There is an intimate connection 
between the trajectory of laboratory displacement— a trajectory that Knorr- 
Cetina specifies as “the detachment of objects from a natu ral environment and 
their installation in a new phenomenal field defined by social agents”— and the 
detachment of scientific experts from broader society.50 In Latour’s account of 
Pasteur’s bacteriology, for instance, the displacement of the microbe from the 
farm to the lab produced a twofold “reversal of strength”: “The change of scale 
makes pos si ble a reversal of the actors’ strengths; ‘outside’ animals, farmers and 
veterinarians  were weaker than the invisible anthrax bacillus; inside Pasteur’s 
lab, man becomes stronger than the bacillus, and as a corollary, the scientist in 
his lab gets the edge over the local, devoted, experienced veterinarian.”51 When 
laboratories extract objects from the environment, they also construct scien-
tists as objective observers of nature. Amateurs, laypeople, and prac ti tion ers 
like farmers or veterinarians are all subordinated to the authority of laboratory 
expertise.
By highlighting the movement into the pandemic epicenter, rather than the 
detachment of objects and their circulation back to the lab, this book charts a 
distinct trajectory of displacement to both scientific objects and scientific sub-
jects.52 As scientists turned from the virus to the nonvirological and attempted 
to turn the context of influenza viruses into a research object, their inquiry 
was repeatedly displaced by their encounters with the artifacts of  human prac-
tices. Rather than constituting researchers as “scientific entrepreneur- generals 
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[who] go about waging war to conquer and discipline new allies,”53 winning 
carefully staged  battles over farmers or local veterinarians through the mastery 
of scale, the pathway into the epicenter forced scientists to build new connec-
tions to the nonexperts that inhabit the research site. In a partial reversal of 
Latour’s reversal of strength, the experts realized how much they needed to 
learn from  those outside of the lab. Not least from farmers and their devoted 
veterinarians.
 AFTER THE EPICENTER
To guide the reader along this pathway into the epicenter, the book is 
divided into three parts. Each part highlights one layer or strata of the pan-
demic epicenter, one dimension of the site that  causes displacements to the 
trajectory of global health intervention.54 Part I, “Ecol ogy,” draws on archival 
research at the who in Geneva and interviews to explain the initial movement 
of pandemic influenza research into the hy po thet i cal epicenter.  After show-
ing how laboratory research on viruses played a crucial role in constructing 
the influenza epicenter hypothesis, I then trace how the current outbreak led 
to the epistemological displacement of influenza research from virological to 
ecological disciplines, and follow its spatial displacement from laboratories in 
Rome or Atlanta to the farms and fields of places like China’s Poyang Lake. 
Within a virological frame, the search for the origins of pandemics had in-
volved a “condensation” of the pandemic threat into a microscopic pathogen. 
Much like modern biology’s treatment of the gene as a metonym for life itself, 
“the part became the  whole.” By contrast, the search for the nonvirological en-
vironments that produce pandemic viruses drove an expansion in the scale of 
research objects as scientists sought to understand the “complex systems” from 
which the virus had previously been “extracted as one tiny part.”55
However, as Cappelle’s shock upon arrival at Poyang Lake makes clear,  these 
contexts expanded in unexpected directions, drawing researchers to question 
the social, cultural, and po liti cal circumstances that shape the ecol ogy of in-
fluenza. In the subsequent two parts I show how the scientific movement into 
the pandemic epicenter encountered displacements produced by two diff er-
ent layers of social and po liti cal circumstances. Part II, “Landscape,” focuses 
on the encounters of scientific models and experimental systems with the his-
torical and cultural practice of farm production.  These “working landscapes,” 
I argue, continually make and remake the physical environments and inter-
species ecologies of the pandemic epicenter. In this part I draw on fieldwork 
that I conducted with both fao- affiliated scientists and poultry farmers in the 
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Poyang Lake region in order to juxtapose the micro- practices of fact construc-
tion with the practical configurations of human– environment interaction. Fi-
nally, part III, “Territory,” examines the intersection of global health proj ects 
with China’s investments in “biosovereignty,” charting how research into the 
epicenter intersects with national claims over biological resources, agricultural 
development programs, and state- led veterinary reform. I explore how fao of-
ficers and researchers negotiated with Chinese counter parts to access research 
sites, virus samples, and information, and I examine how the fao’s efforts to 
build epidemic response capacity in China’s veterinary sector intersected, in 
unexpected ways, with ongoing post- Mao transformations in the vocation of 
state- employed veterinarians.
Of necessity, I  adopted something like a “multisited” research approach in 
order to follow the movement of global health into the epicenter. Although 
Poyang Lake is a central orienting site for both the influenza researchers and 
myself, other sites such as the Emergency Center in Beijing  were equally 
impor tant in my fieldwork, not to mention the globally distributed locations— 
Geneva, Rome, London, Hong Kong— that I explored through archival ma-
terials. Furthermore, the pandemic epicenter should not be understood as a 
“local” site confronted by the “global” interventions of international agencies 
and plans for pandemic preparedness. Rather, the pandemic epicenter is both 
global and singular, and is stratified by layers of significance that embody dif-
fer ent qualities but also cover diff er ent spatial scales: ecosystems, regional 
landscapes, and po liti cal territories. As a result, the book is not a documenta-
tion of any site or sites, per se, but an account of a journey in search of the epi-
center.56 I examine how the objects of global knowledge become the situated 
contexts in which knowledge is produced, leading to the emergence of new 
forms of scientific ethos, livestock production, and po liti cal exchange.57
During this passage I explore both sides of the doubled relationship be-
tween scientific practice and the pandemic epicenter. On the one hand, I docu-
ment the scientific practices that have made and remade the hypothesis that 
China is the epicenter of influenza pandemics. On the other, I explore how 
the hypothesis of the pandemic epicenter produced a displacement in scien-
tific practices by drawing experimental systems into the epicenter and onto 
the farms and fields of rural working landscapes. Anthropologists and other 
scholars have recently suggested that scientific and journalistic identifications 
of China as a pandemic epicenter map a “geography of blame” in which “tradi-
tional ecologies, economies and socie ties figure as ‘natu ral reservoirs’ of deadly 
viruses.”58 As Arthur Kleinman and colleagues put it, “Global discourses re-
garding the origin and spread of h5n1 avian influenza all too often consist of 
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allegations of blame and assumptions of cultural shortcoming rather than of 
serious investigations of the po liti cal, cultural and socio- economic realities of 
the socie ties that have come to be associated with the virus.”59 In this book I 
investigate China’s pandemic epicenter by tacking between sites (Beijing and 
Poyang Lake) and points of view (fao livestock specialist, state- employed offi-
cial veterinarian, duck farmer,  etc.) to document the complex interplay among 
science, blame, politics, socio economics, and culture. However, my primary 
goal is not to provide a better account of the real contexts of the hy po thet i cal 
epicenter but to follow how scientists and their experimental systems turned 
 these contexts into objects of inquiry. Ultimately, I suggest, only by following 
scientists and experimental systems in their search for the pandemic epicen-
ter can we hope to reconstruct the constantly reiterated claims that China 
is “ground zero” for influenza pandemics. In  doing so we may also articulate 
a diff er ent understanding of scientific knowledge and expert authority along 
the way.
PA R T  I
E C O L  O G Y

C H A P T E R   O N E
T H E  O R I G I N S  O F  PA N D E M I C S
Influenza is the paradigm of a pandemic disease, an original exemplar. Before 
the nineteenth  century, the term pandemic, meaning “all  people,” rarely referred 
to diseases of any sort. Instead, it most often appeared as a critical description 
of social mores deemed vulgar and common. As Mark Harrison points out, the 
modern concept of pandemic disease took shape when both medical and lay ob-
servers followed the spread of the so- called Rus sian flu around the world during 
the years 1889–91.1 During the Rus sian flu, news correspondents telegraphed re-
ports that helped readers— and health officials—to track the spread of influenza 
outbreaks from the Caucasus and Rus sia to Western Eu rope, and then around 
the world to colonial outposts in Africa, India, Singapore, and Shanghai the fol-
lowing year.2 “This influenza epidemic,” wrote Ditmar Finkler, a German physi-
cian who experienced the Rus sian flu firsthand, “broke forth from the East, and 
overwhelmed the world in a pandemic such as had never before been seen. The 
high flood of the pandemic flowed over the  whole globe in the space of a few 
months.”3
Telegraph reports, part of what Harrison calls an “emerging global public 
sphere” constituted by “new technologies of communication and transporta-
tion,” made the global scale of the outbreak apparent, enabling observers to 
distinguish an influenza pandemic from regional epidemics. As a result, the 
concept of pandemic disease became configured at a global scale, grounded in 
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the emergence of the planet as an object and dimension of knowledge.4 The 
search for the geographic origins of flu pandemics was one perhaps unexpected 
consequence of this global frame.
How does a disease become vis i ble at the scale of the planet rather than 
the diseased body or the pathogenic virus? Phi los o phers have emphasized a 
change of perspective at the core of modern globalism, a view from above that 
allows one to “take an arbitrary position in the external space from which to 
approach the Earth like a visitor from a foreign planet.”5 However, as the use 
of telegraphic communication and mapmaking during the Rus sian flu makes 
clear, the planet became a unified, knowable unit only through the mundane 
spread of standardized infrastructures for observation, mea sure ment, and 
communication— what Paul N. Edwards has called “infrastructural global-
ism.”6 Although historians may speak of the unification of the globe by disease 
as early as the fifteenth  century  because of worldwide movements of trade and 
troops,  these pandemics did not become objects of knowledge  until infrastruc-
tures of rapid communication made the global movement of outbreaks observ-
able several centuries  later.7
Attending to infrastructural globalism is helpful, as Edwards demonstrates, 
 because it reveals how the forms of planetary knowledge change along with de-
velopments in technical infrastructure. Initially, observation of flu pandemics 
depended on the nineteenth- century extension of colonial outposts, including 
telegraph lines and shipping routes. By the mid- twentieth  century, however, 
a new form of infrastructural globalism would transform the planetary per-
spective on pandemics: the microbiological laboratory. Andrew Cunningham 
has described the birth of bacteriological research at the turn of the twentieth 
 century as a “laboratory revolution” that transformed the clinical identity of 
disease.8 But in the case of influenza, laboratory transformations took place 
not at the clinical scale, where patients are diagnosed with a specific disease, 
but at the planetary scale of the flu pandemic. The isolation and classification 
of the influenza virus in the laboratory changed how observers tracked the flu, 
and the flu pandemic, across the globe.9
Although several laboratory researchers claimed to have discovered a bac-
terium responsible for influenza during or  after the 1889–90 Rus sian flu, the 
devastating 1918–19 pandemic “revealed the limits of laboratory medicine” 
when no known agent could be consistently linked with cases of disease.  After 
1918, influenza even became a key model for rethinking epidemics in terms of 
host  factors and environmental conditions of disease.10 At the same time, the 
crisis also led to a renewed search for the causal agent, but one that increas-
ingly turned away from bacteria  toward the still poorly known, and at the time 
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microscopically invisible, “filter- passing viruses.”11 The term refers to agents 
that  were so small that they could pass through a Berkefeld  water filter de-
signed to strain out bacteria. They could not be seen with light microscopes or 
studied with bacterial culture methods.12 If a solution that passed through the 
filter still caused disease in an animal model, the researcher could presume that 
a virus, rather than bacteria, caused the infection.13 During the early 1930s, re-
searchers at the British National Institute of Medical Research fi nally isolated 
a filter passer that they described as the “influenza virus,” producing “a new 
classification of ‘epidemic influenza’ as a virus disease.”14
However, this new viral identity of influenza changed  little about the 
clinical diagnosis of the disease or its medical treatment, which remained 
“symptom- based.”15 Instead, the laboratory identification of the influenza virus 
hastened the transformation of the epidemiological identity of the influenza 
pandemic. In this chapter I chart three key episodes in the laboratory transfor-
mation of the influenza pandemic across the twentieth  century. In each case, 
laboratory research on viruses changed how scientists understood the form, 
scale, and origins of the global pandemic. As the World Health Organ ization 
incorporated the results of virus research into a “worldwide” influenza surveil-
lance system, I show how China came into view as the probable origin of influ-
enza pandemics— both geo graph i cal source and ecological reservoir—or what 
eventually would be called the influenza epicenter.
VA RI  E  T IES OF INFLUENZA
The discovery of the influenza virus created a new laboratory research ob-
ject, one that quickly attracted a large number of investigators. During the 
1930s and 1940s, most research on influenza was driven by the hope to produce 
a vaccine, particularly during World War II. The devastating impact of the 1918 
flu pandemic, although perhaps “forgotten” by the wider public, was  etched 
in the memory of military leaders.16 According to historian John Eyler, “The 
development and testing of vaccines against influenza was one of the most 
impor tant sources of information in  these de cades about the flu virus.”17 The 
transformation of the epidemiological identity of the flu pandemic directly fol-
lowed from  these vaccine research programs but did so  because of serendipity 
and failure rather than achievement of planned objectives.
In 1941, as biologist George Hirst routinely injected virus into an egg in 
the pro cess of vaccine production, he made an accidental discovery. When 
influenza- infected allantoic fluid (the egg “white”) was mixed with chick blood 
contained in the embryo, the blood cells clotted and clumped together, an ef-
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fect known as hemagglutination.18  After he was able to repeat the effect in a test 
tube, Hirst argued that hemagglutination could be an effective diagnostic test 
for the presence of influenza virus in a sample.19 Even more power ful, however, 
was a second, related finding: in  later experiments, Hirst showed that when 
blood serum taken from an organism previously infected with influenza— what 
was known as antiserum— was added to the mixture of allantoic fluid and chick 
blood in the test tube, the blood no longer clotted. The antiserum, in other 
words, inhibited hemagglutination. Such a serological method could provide 
a useful test for identifying  whether patients had been infected with the in-
fluenza virus: results could be obtained cheaply and within hours, without 
requiring the painstaking isolation of viruses. However, Hirst’s research also 
raised some new questions. In subsequent experiments, Hirst found that for 
any par tic u lar influenza virus sample,  there  were some antisera that did not in-
hibit the hemagglutination pro cess. In  those cases the chick blood still formed 
into clumps. What explained this variability? And was it significant? Part of 
the answer would come several years  later in the aftermath of a devastating 
vaccine failure.
In 1943 the U.S. Army Epidemiological Board Commission on Influenza, 
led by Thomas Francis, conducted a large vaccine field trial involving 12,500 
students. With evidence that it was working, the vaccine was used on soldiers 
in 1945, again with impressive results. In 1947 the commission distributed the 
vaccine once again for use in both soldiers and civilians, but this time observed 
a wholly unexpected result: the vaccine provided no protection at all. More-
over, virus strains isolated from sick patients showed no cross- reactivity of an-
tibodies with sera from strains isolated in previous years. Francis and other re-
searchers suggested that the epidemic was caused by a new strain of influenza 
a, significantly diff er ent from previous strains, which they called a- Prime.20
 After the vaccine failure of 1947, Hirst’s hemagglutination inhibition assay 
took on a new importance. If the influenza virus experienced meaningful anti-
genic variation, then Hirst’s hi assay provided an elegant method for mea sur-
ing this variation. First, the assay allows a researcher to classify two or more 
influenza viruses in terms of their antigenic relatedness. Compared with other 
cross- neutralization studies, the hi assay increased the ease and precision with 
which viruses could be compared. Put simply, if the antisera blocked the viral 
effect of clumped blood cells, the test revealed an antigenic relation; if it did 
not, then the virus being tested was antigenically distinct. In time, the  great 
number of distinct viruses identified would lead to new nomenclature as the 
classification of viruses according to hemagglutinin standards (e.g., h1, h5) was 
added to the classification by type a, b, and c.
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Second, the hi assay also mapped  these distinctions onto the terrain of pub-
lic health and epidemiology.  Because the assay uses immunological pro cesses 
to classify viruses, the results give researchers an indication of the potential 
public health threat of a sample. In par tic u lar, the inability of any existing an-
tisera to recognize and destroy a virus sample suggests that the sample might 
evade immune systems and infect a large proportion of the population. Looked 
at from this point of view, one could say that the hi assay is an assessment not 
of the class of a virus but of the vulnerability of a population.
The vaccine failure transposed the epidemiological difference between 
epidemic and pandemic onto the antigenic differences among viruses.21 If a 
par tic u lar influenza virus resists the destructive effect of existing antisera, 
the virus could be defined as “new” in relation to the immunological history 
of the  human population. Even before a virus spread very far, its potential to 
cause a  future pandemic could be identified. As Australian animal pathologist 
William Ian Beveridge pointed out, the definition of a pandemic is thereby 
transformed. “Although the word ‘pandemic’ means literally just a widespread 
epidemic,” Beveridge  later wrote in 1978, “it has come to have a special con-
notation when applied to influenza: a world- wide epidemic caused by a new 
subtype of influenza a virus.”22 Defined in terms of viral novelty, this new con-
ception of pandemic changed the infrastructure of the planetary perspective: 
 after 1947, the pandemic potential of a virus could be observed inside a single 
laboratory.
ASSAYS OF WORLD HEALTH
 After World War II, the newly established World Health Organ ization 
(who) placed this laboratory definition of pandemics at the foundation of a 
proposed worldwide influenza- surveillance program. At a July 1947 informal 
meeting in Copenhagen, microbiologists from fourteen countries and a rep-
resentative from the who agreed that the antigenic variation of influenza 
created a prob lem that transcended national borders. In theory, a “new” virus 
emerging in one part of the world could cause a pandemic that threatened the 
entire planet. For this reason, the prevention and control of influenza had to 
be international in scope.23
For the who, surveillance for pandemic flu was one route  toward the tech-
nical actualization of a moral vision for “world health.”24 When the Interim 
Commission of the who held its fourth meeting in August 1947 to draft a con-
stitution for the incipient organ ization, one of its first decisions called for the 
foundation of a “world influenza centre.” At the center of the plan was the goal 
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of vaccine development and the prob lem of influenza variation. As a note by 
C. H. Andrewes included in the 1947 minutes explains,
One might perhaps hope to isolate a strain from the beginning of an epi-
demic, adapt it to growth in fertile eggs and produce a vaccine in time to 
be of use before the epidemic is over. In practice,  there is not nearly enough 
time to do this within one country. But if it could be shown that a new— 
and especially lethal— strain was spreading from country to country, the 
vaccine might be produced in time to protect countries yet unattacked. 
The above arguments seem to show that many prob lems concerning in-
fluenza can only be solved by international collaboration, such as could be 
fostered by the World Health Organ ization.25
The World Influenza Center (wic) initially borrowed space from the British 
National Institute for Medical Research and appointed Andrewes as director. 
In the early years the grandiose name belied the fact that the center consisted 
of “a  couple of laboratory rooms and some animal quarters,” as Director of the 
Veterinary Division M. M. Kaplan put it.26 The key to the wic’s potential abil-
ity to provide warning of the next flu pandemic lay not merely in this  humble 
campus, however, but in the international network of laboratories that would 
isolate and submit viral samples to London: “The Expert Committee envis-
aged that, by cooperating with an international network of laboratories, who 
could advise member states regarding control of influenza. who could also 
coordinate surveillance on the appearance and spread of influenza in order to 
accurately forecast the time and place of influenza epidemics.”27
In most member states, laboratories  were equipped with technical equip-
ment sufficient to make a “serological diagnosis as between Influenza a and b, 
isolating a virus in eggs and drying it off to send to the centre,” while at the cen-
tre and perhaps a few regional laboratories studies of antigenic variation would 
be conducted.28 As Michael Bresalier has argued, the key to this international 
network was the extension of laboratory equipment and standard protocols to 
the member states.29 Andrewes himself stressed that participating laboratories 
“would have to agree to use common techniques.”30 The who’s A. M. Payne 
agreed that “epidemiological reports can be correctly interpreted only in terms 
of laboratory studies of the viruses responsible.”31 The United States soon lob-
bied to have a central reference laboratory of equal status with London in 
Bethesda, Mary land. By 1953, the two “who influenza centers” stood at the 
apex of an international network involving fifty- four laboratories in forty- two 
nations and maintained formal or informal contacts with several additional 
labs in Eastern Eu rope and the Soviet Union.32
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The World Influenza Programme (wip) therefore superimposed two forms 
of the “globe” in its surveillance of pandemic flu. On the one hand, at the cen-
tral reference laboratories in London and Bethesda, the potential planetary 
scale of an influenza pandemic was now rendered in an antigenic difference 
between viruses vis i ble at a microbiological scale. In a sense, a single laboratory 
equipped with the proper reagents could identify a “new” antigenic variant 
that would likely cause a global pandemic. On the other hand, a worldwide 
network of laboratories, using standard laboratory protocols to collect sam-
ples, tracked the appearance and distribution of influenza viruses across the 
 actual surface of the planet.
 These two global perspectives did not simply mirror each other. That is to 
say, the global coverage of the surveillance network was not only a mechanism 
for verifying the  actual global spread of a new virus variant. Rather, the two 
modes of planetary observation played against each other to construct a nar-
rative of how pandemics appeared, spread, and dis appeared. In an interview, 
Andrewes described how he  imagined the wip would work: “When  we’re able 
to trace  these movements [of the virus], and particularly the movements of 
par tic u lar va ri e ties of influenza, we are in a position to warn countries just 
what the virus is like, when it is likely to get  there, and what kind of vaccine 
they should have ready.”33 Soon the wip’s work of tracing the movement and 
variation of the virus raised questions that exceeded the frame of vaccine devel-
opment. The 1957 flu pandemic, the first to take place  after the establishment 
of the World Influenza Programme, shows how the wip’s binocular planetary 
perspective gave birth to a dramatic new hypothesis: China could be the source 
of pandemic influenza viruses.
ASIAN INFLUENZA
On May 5, 1957, a who representative in Singapore sent a tele gram to 
London reporting a large outbreak of influenza in the tropical city:
extensive outbreak influenza singapore stop not notifiable 
definite statistics unknown stop strains isolated  will forward 
world centre34
A team of researchers based at the University of Malaya in Singapore isolated 
a type a influenza virus but could not provide more detailed analy sis based on 
the level of their equipment. They sent samples to the who Influenza Center 
in London.35 The London researchers subsequently identified a “new variant 
of type a.” On May 24 the who sent a memo to all influenza centers in the 
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network: “The virus isolated in Malaya is evidently a new variant of type a dif-
fering in several re spects from recently isolated strains. . . .  Although this is not 
certain it appears to be so diff er ent from previous strains that existing vaccines 
would prob ably not give protection. It is therefore being distributed to vaccine 
manufacturing firms as well as Influenza Centres.”36
Thus, by late May, although the virus was still confined to the Western 
Pacific, the who had already identified a “new variant”— soon referred to as 
the a2 or Asian variant— that it expected might cause a global flu pandemic. 
In the weeks and months that followed, the who continued to collect and 
collate reports of epidemics taking place around the world.37  After the out-
break was “notified to the  whole world,” a who Bulletin  later noted, “health 
ser vices  were on the alert everywhere. It was carefully followed as it spread 
across the world, and in some countries its arrival was even predicted and 
awaited.”38 Surveillance of the 1957 pandemic thereby linked identification of 
a novel virus with observation of that virus as it spread across the planet. As a 
result, monitoring the pandemic in pro gress inscribed a heterogeneous plan-
etary geography through which the location of appearance and the temporal 
spread of a pandemic could be mapped. The who named the 1957 pandemic 
the “Asian Influenza Pandemic”  because the World Influenza Program’s labo-
ratory surveillance network detected the novel variant in Asia and was then 
able to follow the virus as it spread through populations elsewhere in the world 
(see figure I.1).
However, the 1957 pandemic also exposed major gaps in the wip labora-
tory network. The most crucial of  these gaps appeared in the probable source 
of the virus itself: China. China had been a founding member of the who in 
1947, at the time  under the rule of the Republic of China (ROC). Indeed, China 
was given the honor of being the first signatory of the un Charter. But  after 
the Communist Party took power in Beijing and the nationalist government 
retreated to Taiwan, the United Nations recognized only the Taiwan- based 
Republic of China. This policy was also followed by all of the un agencies, in-
cluding the who and the fao. The rest of the mainland, ruled by the  People’s 
Republic of China, was unable to participate in who activities, including the 
World Influenza Program.39 Although the exclusion of mainland Communist 
China from the un had roots in cold war geopolitics, the situation was actu-
ally far more historically par tic u lar. The Soviet Union and several Communist- 
ruled Eastern Bloc countries  were members of the un and worked closely with 
un agencies such as the who.40 As A. M. Payne put it, “The 1957 pandemic of 
influenza is the first that it has been pos si ble to study using modern virological 
techniques in an almost world- wide network of laboratories which had been 
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or ga nized by the World Health Organ ization with just such an eventuality in 
mind. It was almost ironical therefore that the epidemic should originate in an 
area not covered by the programme.”41
The irony of Communist China’s exclusion from the who is even greater 
than Payne makes it out to be, however, for the who missed much more than 
epidemiological reports of outbreaks or virus samples. Indeed, one could per-
haps describe Chinese laboratories at this time as an alternate “world center” 
of influenza research. Chinese scientists, led by microbiologist Zhu Jiming 
(Chu Chi- Ming), isolated the influenza a virus and in de pen dently identified 
the strain as a novel variant in March, at least two months prior to the who’s 
May 24 announcement. Born in Jiangsu, China, in 1917, Zhu completed a PhD 
at Cambridge University and was a key research fellow working with C. H. 
Andrewes at the National Institute of Medical Research’s World Influenza 
Centre between its founding in 1948 and 1950.  After the unification of China 
 under the Communist- led  People’s Republic, Zhu— who had several friends in 
China’s Demo cratic League, a moderate center- left party that eventually allied 
with the Communists— de cided to return to his home country. He was first 
assigned to the Central Biological Products Research Institute in Beijing and 
 later to the Changchun Biological Products Research Institute.42
In Changchun, Zhu soon had an opportunity to continue his research on 
influenza. In March 1957 he and his colleagues identified an outbreak of influ-
enza in the city and quickly isolated several viruses. The height of the epidemic 
arrived in mid- March, and by early April the number of cases  was declining. 
Epidemiological evidence showed that the outbreak was extremely widespread, 
affecting all age groups more or less evenly, suggesting that “the population 
lacked immunity to the circulating virus.” The team isolated thirty- two viruses 
from patients and found a remarkable 94  percent of the samples positive for 
influenza. Then, using the same techniques that he had used at London’s wic, 
Zhu compared  these viruses with other flu viruses isolated across China and 
the world in previous years.  These studies demonstrated that “although the 
viruses isolated in Changchun  were still ‘a’ type viruses, the viruses  were anti-
genically distinct from all other ‘a’ viruses included ‘swine type’ (猪型), ‘origi-
nal a- type’ (原甲型), [and] ‘a- Prime type’ (亚甲型).” In serological studies, Zhu 
and his lab “could not see any relations whatsoever between the new viruses 
and previous A type viruses.” This was, Zhu argued, the most significant varia-
tion seen in the influenza virus since the 1946 a- Prime pandemic.43
In December 1957 Zhu submitted an English- language report of this re-
search to a medical journal published in Soviet- bloc Czecho slo va kia. This re-
port reiterates that the strains isolated in China between March and April 1957 
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are “antigenically distinct in the hemagglutination inhibition test, from swine, 
classical- a and a- prime viruses.” Zhu adds that his laboratory was also able to 
compare  these Chinese flu strains with  those isolated in Singapore (a/Singa-
pore-1/1957), the Netherlands, and the USSR in May or  later and demonstrated 
that they are “antigenically similar.”44 Zhu concludes that “the 1957 epidemic 
was caused by a new variant of a virus to which the population possessed  little 
immunity” and must have “originated from one locality and spread along com-
munication lines with  human movement.” He then raises a fundamental ques-
tion: “Was it imported or did it rather originate in China?”45
Zhu based his answer on the results of routine influenza surveillance ongo-
ing in China in previous years, which he compared with data published by the 
who. During the winter of 1956–57, large outbreaks of influenza  were reported 
across China, and laboratories in Beijing, Loyang (Luoyang), and Changchun 
isolated the older a- Prime virus from patients. But then, in the spring of 1957, 
“When the large epidemic swept across China in March– April, all strains iso-
lated and so far studied appeared to be of the new variant type.” Drawing from 
who reports, Zhu then tracked outbreaks of the new strain into Hong Kong 
in mid- April, Taiwan, Singapore, and Southeast Asia, then Australia and South 
Asia at the end of May, before the new flu virus fi nally reached Eu rope and the 
United States in early June. Zhu concluded that “an epidemic caused by a new 
variant of influenza a virus apparently commenced in China and spread via 
Hong Kong to Southeast Asia, Japan, and the rest of the world.”
Perhaps equally impor tant, Zhu recognized that identifying China as 
the source was not the end of the inquiry but rather raised crucial new ques-
tions about the origin of influenza pandemics. As he explains, “ There is rea-
son to suspect that the new virus actually originated in China, perhaps in the 
Kweichow [Guizhou]–Yunnan border region where the epidemic apparently 
started. How and why could such a variant have arisen is a question of obvious 
importance.”46
Retrospectively, the who acknowledged that the Chinese team identified 
the novel variant first. In September, a who press release relayed information 
received from Chinese sources about the origins of the epidemic (note the geo-
graph i cal discrepancy from Zhu Jiming’s account, however): “It started in the 
north of China at the beginning of spring and penetrated into the interior 
of the country, where the virus was isolated for the first time at Peking, in 
March. Cases next appeared in Hong Kong in the  middle of April.” As the who 
concluded, “The gaps existing in what should be a world- wide system of epi-
demiological notification have become painfully apparent on this occasion.”47 
As Payne added in his  later paper, “It is clear that [the Chinese researchers] 
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recognized most of the impor tant features of the virus which have since been 
described elsewhere. It is unfortunate that this information did not reach the 
rest of the world  until the epidemic was already spreading widely. If it had we 
should have had two more months to prepare.”48 From the very first moment 
when epidemiological and virological research identified China as a pos si ble 
source of an influenza pandemic, the scientific infrastructures of planetary ob-
servation already had become entangled in a diff er ent, less than fully transpar-
ent, spatial ordering: global geopolitics.
In the next section I show how the spatial identification of China as an ori-
gin of pandemic influenza was further transformed and specified by research 
into the ecological conditions that give rise to new influenza viruses. For, as 
Zhu Jiming asked, if the influenza pandemic not only commenced in China 
but the new variant virus also originated in China, what  were the conditions of 
this origin? Much like the planetary perspective, which was made pos si ble by 
the wip laboratory network and standard virus assays, this ecol ogy of influenza 
emerged from the laboratory.
LABORATORY ECOLOGIES
Nowhere is the historical ontology of diseases more uncertain than in the 
species multiplicity that, we now know, hosts influenza viruses. The history of 
laboratory research on influenza viruses is for long periods a series of  separate 
histories, each describing research programs devoted to apparently distinct 
pathogens in diff er ent animal hosts. Research on the causal pathogens  behind 
diseases that afflicted  humans, swine, poultry, and  horses proceeded in paral-
lel, even counterpoint, rather than in unison. As late as January 1933, Walter 
Fletcher of the British Medical Research Council complained that “no ani-
mal (except possibly the anthropoid ape) is affected by influenza,” thereby, 
in his view, reducing the value of experimental research with animal mod-
els.49 During the course of the 1930s, laboratory identification of the swine flu 
and  human flu viruses began to show links between  these diff er ent diseases 
and, by implication, ecological connections between  these diff er ent species. 
To adopt a phrase from François Delaporte, “an epistemological transforma-
tion made it pos si ble to see”  these diff er ent diseases “in a new light.”50 By 
the 1950s, American researchers working on swine flu, British researchers 
studying  human flu, German researchers studying fowl plague, and Czech re-
searchers studying equine flu established that  these diseases  were all caused 
by similar— even perhaps identical— influenza a viruses. However, researchers 
remained perplexed by this accumulating evidence: What was the connection 
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between  these viruses in diff er ent species, if any? Could they transmit from 
one species to another?
During the 1957 “Asian” pandemic, scientists began for the first time to 
seriously consider the pos si ble role of animals in the origin of pandemics. As 
Kaplan and Beveridge  later recalled, “Before the 1957 pandemic only a few 
workers . . .  paid any attention to the pos si ble relationship between animal 
and  human influenza. . . .  Influenza as a zoonosis was considered a biological 
curiosity rather than an impor tant link in the epidemiology of the disease in 
man.”51 Researchers in the  People’s Republic of China  were among the first to 
draw links between animal flus and the  human epidemiology of the pandemic. 
As Zhu Jiming pointed out, agreement that the 1957 pandemic commenced in 
China merely displaced the question of origins from “Where?” to “How and 
why?” When Zhu isolated the new variant influenza a virus, he located the 
origin of the virus in the southwestern part of China, somewhere in the prov-
ince of Guangxi or Guizhou. But he also noted that the 1957 “variant” strain 
was not merely antigenically distinct from the previously circulated strain; it 
was also an “extremely significant variation.”52 As he  later explained, “The new 
variant virus appears to us to be too radically diff er ent in its antigenic and 
other characters from the a- Prime virus, its immediate pre de ces sor, to make 
evolution from the latter a plausible hypothesis.” Evidence suggested that this 
virus could not have evolved through the gradual accumulation of mutations 
during seasonal  human outbreaks. Instead, Zhu sought a new ecological ex-
planation for the origin of influenza pandemics. “It would prob ably be wiser,” 
he suggested, “to look around for some other pos si ble explanation such as an 
unexpected animal reservoir as the origin of this queer variant.”53
Soon  after the  human outbreak, Chinese scientists began looking for influ-
enza viruses in animals as well as  humans. In June 1957 reports reached the who 
from Chinese scientists describing the isolation of “the variant strain from the 
lungs of naturally infected pigs in China, and of epizootics of an influenza- like 
disease in areas of China severely struck by the  human disease.” In response to 
 these reports the who initiated the first worldwide “animal serum survey” on 
influenza. As Kaplan  later recalled, he developed the survey “ because at that 
time [he] had the strong hunch that animal reservoirs could be very impor tant 
in the epidemiology of  human influenza and origins of mutants or recombi-
nants.”54 In July and August 1957 the who requested that veterinary ser vices 
in a large number of countries “take blood specimens from swine and  horses 
in diff er ent parts of their countries, if pos si ble before the pandemic struck, 
and to take a second specimen from the same animals, if this could be done, 
about three months  after the epidemic had subsided in the locality.”55 Just as 
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the who’s World Influenza Program tracked the 1957 flu pandemic as it spread 
across national borders and through diverse populations, the who Veterinary 
Public Health division also attempted to assess  whether the same virus would 
spread through animals. Veterinary ser vices in thirty- three countries partici-
pated in the who- led animal survey, taking blood specimens from animals, 
freezing them or storing them at cold temperatures, and in most cases sending 
them to who influenza centers. Only a few positive serological results  were 
obtained, but even this small number confirmed the hypothesis that the new 
strain could indeed infect pigs and  horses as well as  humans.
In a 1959 report summarizing the results, Kaplan and Payne argue that the 
survey findings, coupled with other evidence of the periodicity of pandemics 
and the “common country of origin (China)” of the 1889 and 1957 pandem-
ics, suggest that “a parent influenza strain . . .  resides in an animal reservoir 
on the mainland of China.”56 As I noted above, Zhu Jiming and other Chinese 
researchers had already come to the same conclusion. Once again, however, 
mainland China was one of the few parts of the world not covered by Payne 
and Kaplan’s animal serological survey. Although C. H. Andrewes wrote to F. F. 
Tang of the Peking- based National Vaccine and Serum Institute proposing the 
collection of “sera from animals” in the “area in which the epidemic started”— 
even suggesting “the possibility that the Asian ’flu may have arisen from a res-
ervoir in an animal in north China”—no sera  were ever sent or reported to 
the who. During this period, the USSR, Poland, Czecho slo va kia, and other 
Socialist Bloc countries all participated in the survey, but the  People’s Republic 
of China remained outside of the who’s surveillance network.
Then, in 1968, history seemed to repeat itself. In July another new influenza 
variant was isolated in Hong Kong and soon spread across the entire world, 
causing what has been referred to as the “Hong Kong” flu pandemic. The Times 
of London first reported an outbreak of acute respiratory disease in southeast-
ern China on July 12. Five days  later, the Hong Kong Influenza Centre reported 
to the who an outbreak of influenza- like illness.  After isolating viruses that 
appeared to be influenza but  were antigenically distinct from the circulat-
ing a2 virus, Hong Kong sent the strains “as infected tissue- culture fluids on 
wet ice to the World Influenza Centre,” and the wic quickly confirmed a new 
variant strain.57 The outbreak “adds a  little more information to the often- 
expressed hypothesis that strains of influenza virus which have the capacity 
to spread widely and rapidly often arise” in southern China, wrote researchers 
from the who. However, China also remained a blind spot within the wip 
surveillance system. Indeed,  things  were even worse than before, as China was 
in the midst of the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution. “Unfortunately,” 
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the who  scientists continued, “contact between health authorities in China 
and other countries is even more difficult than in 1957 and it is impossible to 
obtain information on the pos si ble origin or be hav ior of the epidemic prior to 
its appearance in Hong Kong.”58
In addition to reaffirming the hypothesis that pandemic flu viruses arise in 
southern China, the 1968 Hong Kong flu pandemic also strengthened interest 
in the pos si ble existence of an animal reservoir.59 Since 1957, the who had con-
tinued to work with collaborating laboratories to develop what was becoming 
known as the “natu ral history of influenza” and  later the “ecol ogy of influ-
enza.” By 1969, much had been learned, but the major question still remained: 
“Are lower animals of any importance as a prime source of the major antigenic 
shifts in the influenza a group that cause the recurring epidemics and pandem-
ics?”60 Was  there a “ghostly reservoir as yet undiscovered”?61 To find out, the 
who’s Martin Kaplan proposed a research program that would include the 
isolation of viral strains from wild animal species, continued surveillance of 
animal influenza in diff er ent countries using standard diagnostic kits, and lab-
oratory research on the so- called recombination of influenza viruses. Of  these, 
the last— though seemingly far removed from ecological questions— played the 
most impor tant role in constructing an ecol ogy of influenza. Recombination 
experiments rewrote the ecological relationships among  human, animal, and 
bird species from inside the laboratory.62
VEHICLES AND VESSELS
During the 1930s viruses came to be seen as “prototypical models for he-
reditary particles” or something like “naked genes.”63 Used as model organisms, 
virus research prompted new forms of experimentation and paved the way for 
the movement of ge ne tics research  toward a molecular scale.  Because  these 
model organisms  were also pathogens, intimate and frequent exchanges took 
place between “basic” research on ge ne tics and “applied” research for public 
health, with the same viruses  under the microscope and in the centrifuge. In-
fluenza was one of the most impor tant.
Frank Macfarlane Burnet, a researcher with the Hall Institute in Australia, 
had been a fellow of the National Institute of Medical Research in London 
during the years when Andrewes and colleagues discovered the influenza virus. 
When he returned to Australia, Burnet continued work on influenza, attempt-
ing to develop a vaccine to protect troops during World War II. His vaccine 
failed, but his immunological approach led him to study what caused changes 
to influenza virulence. To do so, he developed some of the first experiments 
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in the ge ne tics of the influenza virus, a research program that soon produced 
significant findings about viral genes.
Burnet’s trajectory was complex and multidirectional. Although moving 
from the immediacy of public health to “basic” ge ne tics research, his findings 
in experimental ge ne tics almost immediately returned to transform the scope 
and scale of influenza as a public health prob lem. Burnet found that the in-
fluenza virus not only mutates, as was common to many viruses, but can also 
recombine: that is, two strains of virus placed in the same culture medium can 
exchange ge ne tic material among themselves.64 In 1959 he went even further 
to suggest that the high frequency of recombination indicates that influenza 
viruses must also undergo reassortment, the exchange of complete gene seg-
ments.65  After conducting similar studies at New York City’s Rocke fel ler Insti-
tute, Edwin Kilbourne argued that such reassortment could be a source of the 
ge ne tic novelty that is required for the emergence of pandemic strains. If so, he 
speculated, animal reservoirs carry ing diff er ent strains of flu may indeed play a 
key role in the emergence of  human pandemics.66
But it was experiments by Robert Webster that intensified the implications 
of  these findings when they eventually showed that “hybrid viruses” could 
be artificially produced in vivo as well as in vitro. Webster was born in New 
Zealand and trained in Australia during the late 1950s before establishing his 
permanent laboratory at St. Jude’s  Children’s Hospital in Memphis, Tennes-
see. In the wake of the 1968 Hong Kong pandemic, Webster noted that the h 
and n antigens of the new variant a2 virus had cross- reactivity with viruses 
isolated from ducks and  horses. He called for a new research program: “An 
explanation of the occurrence of  human influenza viruses with animal or avian 
antigens should now be sought in a positive fashion. The tools are at hand 
for producing antigenic hybrids of  human or animal influenza viruses in the 
laboratory and the next question we should try to answer is  whether virulent 
antigenic hybrids can be produced in natu ral hosts.”67 Taking influenza viruses 
extracted from multiple species, Webster co- infected a single animal host with 
both viruses  under laboratory conditions. Infecting turkeys with two distinct 
influenza viruses, for instance, Webster  later isolated a hybrid or “new” virus 
that could infect and kill a chicken immunized against both “parental viruses.” 
In another experiment, he showed that a  human and a swine influenza virus 
could reassort inside of a single porcine host, which he  later called a “swine 
mixing vessel.”68  After flu viruses infected an animal host, Webster showed 
they exchanged parts inside the animal organism, emerging transformed. As 
he explained in a 1970 letter, the experiments showed “the role of lower mam-
mals and birds as vehicles in which ge ne tic interaction between the influenza a 
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viruses could occur.”69 In Webster’s ecol ogy of influenza, animals  were becom-
ing vessels and vehicles of virus reproduction and evolution, where before they 
 were merely vectors of virus transmission. In a conclusive 1974 article, Webster 
and his coauthor, Charles Campbell, argued on the basis of  these experiments 
that pandemic flu viruses most likely derive from the reassortment of  human 
and animal influenza viruses, rather than the gradual mutation of seasonal flu 
viruses.70
Laboratory research was accumulating experimental results that appeared 
to expose the interspecies contacts and exchanges at the heart of influenza 
emergence. Still, experimental studies provided only “circumstantial evidence” 
of the natu ral history of flu pandemics, Webster and Campbell acknowledged. 
In order to verify that their experimental hypothesis held true “in nature,” they 
suggested two pos si ble routes of further research. The first approach would 
“detect recombinations of influenza viruses in nature prior to the emergence 
of the next pandemic strain,” but they feared the “rarity of such an event” 
made this approach unlikely to produce convincing evidence. More promising, 
they argued, would be an “ecological approach” based on the establishment of 
a “bank of influenza viruses” isolated from wild birds, domestic poultry, and 
livestock. This was something like what Graeme Laver had done with wild 
seabirds in Australia and Dmitry Lvov was  doing with a range of animal species 
in the Soviet Union.71 Following the emergence of a pandemic virus, Webster 
and Campbell suggested, the new variant strain “could be compared with the 
viruses in the bank to determine if recombination plays an impor tant role in 
the emergence of  human strains in nature.”72 The ecol ogy of influenza, as it 
was beginning to be called, would be constituted out of a bank of influenza 
viruses collected and stored in the laboratory.
INTO THE EPICENTER
In 1982 Geoffrey Schild, a virologist at London’s World Influenza Centre, 
summarized a London conference meeting into a proposal for a who- led 
“Global Programme on the Ecol ogy of Influenza.” The proposal suggested that 
the ecol ogy program could be modeled on the World Influenza Program’s col-
lection of  human influenza isolates and would emphasize the importance of 
global scale. Schild recalled how the who developed the wip  because the “ca-
pricious epidemiology of influenza in man could be adequately studied only on 
a global basis” and suggested that the same global scale would be necessary for 
animal surveillance. The Programme on the Ecol ogy of Influenza would also 
emphasize the collection of viral isolates, but from “non- human sources” of 
T H E  O R I G I N S  O F  PA N D E M I C S  43
influenza. New proj ects included a survey sent to influenza researchers around 
the world, similar to Kaplan’s 1957 survey, asking for the collection and submis-
sion of serological studies or isolated viruses on equine influenza.73
As we have seen, China had become a par tic u lar concern for global influ-
enza surveillance for two reasons. First, historical evidence pointed to China 
as the origin of the viruses that caused the 1957 “Asian” and 1968 “Hong Kong” 
pandemics. As Webster’s laboratory experiments accumulated evidence that 
an “ecol ogy of influenza” enabled interspecies viral reassortments and the pro-
duction of “new” influenza viruses, the spatial identification of China as an 
origin of pandemic viruses gained an ecological depth and scale. What was it 
about China’s farmed ecol ogy that encouraged the reassortment of influenza 
viruses? Was an animal reservoir somewhere inside China? Second, China’s 
territory had been largely absent from the purview of even the most global 
programs of influenza surveillance  because of the exclusion of the  People’s Re-
public from the United Nations and the politics of the Cultural Revolution. 
Questions about the origins of pandemic influenza  were therefore lacking cru-
cial data that could be obtained only inside mainland China.
By the 1980s, however, both science and geopolitics  were in motion, travel-
ing  toward Chinese landscapes. In July 1971, socialist Albania and sixteen other 
nations proposed Resolution 2758 to the United Nations General Assembly, 
calling on it to “expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai- shek from 
the place which they unlawfully occupied at the United Nations and in all the 
organ izations related to it.” This was not the first such proposal: Albania, stub-
bornly per sis tent, had proposed similar resolutions throughout the 1960s, and 
each time, equally stubborn, the United States had ensured that the propos-
als failed to muster sufficient support. But by the early 1970s, the lines across 
the po liti cal globe  were taking new forms. Henry Kissinger had just been to 
Beijing, preparing the way for President Richard Nixon’s landmark 1972 visit 
to China. Although the US still tried to find a diplomatic way for Taiwan to 
remain in the un, its moderate proposal failed, and Albania’s passed (Taiwan 
withdrew immediately before the passage of Resolution 2758). Over the course 
of the next few months most of the un agencies, including the who and the 
fao, had substituted the Beijing- based  People’s Republic for the Taipei- based 
Republic as the legitimate representative of China.74
Almost immediately following the inclusion of the  People’s Republic, the 
who began to or ga nize study trips to send experts and officials to observe 
health care in China and initiate scientific exchanges. Many of  these trips 
focused on topics like primary health care and China’s celebrated “barefoot 
doctors.” Pandemic influenza was a focus of a smaller number of who study 
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trips. In September 1972, Webster and Laver traveled to China with a group 
of Australian medical doctors on an unofficial trip  because they “hoped that 
the Chinese might have information about animal and avian influenza viruses 
occurring in China.” The trip was disappointing, despite the “enthusiastic 
friendliness” that the Australians encountered from officials, hospital staff, 
and the general population. The itinerary was “pretty inflexible”; as Laver re-
ported to the who, “Most of our time was spent visiting hospitals where we 
saw traditional Chinese medicine as well as Western medicine being prac-
ticed,” and the highlight seemed to be observation of acu punc ture anesthesia 
during surgery, hardly of scientific interest to their pandemic research. As 
Laver recalls,
We did not find out much about influenza. In one city we saw a group of 
pigs, wallowing in the mud. We asked the Chinese if we could take samples 
of the pigs’ blood to see if any antibodies could be found.  There was a good 
deal of re sis tance to this request but  after much haggling we  were allowed 
to bleed one pig. Since a single sample does not do a  great deal for the sta-
tistics we asked if we could have some more. Came the answer: “In China 
 today all pigs are equal; you have your sample, be satisfied.”75
Webster and Laver  were able to contact virologist Zhu Jiming, however, and 
they spent “a  whole day” at the National Vaccine and Serum Institute (nvsi), 
where Zhu ran a laboratory on virus research at the time. Zhu helped translate 
their talks to the nvsi, provided information about China’s vaccination and 
surveillance programs, and even shared isolates related to the 1957 pandemic 
strain.76 They also observed “how primitive Chinese laboratories had become 
during the dark days of the Cultural Revolution; no deep freezers, no equip-
ment for storing live viruses for long periods of time.” Throughout their visit, 
they  were “unable to find out anything about influenza viruses infecting ani-
mals or birds.”77
In 1981 Webster applied for funding from the U.S. National Institutes of 
Health for a conference to be held at the Institute of Virology in Beijing on 
the “origin of influenza viruses.”78 In his proposal for the workshop, Webster 
notes that several pandemics are widely believed to have originated in China— 
including the 1957, 1968, and 1977 pandemics— and he suggests that this infor-
mation deserves to be “examined in the light of recent knowledge of influenza 
and its ecol ogy in animals.” In other words, the planetary hypothesis of China 
as origin point needed to be redrawn based on the ecological inferences com-
ing out of Webster’s laboratory. Yet to do so would also require forging new 
relations of scientific collaboration, Webster acknowledged. “The question of 
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‘why China,’ ” he explained, “should be reviewed in conjunction with Chinese 
scientists.”  After all, “Chinese scientists are in a unique position to resolve the 
intriguing question of why so many  human epidemic strains have originated 
in their country.” As a result, the aims of the workshop included not only im-
mediately scientific ones but also the training and development of a Chinese 
infrastructure for viral surveillance. The workshop would, he proposed, “stim-
ulate the use of modern molecular biological methods in China so that an ex-
planation to the intriguing question of why many ‘new’ pandemic strains arise 
in China may be forthcoming; such information could provide a basis for effec-
tive control in the  future.” Equally impor tant, the workshop would provide a 
venue to “establish personal and scientific contact with a number of virologists 
in China who have previously not been contacted” but had expressed interest 
in “collaborative studies with overseas virologists.”79
Laver co- organized the workshop, while Zhu Jiming, newly appointed as di-
rector of China’s Institute of Virology, conducted local coordination in Beijing. 
Papers presented ranged from molecular studies of the structure of antigenic 
proteins to immune response, and included four papers on “viruses from birds 
and lower mammals.” A team from the Institute of Virology— led by Guo Yu-
anji and including Zhu Jiming— presented a paper on what they called “influ-
enza ecol ogy in China.” The paper reported the results of “virus surveys” that 
the institute conducted on domestic ducks, feral ducks, and pigs.  These sur-
veys isolated a broad range of influenza viruses, including a “ great diversity of 
subtypes of influenza a,” from domestic ducks. Guo and colleagues concluded 
that  these findings  were “consistent with the hypothesis” that avian and pig 
viruses “play an impor tant role in the origin of new subtypes” of  human flu.80
Another conference on the ecol ogy of influenza was held in Hong Kong, 
then a British colonial city, the same year. The meeting was chaired by C. H. 
Stuart- Harris, who had been a research assistant at the British Medical Re-
search Council (mrc) when influenza virus was first isolated, and had made 
several impor tant contributions to flu research himself. The rest of the dozen 
or so participants came from veterinary, public health, and virology institutes 
in Hong Kong or China (prc), including Guo Yuanji from the Institute of Virol-
ogy and G. Z. Shen from the Health and Anti- Epidemic Station in Guangzhou. 
At the meeting, the group examined “some features of  human and animal life 
in Hong Kong and the southern regions of China where epidemics of influenza 
a caused by novel surface antigens— hemagglutinin (h) and neuraminidase 
(n)— have arisen and have spread as pandemics throughout the world.”81
Although Stuart- Harris chaired the meeting, the driving force  behind the 
discussion of the ecol ogy of influenza was Kennedy Shortridge. An Australian 
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by nationality, Shortridge moved to the microbiology laboratory in Hong 
Kong—at the very edge of mainland China’s territory— soon  after the so- called 
Hong Kong flu of 1968, inspired by the hope of detecting the onset of the next 
pandemic virus.82 Once  there, he began to collect influenza viruses, primarily 
from poultry, and type them in his lab. The laboratory collected viruses dur-
ing a weekly or fortnightly influenza surveillance program at a Hong Kong 
“poultry dressing plant” that sourced chicken, geese, and ducks from farms 
both in Hong Kong and in the southeast of the  People’s Republic. Additional 
viruses  were collected from duck feces and pond  water at a domestic duck farm 
in Hong Kong.83 The surveillance program isolated a wide variety of influenza 
a viruses, successfully typing 46 out of the 106 ha/na protein combinations 
pos si ble  under the existing nomenclature system. Hong Kong proved to be an 
“extremely fruitful source of influenza viruses,” Shortridge wrote.84
In total, at least three conferences on the “ecol ogy of influenza” took place 
that same year. The ecological focus of attention, and the abrupt geo graph-
i cal movement of research programs  toward China, prompted a somewhat 
disgruntled response from Alan Kendal of the U.S. cdc. “At first thought,” 
Kendal scrawled on cdc Influenza Center notepaper  after reading Webster’s 
conference proposal, “it is hard to see why who should support the same old 
group of  people to come together in China and use fallacious arguments (or 
non- arguments) to involve China as the source of a new strain.”85 However, 
Kendal’s skepticism overlooks the fact that the discussions at  these confer-
ences  were not exactly repeating “the same old” arguments about China as an 
origin of pandemics. In fact, Shortridge, Webster, and  others  were beginning 
to build connections between two distinct ideas: on the one hand, China as the 
geo graph i cal source of influenza pandemics, and on the other, laboratory un-
derstanding of the interspecies communications that cause the reassortment 
of new viruses. Together, the two ideas pointed to China as the ecological birth-
place of pandemic influenza viruses.
In a report on the Hong Kong discussions submitted to the Lancet that 
explic itly linked  these two ideas, Shortridge and Stuart- Harris proposed that 
southern China might be an “epicentre” of influenza pandemics. Describing 
the agrarian landscapes of southern China, they argued that the ecol ogy of the 
region promoted “exchange of viruses between animals and man”: “The close-
ness between man and animals could provide an ecosystem for the interaction 
of their viruses.” Of par tic u lar concern was the human- cultivated, “age- old” 
ecosystem of rice paddies, waterways, and poultry and pig farms: “The densely 
populated, intensively farmed area of southern China adjacent to Hong Kong is 
an ideal place for events such as interchange of viruses between host species.”86
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The hypothesis of the influenza epicenter transposed experimental facts 
produced in the laboratory onto the ecologies and environments of southern 
China. As I discussed above, Robert Webster’s laboratory research had dem-
onstrated the impor tant role of interspecies contacts in the reassortment of 
viruses. The co- infection of a host by viruses originating from two species 
allowed  these viruses to exchange ge ne tic material, producing new variants 
of flu. Shortridge claimed, quite simply, that the relations among species ar-
tificially constructed in Webster’s laboratory  were the stuff of everyday life 
along the Pearl River Delta. “In the villages,” he and Stuart- Harris wrote, “it is 
common to see ducks, geese, and chickens  running loose in proximity to pigs 
and  water buffaloes and to see small  children playing in the environment.” If 
interspecies contacts led to viral reassortments, and viral reassortments caused 
pandemics, then for  these reasons China’s densely populated and intensively 
cultivated southern region was prob ably a “point of origin” for flu pandemics.87 
No longer simply showing that China was where influenza pandemics started 
from, Shortridge and  others  were beginning to answer the questions posed by 
Zhu Jiming: How and why did they begin  there?
Through research on the influenza virus in the laboratory, knowledge of 
the virus began to point beyond the virus— toward specific regions like south-
ern China and  toward ecologies of poultry farms, pigsties, and waterways. In 
the next chapter we  will see how the effort to answer  these questions brought 
the science of pandemic flu out of the laboratory, displacing the concept of an 
ecol ogy of influenza in the pro cess.
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In crafting the influenza epicenter hypothesis, Kennedy Shortridge deployed 
environmental and ecological tropes of disease and pathology, but his experi-
mental system remained bound within a laboratory scale. In many re spects, 
Shortridge’s practice resembles the classical bacteriology of Louis Pasteur, as 
presented in Bruno Latour’s account of the laboratory as a “center of calcula-
tion.”1 Shortridge, like Pasteur, ventured out to farms and slaughter houses to 
collect biological material, then brought the material back to his laboratory to 
be translated by inscription devices, including hemagglutinin inhibition tests.2 
Using the language of phyloge ne tics, he built a classified and ordered archive of 
samples typed according to their hemagglutinin and neuraminidase proteins: 
h1n1, h7n2, h9n1. Drawing from this bank or profile of influenza ecol ogy, Short-
ridge built narratives about the ecological conditions of pandemic emergence.
Theresa MacPhail points out that alongside rapid advances in molecular 
biology, claims about the origins of pandemic flu increasingly drew from stud-
ies of the ge ne tic relations between viruses: “Phyloge ne tic relationships between 
strains are analyzed to produce knowledge about the ‘ecol ogy’ of influenza vi-
ruses.”3 For instance, during the 1990s Robert Webster and  others identified 
wild aquatic birds as the reservoir of influenza viruses by comparing ge ne tic 
sequences from a  human flu virus with flu viruses sampled from aquatic birds.4 
Yet when I began my fieldwork in early 2010, I found that scientists working 
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inside China had an understanding of the “ecol ogy” of influenza very different 
from Webster and Shortridge’s viral banks and phyloge ne tic charts. The popu-
larity at the time of the phrase “One Health,” often used to refer to a broader 
approach to flu research demanding collaboration across disciplines, was one 
sign of this nonvirological understanding of the influenza prob lem.5 Talks on 
One Health frequently took place, the United Nations’ China- based offices 
began a new “sub- working group” on the “human– animal disease interface” in 
2010, and this working group or ga nized a two- day “One Health China Event” 
in Beijing the following year. As a researcher explained to me, many of the 
 people working on flu in China  were “trying to embed molecular pro cesses in 
the larger ecol ogy.” This chapter aims to specify the contours of this emerg-
ing eco- virology of influenza and its differences from an  earlier virus- centered 
ecol ogy. In what way is the molecular scale of viruses and genes embedded in 
a larger- scale ecol ogy?
Of course, research on the ecological conditions of disease long predates 
the term One Health. Disease ecol ogy has been described as a “minor tradition” 
in twentieth- century infectious- disease research.6 And as we have seen, flu 
researchers from Robert Webster to Zhu Jiming to Kennedy Shortridge had 
developed what they called an “ecol ogy of influenza” since the early 1970s. 
This chapter specifies the epistemological displacements that have taken 
place in recent flu research at the epicenter, despite remarkable continuities 
in research programs over the past fifty years: continuities that include the 
use of terms such as ecol ogy. To uncover this displacement, I focus attention 
on a single truth claim that is essential to the identification of southern China 
as the epicenter of pandemic flu viruses: the hy po thet i cal role of free- grazing 
ducks in the emergence of new viral strains. Tracing how Kennedy Shortridge 
articulated this claim with experimental evidence in the 1980s, I then follow 
the reassertion of the claim in con temporary pandemic flu research. By follow-
ing this reiteration of the same claim, the epistemological displacements of 
the forms for making truth claims— the experimental systems, to use Hans- Jörg 
Rheinberger’s term— are made vis i ble. At stake, as we  will see, are two distinct 
concepts of ecol ogy: the first built upon the phylogeny of viruses and the sec-
ond constructed through spatial models of landscape and species interaction.
In criticizing how discourses about pandemic epicenters construct a geog-
raphy of blame, anthropologists have highlighted how  these scientific studies 
rely on unscientific tropes of exotic environments and “backward” traditional 
cultures.7 In this chapter I approach Shortridge’s ecological claims in a diff er-
ent manner. Tracing dramatic changes in the form and scale of scientific work 
on the epicenter, I show how Shortridge’s anecdotal claims about environment 
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have been turned into research objects in spatial ecol ogy. This does not mean 
that science freely escapes history or ideology. On the contrary, it means that 
the trajectory of scientific change is  shaped by the displacement of ideological 
pasts.
TWO EPISTEMOLOGIES OF ECOL OGY
At the center of Shortridge’s viral ecol ogy of influenza is a claim about 
ducks, not viruses. By 1982, Shortridge had spent over five years collecting, 
analyzing, and archiving influenza viruses from poultry and other livestock. 
He found that Hong Kong was full of flu viruses, but he also found that  these 
viruses  weren’t everywhere. In one article Shortridge reported with evident 
pride that he was able to isolate and type nearly half of the 106 hemagglutinin 
and neuraminidase protein combinations pos si ble  under the existing classifi-
catory system. He also emphasized an even more unexpected finding: he iso-
lated all but one of  these combinations from a single species: domestic ducks. 
Overall, Shortridge consistently found sixteen times as many influenza viruses 
in ducks than chickens in each of the five years that he looked for viruses. 
Shortridge concluded that the results demonstrated “the importance of ducks 
in influenza ecol ogy.”8
Before he reported his results,  there was no consensus among influenza 
researchers about the role of domestic waterfowl in the emergence of influ-
enza pandemics. Although some virologists speculated that ducks could be a 
reservoir of viruses, and a source for the viruses that cause  human pandemics, 
 others suggested that ducks may receive viruses from  humans  after pandem-
ics.  After “unearth[ing] a seemingly bottomless reservoir of viruses” in south-
ern China’s ducks, including many viruses that had never been isolated from 
 humans, Shortridge argued that “domestic poultry might be donors of viruses 
adaptable to  human hosts rather than recipients.”9 In a paper presented to the 
“Origin of Pandemic Influenza” conference held in Beijing in 1982, Shortridge 
included a diagram that, he claimed, described the “generalised sequence of 
transmission for the emergence and spread of a pandemic virus.” To craft this 
hy po thet i cal sequence, he drew from the growing bank of influenza viruses 
he had assembled, a bank that Frédéric Keck has compared to a museum ar-
chive.10 In the diagram, the virus leaps from wild waterbirds to domestic ducks 
to  humans and back again, before fi nally ending in the domestic pig (uncon-
ventionally considered in this diagram model as a dead- end host).11 “Since duck 
raising may be fundamental to the emergence of pandemic viruses,” Shortridge 
concluded somewhat pessimistically, “then it would seem that the control of 
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influenza at source may be an impossibility given the continuity of the farming 
practices in the region and the high density of the rural population.”12
In developing  these findings into the hypothesis of the pandemic epicen-
ter, however, Shortridge did not restrict himself to statements about the fre-
quency of detected viruses. A close reading of Shortridge’s classic article, “An 
Influenza Epicentre?” (coauthored with C. H. Stuart- Harris), reveals the asser-
tion of two distinct kinds of truth claim. One set of claims pre sents the facts 
constructed in Shortridge’s experimental system: concise virological results, 
often supported by reference to more technical articles published by Short-
ridge or  others.  These strictly virological statements are juxtaposed, however, 
with broader claims about the ecol ogy and ethnology of southern China. For 
instance, Shortridge and Stuart- Harris highlight what they call an “age- old” 
agricultural practice: the use of ducks for manuring and protection of the wet- 
rice paddy. They adopt an almost ethnographic style: “[Farmers] make use of 
the food preferences of domestic ducks which help protect the growing rice 
from insect and shellfish pests and carry out weeding, intercultivation, and 
manuring. This practice reduces farmers’ dependence on chemical insecti-
cides, herbicides, fertilisers, and mechanical farming aids and provides a close 
bird/water/rice/man association that varies with the seasons of rice- growing.”13
The hypothesis of the pandemic epicenter relies as much on  these ethno-
logical claims as on the results of laboratory experiments. Put another way, if 
we ask how virological findings are transposed onto southern China’s land-
scapes, it becomes clear that in this case ethnological statements— and not 
virus sampling— are the crucial instrument of transposition. Yet,  these ethno-
logical claims never became the scientific objects of Shortridge’s experimen-
tal system. Instead, Shortridge supports his ethnology with a diverse array of 
rather more anecdotal evidence: personal communications, his own travel 
experience, unpublished papers, and even Joseph Needham’s magisterial (but 
historical) Science and Civilization in China.
Inside the hypothesis of the influenza epicenter, therefore, are two kinds of 
facts with diff er ent epistemological standing. Shortridge’s laboratory research 
produces a lot of facts about the role of ducks in what he calls “the ecol ogy of 
influenza,” but his viral profiles, on their own, do not support the claims he 
makes about the agricultural ecol ogy of ducks and duck farming in southern 
China. Viruses are studied with analytic precision, but the ecologies of farm 
animals and rice paddies are described in more “meta phoric” terms, to adopt 
Warwick Anderson’s distinction.14 Historian of biology Georges Canguilhem 
describes this second type of truth claim as a scientific ideology and suggests 
that such ideologies play a crucial role in the historical trajectory of scientific 
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change. As historians have shown, scientists rigorously define their objects, 
producing what Rheinberger has called “epistemic  things” that are fundamen-
tally distinct from everyday  things. Yet  these epistemic  things do not, and can-
not, exist in a pure culture, in absolute isolation. Rather, they are supported 
by a matrix of linkages to politics, modes of repre sen ta tion, and economies of 
value.  These linkages ultimately provide much of the motor driving scientific 
change: pointing  toward new research prob lems, suggesting the significance 
of research findings, applying research questions to new domains. Although 
sometimes derided as hype,  these para- scientific linkages are, even more than 
experimental systems proper, the manner in which scientific “ futures [are] 
carved out of the pre sent.”15
The concept of scientific ideology illuminates a model of scientific change 
that is neither as radical and absolute as a paradigm shift nor as linear and 
gradual as “development- by- accumulation.”16 A scientific ideology, according 
to Canguilhem, both precedes and follows upon the constitution of a scientific 
object or epistemic  thing. A scientific ideology is not a fraudulent science, nor 
is it antiscience: indeed, it has the “explicit ambition to be a science.”17 It is 
more like a virtual cloud suggesting the outlines of a near  future that has yet to 
become actualized in a scientific experiment.
More recently, Rheinberger and Staffan Müller- Wille describe the working 
of scientific ideology in their cultural history of heredity. Nineteenth- century 
ideas about heredity provided a background of interests and motivations that 
guided the experimental research that ultimately constructed the “gene” as a 
scientific object. Concern about heredity first emerged in areas such as animal 
breeding or  legal inheritance. Early scientific investigations largely derived 
from interests and anx i eties about race in the late nineteenth  century. Initially, 
 these ideas about heredity  were only loosely linked to experimental findings, 
at best. Yet, as Rheinberger and Müller- Wille stress, the objectification of the 
gene would not have taken place without them.
Even when the ideologies about the  imagined significance or potential of 
a scientific proj ect  don’t come true, something new is created in the pro cess. 
What is impor tant from a historical point of view is that this pathway  toward 
the new was in part pushed by  those ideologies in a certain direction. The sci-
entific objectification of ideology is not a pro cess of fulfillment, in which the 
 imagined  future is actualized. Rather, Canguilhem explains, objectification is a 
pro cess of displacement: “Scientific ideology does indeed stand over [superstare] a 
site that  will eventually be occupied by science. But science is not merely over-
lain: it is pushed aside [deportare] by ideology. Therefore, when science eventu-
ally supplants ideology, it is not in the site expected.”18 Canguilhem is playing 
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on the idea of superstitions (superstare) as ideas that “stand over”  future scien-
tific sites, but also challenging the idea that science follows a linear path of pro-
gress out of superstition, as if simply replacing or overlaying true knowledge on 
top of false belief. Instead, scientific ideologies lay out a direction of inquiry, 
but the  actual results of that inquiry are pushed in unexpected directions.
In 1997 the emergence of the novel h5n1 highly pathogenic avian influenza 
virus in Hong Kong, and the attribution of several  human deaths to h5n1 in-
fection, was at first widely seen as a confirmation of Shortridge’s hypothesis. 
Shortridge himself reiterated that “China is the principal reservoir of influenza, 
and southern China is the influenza epicenter.”19 Faced with what appeared to 
be a pandemic warning, Hong Kong’s veterinary administration slaughtered 
all poultry in the territory. The virus seemed gone. The world was saved.
But then the virus kept reemerging: isolated from geese imported for 
slaughter in Hong Kong (1999), in ducks from China’s Guangxi Province 
(1999), in geese sold at Vietnam’s poultry markets (2001), and again in a duck 
in Guangxi (2001).20 As Les Sims, Hong Kong’s assistant director of agriculture 
quarantine, told me, “Virus continued to circulate in China all through from 
1996 to 2004 and the absence of reports of disease does not reflect the true 
infection status. . . .  It is clear from basic biology that disease must have been 
occurring in the mainland but for what ever reason was not being reported.” 
In 2003 the h5n1 virus reemerged in Hong Kong before spreading rapidly and 
widely throughout Southeast Asia. The repeated emergence of h5n1 and re-
lated viruses set the stage for the displacement of Shortridge’s experimental 
system. His anecdotal or ideological claims about the agricultural ecol ogy of 
southern China  were pushed aside by a new set of experimental systems that 
made the ecol ogy of the epicenter into a scientific object of its own.
FROM VIRUS TO LANDSCAPE
The virus that reemerged in 2003 was genet ically somewhat distinct from 
the 1997 virus, showing that the virus had accumulated a series of mutations in 
the intervening years.21 More impor tant than this molecular change, however, 
 were changes in the geographic extension of viral infection. By 2004, the virus 
had spread far beyond Hong Kong, with large outbreaks appearing almost si-
mul ta neously in the poultry farms of Thailand and Vietnam and ravaging the 
flocks of smallholders and industrial  giants alike. I first realized the importance 
of this newly extended viral geography in conversation with Robert Wallace, 
a self- described “phylogeographer” whom I met in Beijing. In his work, Wal-
lace tries to link the molecular phyloge ne tics of virus strains with the spatial 
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geography of their isolation, developing a narrative of viral origins and emer-
gence.22 He told me that even without mutations to the molecular structure 
internal to the virus, a changed epidemic geography can itself transform the ca-
pacity for transmission, offering new challenges and opportunities for control. 
“Once the level of coordination changes, spatially,” he explained, “the nature 
of the prob lem changes.” For instance, when Ebola spread out of remote vil-
lages and into large urban areas in West Africa in 2015, the mode of infection 
changed even though  there was no change to the virus. The ecol ogy of host 
networks, not the virus, had mutated.23
As avian influenza a h5n1 spread out of the pandemic epicenter and beyond 
Hong Kong, the mode of infection did not change much, but the epidemiologi-
cal prob lem certainly did. As it spread through Southeast Asia and beyond, and 
as it persisted in poultry populations, the virus began to take on a geography. 
Kennedy Shortridge’s laboratory had perched at the frontier of the epicenter 
to detect the onset of a pandemic before it emerged. The objective had been 
to collect and classify a bank of influenza viruses so that any new strain could 
be identified and compared with the viral archive. Now, as the virus spread, 
geography and landscape became new research objects for understanding the 
ecologies of an emerging disease.
In the rest of this chapter I chart this pro cess of displacement by follow-
ing the reiteration of one of Shortridge’s most significant claims about the in-
fluenza epicenter: the “importance of ducks in influenza ecol ogy.”24 I do so 
by discussing the work of spatial ecologist Marius Gilbert and his collabora-
tors, a team of researchers linked to the Food and Agriculture Organ ization 
Emergency Center that I followed during my fieldwork in China. By restating 
Shortridge’s claim in terms of a very diff er ent experimental system, Gilbert did 
not simply add new facts to the store of knowledge about pandemic flu; he also 
displaced the phyloge ne tic concept of the influenza epicenter. He pushed aside 
anecdotal claims about the landscapes of the influenza epicenter by turning 
them into objects of a spatial ecol ogy.
Gilbert completed a PhD in agricultural and allied biological sciences from 
the  Free University of Brussels in 2001, and he is now affiliated with the same 
university’s Center for Biological Control and Spatial Ecol ogy. Spatial ecol-
ogy derives from a  simple but fruitful princi ple: “In nature, living beings are 
distributed neither uniformly nor randomly. Rather, they are aggregated in 
patches, or they form gradients or other spatial structures.”25 Spatial ecol ogy 
attempts to identify the ecological rules that explain the distinctive pattern of 
population distribution for a par tic u lar organism. In Gilbert’s doctoral disser-
tation, he modeled the invasions of the bark beetle Dendroctonus micans, and in 
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subsequent work analyzed the spread of the horse- chestnut leaf miner (Cam­
eraria ohridella), a leaf- mining moth, in the United Kingdom.
Gilbert’s recent work on avian influenza transposes the tools and equip-
ment of spatial ecol ogy from pest invasions to viral epizootics. As a brief 
biographical statement on Gilbert explains, his “work initially focused on 
the spatial ecol ogy of invasive insects. In the last 10 years, he became interested 
in the way concepts and methods usually applied to invasion ecol ogy could be 
used to improve our understanding and modeling of epidemiological study sys-
tems, and started working on several animals [sic] diseases such as Bovine Tu-
berculosis (btb), Foot and Mouth Disease (fmd), and Highly Pathogenic Avian 
Influenza (hpai).”26 In a coauthored methodological statement published in 
2004, Gilbert wrote that key questions about emerging diseases (“How did a 
pathogen enter a  human population? What are the characteristics of poten-
tially invasive pathogens?”) could be effectively answered with the tools of 
spatial ecol ogy: “ These questions relate to the adaptation of a pathogen to a 
new host, and can be addressed by comparisons between emerging diseases and 
invasive plant and animal species.”27
Gilbert told me that his first opportunity to study hpai “on the ground” 
was in Thailand.  After reemerging in Hong Kong, hpai h5n1 struck Thailand 
in January 2004, roughly concurrently with similar outbreaks in Vietnam. A 
second outbreak, known in Thailand as the “second wave,” began in July 2004 
and grew in severity and scale throughout the summer. At first, the epizootic 
appeared to catch the Thai government by surprise. The Ministry of Public 
Health (mph) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (mac) fought 
over jurisdiction and policy, hindering efforts to control the spread of the virus. 
By the end of September, however, they began to cooperate with the Depart-
ment of Livestock Development (dld) on a surveillance and control program 
that they called the X- Ray.28
With the X- Ray, Thailand established an unpre ce dented active surveillance 
program for avian influenza. Most influenza surveillance systems are passive— 
that is, they collect and collate ad hoc reports from laboratories, physicians, or 
veterinarians. The who’s World Influenza Program exemplifies such passive 
surveillance. The central reference laboratories do not actively search for flu 
viruses across the globe but in fact depend on reports of outbreaks and sub-
missions of viral specimens from other laboratories around the world. Active 
surveillance, as its name implies, involves building infrastructure to actively 
search out disease across a par tic u lar territory or population. The Thailand 
X- Ray aimed to provide just such a “composite picture of hpai situation in 
Thailand” during a one- month period. The program established thousands 
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of surveillance and rapid response teams (srrts) that built upon and trans-
formed existing public health infrastructure, most notably adapting more than 
700,000 existing village health volunteers (vhvs) into a grassroots surveillance 
system.29 The vhvs investigated any unusual poultry or  human infection 
within their villages, sending reports of outbreaks to the srrts for subsequent 
field sampling and laboratory verification of the causal pathogen.
In addition to facilitating the Thai government’s control and eventual 
eradication of the virus, the X- Ray also produced a rich data archive. During 
the first month of the X- Ray, samples  were taken from 150,648 birds, of which 
724 tested positive for h5n1. The X- Ray also included a “door- to- door” poultry 
survey, in which vhvs collected detailed information from farmers about the 
breeds and size of their flocks.
The scale and quality of this data archive presented a unique opportunity 
for applying spatial ecol ogy to the prob lem of an emerging disease. In par tic u lar, 
Gilbert found the data useful  because the data were derived from active, rather 
than passive, surveillance. Although passive surveillance systems are suitable 
for the sentinel detection of emergent strains or unexpected outbreaks, their 
use for spatial modeling is very  limited. Passive surveillance provides no infor-
mation about geographic locations that did not report strains or outbreaks, and 
therefore is spatially biased. Active surveillance, by contrast, seeks out disease 
or pathogen in  every location included  under the surveillance system,  whether 
or not disease was reported  there, in order to confirm the presence or absence of 
the pathogen. As a result, a more complete spatial picture is created.
The X- Ray, in this case, constructed a database of diagnostically verified 
outbreak reports, including the geographic location and the date of all poultry 
outbreaks during a one- month period. At the same time,  because surveillance 
teams  were deployed in all communes across Thailand, the absence of reports 
of disease had also been verified to be the absence of  actual disease. The qual-
ity of this database allowed Gilbert to construct the first spatial model of the 
“invasion” of avian influenza h5n1.
In the model, Gilbert sought to determine the spatial associations between 
laboratory- confirmed presence of the h5n1 virus and a series of poultry and 
environmental variables, designated as risk  factors. The outputs of the models, 
as presented in the resulting 2006 publication, include a series of six maps of 
Thailand. Two of the maps show the distribution of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza outbreaks in chickens and ducks. The subsequent four maps depict 
the population distributions for broilers and layer hens, native chickens, free- 
grazing ducks, and meat and layer ducks. The counterintuitive results, math-
ematically explored with stepwise multiple logistic regressions,30 are actually 
PAT H O G E N I C  R E S E R V O I R S  57
vis i ble to the naked eye with a careful examination of the maps: the spatial 
pattern of outbreaks in chickens closely matches the locations of free- grazing 
duck populations, rather than the spatial distribution of chicken populations. 
As Gilbert and his coauthors explain, “Although most hpai outbreaks during 
the second epidemic in Thailand occurred in chickens, the spatial distribution 
of  these outbreaks does not correspond to areas with high densities of chick-
ens. . . .  Instead, the distribution pattern suggests an impor tant role of free- 
grazing ducks in rice paddies as in the central plains of Thailand.”31 In a joint 
report prepared for the fao and Thailand’s dld, Gilbert and coauthors stated 
their argument more forcefully: “The implication is that ducks may play a role 
in generating chicken outbreaks, but not the other way round.”32
By pointing to the importance of ducks in the ecol ogy of highly pathogenic 
avian influenza, Gilbert’s study reaffirms Shortridge’s decades- old claim. Pre-
cisely  because of this apparent continuity, however, Gilbert’s work exposes the 
displacements at stake in the turn from phyloge ne tics to eco- virology. For by 
shifting Shortridge’s virological results onto a spatial register, Gilbert opened 
up new perspectives and new approaches for inquiry.
Gilbert’s research objects are situated at a landscape scale rather than mo-
lecular scale. This displacement is particularly vis i ble when Gilbert reiterates 
one of the anecdotal claims about “traditional” agriculture that is at the center 
of Shortridge’s influenza epicenter hypothesis— the practice of allowing ducks 
to forage in rice paddies: “Traditional free- grazing duck husbandry in Thai-
land is characterized by the practice of frequent rotation of duck flocks in rice 
paddy fields  after the harvest, in which they are moved from 1 field to another 
 every 2 days to feed on leftover rice grains, insects, and snails. Duck husbandry 
involves frequent field movements of flocks that are brought together in shel-
ters often located within villages; with marketing of live birds and eggs ex-
tending beyond villages, apparently healthy ducks may play an impor tant role 
in virus transmission, which explains the observed spatial pattern of hpai.”33 
The ethnographic tone of this passage resembles the anecdotal descriptions of 
a “close bird/water/rice/man association” proposed by Shortridge and Stuart- 
Harris in their article on the influenza epicenter. Yet Gilbert, unlike Short-
ridge, began to turn this ideological claim into a scientific object by developing 
a series of mechanisms for analyzing and quantifying the relationship between 
ducks and rice. Along with collaborators in Thailand, for example, he began 
to explore Thailand’s rice- production statistics. Unexpectedly, the results did 
not show a  simple correlation between rice farming and free- grazing duck 
populations. Rather, he found that free- grazing duck populations tended to be 
larger in areas that cultivated multiple crops of rice each year. In areas where 
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farmers grew two or more crops on the same field, the “year round availability 
of post- harvest rice paddy fields” seemed to make free- grazing duck farming 
more likely.34
Nor did Gilbert stop with the claim that duck farming is linked with the 
agricultural practices and landscapes of the region. By showing that wet- rice- 
paddy cultivation (or more specifically, double- cropped rice) is linked to free- 
grazing duck populations, he argued that the one could analytically substitute 
for the other. And this substitution opened up a radical shift in the technical 
equipment of the experimental system, making pos si ble the study of influenza 
from a new viewpoint: from seven thousand kilo meters overhead.
“With the strong association between  free grazing ducks and hpai out-
breaks,” Gilbert wrote, “and also between rice and duck farming systems, an 
option that presented itself was to explore the application of remote sensing 
as a risk assessment decision support tool for hpai.”35 Although initially used 
in earth sciences and climate or atmospheric research, remote sensing gained 
purchase in ecological research during the 1980s and 1990s. More recently, the 
use of satellites to monitor landscape  drivers of disease emergence or vector 
movements— a field known as “tele- epidemiology”— has grown in prominence. 
In both cases the expansion in the use of satellite systems and remote sensing 
has paralleled the growth in commercially available imagery and better image 
resolution.36
In November 2005, Gilbert submitted a proposal to the fao for funds to 
investigate  whether satellite imagery could be used to predict the distribution 
of rice cultivation and  whether  these predictions could be used to assess avian 
influenza risk. As Chunglin Kwa has shown, the use of remote sensing often 
transposed the scale of ecological research away from “local ecologies” and 
field studies  toward regional or “mesoscale” landscapes.37 In this case the use of 
satellites as a new research instrument consolidated the shift from the molecu-
lar scale of viruses to a much broader landscape scale.
Gilbert sought the assistance of a research team led by Xiangming Xiao, a 
geospatial analyst who was already studying the use of satellite optical sensor 
data to predict rice- crop distribution. Xiao was born in China and has a degree 
in plant ecol ogy from the University of Science and Technology in Beijing, but 
did his advanced gradu ate studies in the United States. He is now a professor at 
the University of Oklahoma and the director of Oklahoma’s Center for Spatial 
Analy sis. However, he continues to conduct much of his research on China’s 
landscapes and in collaboration with Chinese research institutes. In a 2005 paper, 
Xiao and coauthors reported on the use of image data collected from the Moder-
ate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer sensor on nasa’s Terra satellite to 
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map paddy- rice agriculture in southern China.  Because the production of each 
crop of rice involves a flooding stage at the time of planting, the paper reports 
the identification of a spectral “fingerprint” (involving temporal shifts in the 
quantitative indices of vegetation and moisture detected by the satellite) that 
corresponds to the flooding of the paddies. By observing this fingerprint, Xiao’s 
team claims to be able to map the geography of double- cropping rice.38
At first, Gilbert and Xiao used  these remote sensing techniques to demon-
strate the relationship between free- grazing duck populations (as recorded in 
the X- Ray survey) and rice- cropping patterns.39 This was a preliminary step, a 
proof of concept, so that subsequent studies would now be able to use remote 
sensing of rice cropping as a substitute for free- grazing duck populations. An-
other study showed that the distribution of double- cropped rice, as identified 
by the satellite algorithm, was closely correlated with hpai outbreaks in both 
Thailand and Vietnam. The authors point out that the substitution of rice 
cropping for poultry statistics offers impor tant benefits to the experimental 
system: “An applied result of this study is that the distribution of rice cropping 
intensity can readily be established at any time and be used to complement tra-
ditional duck census data. Remote sensing data are available at a much greater 
spatial and temporal resolution than traditional censuses, thus allowing a fine- 
scale risk mapping.”40
Poultry censuses are notoriously inaccurate: they are conducted by govern-
ment agriculture departments, which are often inclined to inflate the num-
bers; they are conducted at most once per year; and they do not necessarily 
distinguish types of bird. Free- grazing ducks, in par tic u lar, are poorly captured 
in such official statistics:  free-grazing is a difference of farming practice rather 
than species. Satellite mapping of rice cropping therefore produces a more 
“generalizable” risk  factor than survey data on free- grazing duck distribution, 
as Gilbert explained in a 2011 conference pre sen ta tion I attended in Beijing.41
Julien Cappelle, a PhD student with Gilbert in disease ecol ogy, drew at-
tention to the significance of satellites in marking out the specificity of con-
temporary spatial ecol ogy and epidemiology. Much of the under lying methods 
of spatial analy sis can be traced back to the nineteenth  century, to early heroes 
such as John Snow. “What’s new are the tools,” especially remote sensing and 
satellite telemetry, Cappelle told me: “Satellite images, that’s been around for 
a while now, maybe forty, fifty years, but at the beginning it was  really military 
use only. Now  you’ve got a large range of satellites that are  really  here to ob-
serve the earth, and that produces a lot of images. From  these images you can 
actually get some environmental indicators.” With Xiao’s remote sensing system, 
he explained, you could map rice- cropping intensity at a landscape scale—or put 
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another way, you could map the variation in the distribution of what Short-
ridge had called bird/water/rice/man associations across a landscape.
Shortridge had sampled viruses, then broke them apart to understand their 
antigenic and genomic characteristics. Based on this work at a molecular or 
protein scale, he constructed hypotheses about the ecol ogy of the pandemic 
epicenter. Gilbert, Xiao, and  others now used satellites orbiting the Earth to 
document the spatial distribution of landscape and ecological features in order 
to better locate and differentiate the geography of viral emergence. Avian in-
fluenza was gaining a landscape topography, and soon this topography would 
begin to displace the hypothesis of the pandemic epicenter.
GAINING ENTRÉE
In 2009 Gilbert and Xiao co- organized the “International Workshop on 
Community- Based Data Synthesis, Analy sis and Modeling of Highly Patho-
genic Avian Influenza in Asia.” Phylogeographer Robert Wallace recalls that 
the Bangkok workshop took place in a large room with four long  tables ar-
ranged in a square formation. This spatial arrangement differed from the 
typical scientific conference, which is oriented  toward the reporting of results 
for peer evaluation and where a podium and Power Point screen face rows of 
straight- back chairs. Many of the participants did not know one another, and 
they came from widely disparate fields: ecological modelers and wildlife veteri-
narians, socioeconomists and molecular biologists, epidemiologists and policy 
analysts. The square  table created an architecture of familiarization for con-
fronting the unfamiliar.
Wallace found a “meeting of minds” where, despite diverse backgrounds 
and diff er ent experimental systems, every one was “looking for something  else.” 
The participants shared a certain antipathy  toward laboratory and virologi-
cal “reductions” of influenza epidemiology, Wallace remembers, and they all 
sought to “embed molecular pro cesses in the larger ecol ogy.” As should be clear 
from my discussion of Gilbert’s research, this search did not by any means in-
volve a rejection of virology or the germ theory. Rather, the ethos of looking 
for “something  else” reflects a hope that laboratory and molecular knowledge 
about viruses could be situated within a spatial and multispecies ecol ogy of 
viral emergence. Viral phyloge ne tics had dominated research on influenza 
since the 1970s, extending its purview to make claims about even the ecol ogy of 
influenza. The epistemic community taking shape in Bangkok would, over the 
next five years, propose a series of methods that resituated molecular phyloge-
ne tics within a broader “eco- virological approach.”42 The study of emerging 
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infectious diseases has famously been described as an effort to monitor “viral 
traffic,” that is, to observe and characterize the spillover of viruses from one 
species to another. Shortridge’s laboratory had even functioned as a “sentinel” 
to keep watch over traveling viruses.43 Now Gilbert and  others aimed to build a 
very diff er ent device: a map of the highways and bridges of viral traffic.
The pandemic epicenter loomed in the shadows of the gathering. During 
the Bangkok meeting “China was a big question mark,” Wallace reminded 
his colleagues at a subsequent meeting a year  later. As Wallace explained to 
me, “What came out of that discussion in Bangkok . . .  is that a lot of the 
new h5n1, vari ous, substrains, and new avian influenza  were coming out of 
southern China, and yet we  don’t have entrée into that . . .  and so  there was a 
sense of ‘Oh,  we’re talking about every thing but the most impor tant  thing of 
all on the  table which is what’s  going on in China.’ ” The epistemological dis-
placement of the “ecol ogy of influenza,” from laboratory phylogeny to spatial 
ecol ogy, now drove a spatial displacement of global health proj ects, biosecu-
rity interventions, and experimental systems into the epicenter. In the previous 
chapter I discussed Robert Webster and Graeme Laver’s intriguing, but largely 
disappointing, 1972 trip to China. Conferences and exchanges of virus samples 
increased during the 1980s and 1990s, but international scientific research on 
pandemic influenza remained at a remove from the agricultural landscapes of 
the epicenter. China’s laboratory infrastructure was slow to develop, which 
impacted domestic research and the international sharing of samples. As Guo 
Yuanji of China’s Institute of Virology explained in a 1985 letter, China had 
not sent “original specimens . . .  to the WHO Collaborating Center for refer-
ence and research on influenza in London or Atlanta for final identification” 
 because the Institute lacked “a good quality refrigerator to keep speciments 
and reagents.”44 And as virologist Gavin Smith recalls, despite the success of 
the Hong Kong laboratory’s experimental system in sampling and typing vi-
ruses, it was “too difficult po liti cally and too expensive” to get to the source of 
the animals on farms inside mainland China.45
As the interdisciplinarity of the Bangkok meeting hints, investigating the 
ecol ogy of viral emergence opened research on pandemic influenza to many 
scientific perspectives, including remote sensing of landscapes from satel-
lite imagery, tracking of wild- bird migration, surveys of poultry density, and 
modeling species interactions. Yet as Marius Gilbert  later told me,  these new 
perspectives typically required investigation or validation “on the ground,” in-
side the  actual landscapes of the epicenter. As a result, researchers like Gilbert, 
Xiao, and  others began to move their experimental systems from laboratory 
venues to field settings, and from scientific centers, including Geneva (who) 
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and Rome (fao),  toward the remote sites identified as hy po thet i cal epicenters 
inside China.
In the rest of this book I explore the consequences of  these displacements 
on the morphology of global health and scientific research on pandemic influ-
enza. To exit the laboratory means not only to leave  behind the microscopes 
and virus cultures that or ga nize the epistemic and experimental system of viral 
phyloge ne tics. In anthropology and science studies, the laboratory is much 
more than the iconic, white- walled  house of experiment; more importantly, 
the lab also invokes a distinctive model of scientific authority and expertise. To 
exit the laboratory, therefore, is also to raise new questions about the proper 
relationship between scientific knowledge and other modes of life, production, 
and politics. In moving from the laboratory to the epicenter, the validation 
of a new epistemology of ecol ogy required unexpected engagements with the 
cultural and po liti cal dimensions of China’s landscapes.
PA R T  I I
L A N D S C A P E
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The lowland region surrounding the Poyang Lake is crisscrossed with an  intricate 
system of man- made waterworks. High, earthwork dikes form rings around the 
lakeshore and line the riverbanks to prevent floods and extend agriculture onto 
fertile riverine soil. Irrigation ditches run alongside most roads. Small ponds, 
initially dug for fish farming, are scattered around villages.  Today, many of  these 
 water bodies have been repurposed for duck farming and are populated with 
flocks of swimming white birds. Duck sheds, made of wooden slats and plastic 
sheeting, often stand at the  water’s edge (see figure 3.1). “To drive anywhere,” 
wild bird researcher Scott Newman once remarked with amazement about the 
lake, “from any point A to point B, you see lots of duck farming.”
The scale of duck farming around the Poyang Lake is a local consequence of 
the livestock revolution that accompanied China’s post- Mao market reforms. 
From 1970 to 2017, China’s annual meat chicken production (per head) has 
grown from around 600 million to almost 10 billion, but duck production, 
though beginning from a smaller starting point, has grown just as fast. Duck 
production increased around fifteenfold, from around 150 million (1970) to 
2.25 billion (2017).1 China now accounts for roughly three- fourths of ducks pro-
duced in the entire world (see figure I.2).2 In the early 1980s, Jiangxi Province 
planning reports called for Poyang Lake to be developed as a “production base” 
for commercial waterfowl. According to recent data collected from county- level 
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agricultural yearbooks,  there are more than 14 million ducks raised in the re-
gion  today (around half as many as in the entire United States).3
The high visibility of ducks— easily seen from a van speeding along roads 
and highways, as Newman pointed out— also reflects the mode of husbandry 
common in the region. Most ducks are raised at least partly outdoors in what 
farmers refer to as fangyang or “ free-grazing.” In some instances, farmers let the 
ducks wander  free; in  others, they bring the ducks out of sheds and enclosures 
to graze  under supervision in fields, canals, and ponds. Rice paddies, in par tic-
u lar, play an impor tant role. Paddy- rice cultivation makes up over 90  percent 
of the sown area of all crops in the Poyang Lake region.4 In an agricultural 
technique known as daotian yangya, or “rice- duck coculture,” that dates back 
centuries, farmers purposefully bring ducks to graze in rice paddies. In this 
way, ducks get supplemental feed by gleaning rice left  after harvest and eating 
weeds or small insects. At the same time, they provide the rice crop with ser-
vices such as pest control and fertilization.5
As I showed in the previous chapter, scientific research on pandemic influ-
enza hypothesizes that a pathogenic landscape lurks amid this pastoral scene. 
Indeed, Kennedy Shortridge’s discovery of a reservoir of influenza viruses in 
domestic ducks directly influenced his identification of southern China as the 
FIGURE 3.1.  Adjacent duck sheds on canal.
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“epicenter” of influenza pandemics. In their classic 1982 article on the influ-
enza epicenter, Shortridge and C. H. Stuart- Harris wrote that rice- duck cocul-
ture, in par tic u lar, “provides a close bird/water/rice/man association that var-
ies with the seasons of rice- growing” and thereby promotes the “interchange of 
viruses between host species.”6 Recently, Marius Gilbert and colleagues showed 
that the spatial distribution of h5n1 influenza outbreaks closely matched the 
distribution of “traditional free- grazing duck husbandry.”7
In response to the pandemic threat posed by avian influenza,  these eco-
logical diagrams of viral emergence have been mobilized in two interconnected 
ways.8 First,  these diagrams enable par tic u lar places, such as Poyang Lake, to be 
identified as areas of relatively high risk for hpai outbreaks or viral emergence. 
As one Chinese- led study notes, the Poyang Lake area is a zone of increased 
“disease risk”  because “most backyard poultry raised in the Poyang lake area 
are in a  free ranging style.”9 One gradu ate student I met wrote a master’s thesis 
at a local Jiangxi university that compared known risk  factors such as “free- 
grazing poultry”— “drawn from expert knowledge and experience” that the 
student collected from published papers—to the  actual conditions and farm-
ing practices in the Poyang Lake region. One might say he superimposed the 
zoonotic diagram onto the forms of the  actual landscape. Second, ecological 
diagrams of viral emergence, and particularly  those that trace a chain of inter-
species infections, also mark out points of intervention, sites of prevention, or 
targets for disrupting chains of infection.10 In this regard, diagrams highlight-
ing the role of free- grazing ducks focus attention not only on a par tic u lar spe-
cies but also on practices such as husbandry techniques ( free-grazing) or farm 
infrastructure (enclosed housing).
This chapter examines how this scientific model of viral emergence became 
the basis for a program of biosecurity interventions on China’s farms in the 
global quest to prevent the next pandemic. I trace the Food and Agriculture 
Organ ization’s initial response to the reemergence of hpai h5n1 in 2003, and 
in par tic u lar how the fao translated pandemic preparedness into the idiom of 
rural development through the concept of biosecurity. Whereas who programs 
for pandemic preparedness largely focused on national response planning, 
virus surveillance, and the development of new vaccines, fao officers argued 
that the way to prevent a pandemic was to control the virus “at source.” In a 
plea for donor funding, the fao explained that “The Avian Influenza (ai) virus 
has had a considerable eco nom ical and social impact on affected countries and 
could potentially lead to a new global  human influenza pandemic. Therefore, it 
is in the interest of developed and developing countries to invest in the control 
and containment of the virus. Control of highly pathogenic avian influenza 
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(hpai) at source means managing transmission of the virus where the disease 
occurs—in poultry, specifically  free range chickens and in wetland dwelling 
ducks— and curbing hpai occurrence in . . .  Asia before other regions of the 
globe are affected.”11 For the fao, “targeting the disease at source of infection” 
meant intervening in two domains: geo graph i cally, in Asia, and ecologically, in 
free- grazing poultry.12
The fao justified its own involvement in part according to its traditional 
mission to protect livestock- based economies and food security. As Phil Harris, 
an fao information officer, put it, “Avian influenza remains a potential risk 
to  humans but a real risk to animals.” At the same time, the fao for the first 
time began to position its work as a crucial component of pandemic prepared-
ness and bulwark for  human health. In this regard, Harris pointed out that 
“where animal disease poses a potential threat to  human health, fao’s role is 
to advise on the best methods to contain the disease at the level of animals, pre-
vent its recurrence and undertake research to identify ways of eradicating the 
disease. . . .  The current state of play is that avian influenza is an animal health 
issue and the focus must be on attacking the prob lem at source—in animals.”13
Pandemic preparedness operates in a mode of potential uncertainty— that 
is, pandemics are thought about and acted upon as incalculable  futures and 
therefore uninsurable risks.14 Although the probability that a par tic u lar strain 
 will cause a pandemic cannot be statistically enumerated, the potential threat 
of a pandemic would cause catastrophic consequences for global health. In-
deed, avian influenza viruses such as the h5n1 strain are often referred to as 
viruses with “pandemic potential.”15 Social science scholarship on pandemic 
preparedness has drawn attention to programs such as vaccine development 
and stockpiling, the construction of early- warning surveillance systems, and 
scenario- based exercises— emphasizing how  these techniques aim not to pre-
vent an emergency but to survive or mitigate one.16 By contrast, the fao’s work 
in Asia shows that the anticipation of the potential pandemic is configured 
differently in the spaces defined as “sources” of pathogens than in the wealthy 
countries that seek “self- protection” from pandemic threats.17 The potential 
uncertainty of the next pandemic brings global health from labs and hospi-
tals to the rural farms of the hy po thet i cal epicenter. And on the farm, even 
if a pandemic threat is only a potential  future, the logic of emergency drives 
immediate— and sometimes violent— interventions into the bodies and rela-
tions of animals and  humans.
In this chapter I examine how this mode of uncertainty  shaped interven-
tions into China’s hy po thet i cal influenza epicenter— including culling of dis-
eased birds, closing of markets, and long- term efforts to reduce the number of 
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smallholder poultry farms and free- grazing practices. I track the development 
of fao policies for pandemic preparedness alongside China’s own biosecurity 
planning. Then, drawing on my fieldwork with poultry farmers in the Po -
yang Lake region, I show how biosecurity programs intersected with China’s 
livestock revolution in unexpected ways. In par tic u lar, I compare the fao’s as-
sessment of free- grazing poultry disease risk with the very diff er ent risk assess-
ments made by poultry farmers in the Poyang Lake region.
To be clear, I must distinguish this from the comparison of expert and lay 
risk perceptions that characterizes research into the public understanding of 
science.18 Rather than seeking to uncover the local knowledge, implicit dis-
trust, or critical potential of poultry farmers, I instead highlight the interac-
tion between two anticipatory states: (1) the potential uncertainty through which 
flu scientists turned southern China (and Poyang Lake) into a hy po thet i cal 
source of  future pandemics, that is, a pandemic epicenter, and (2) the vital un­
certainty that surrounds the work of duck farming at the Poyang Lake, where 
duck farmers configure market regimes of debt and profit with the growth and 
life of the ducks. By documenting this interaction, the chapter shows how the 
initial encounters at the pandemic epicenter between global health and agri-
cultural production increased, rather than reduced, uncertainty for both farm-
ers and global health models. The unexpected dimensions and scales of Poyang 
Lake’s working landscapes displaced efforts to impose control “at source.”
TEMPOS OF PREPAREDNESS
The fao’s biosecurity interventions moved into the pandemic epicenter 
according to three distinct tempos: an emergency response to an urgent out-
break (seeking eradication of a circulating virus), an immunological approach to 
containment, and a developmental program to reform agricultural practices in 
order to “reduce risks of outbreaks as a long- term mea sure.”19
At first, in response to outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza vi-
ruses, the fao recommended the culling of infected and surrounding flocks of 
poultry and the institution of movement and trade controls, or what is known 
as a policy of “stamping out”: “When outbreaks of h5n1 or other hpai viruses 
occur, immediate stamping out is the most appropriate and the first response 
of Veterinary Authorities and it is most likely to be successful when it is com-
bined with movement controls, decontamination of infected premises and 
proper surveillance and monitoring.”20
 Until the mid-1990s, culling birds on and around affected farms had suc-
cessfully controlled all hpai outbreaks. Most of  these outbreaks took place in 
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the industrial poultry sector in Eu rope or North Amer i ca, with the largest out-
break striking Pennsylvania farms in 1983–84. Only during the 1990s, during 
hpai outbreaks in Mexico and Pakistan, did culling begin to show its limits. 
In a 2000 review article, leading avian influenza researchers David Swayne 
and David Suarez still stated that “eradication is the only  viable option” for 
hpai, discouraged strategies based on control or management of disease, and 
recommended a “stamping- out or slaughter program for all hpai” outbreaks.21 
Abigail Woods, in a history of foot- and- mouth disease in the UK, has pointed 
out that the urgency of “stamping out” often exceeded scientific or epidemio-
logical utility, leading to costly slaughter of animals without effective control 
of the disease.22 It is certainly true that the specter of an imminent  human 
pandemic heightened the urgency of poultry disease control at the epicenter, 
driving the slaughter of poultry in Asia to an enormous scale. More than 100 
million chickens  were culled in Asia between 2004 and 2005 alone.23
Culling was usually combined with movement and trade controls, such as 
closing of live- poultry markets. Although such control mea sures appear less 
violent than forced slaughter, the impact on farmers was often enormous and 
stretched far beyond the outbreak zone.  Because compensation programs for 
culled birds or lost markets  were usually insufficient or non ex is tent, farmers 
lost capital investments and sometimes even subverted the objective of bio-
security interventions by illegally selling poultry to traders at cut- rate prices. 
Within China, a debate emerged about appropriate compensation levels and 
the efficacy of market closure.24
Second, fao officials and  others raised concerns that “stamping out” was 
not eradicating the virus from farms in China or several other Southeast Asian 
countries (especially Vietnam and Indonesia). Indeed, hpai h5n1 increasingly 
appeared to be an endemic, rather than epidemic, disease. At a conference in 
Chiang Mai in September– October 2004, Se nior Officer Juan Lubroth (fao, 
Emergency Prevention System for Animal Health [empres]) noted that “while 
stamping out is the preferred option vaccination is a suitable tool and can be 
used as a precursor to stamping out.” Lubroth suggested that stamping out was 
most effective in situations of “early detection/small outbreak,” whereas “vac-
cination as an ancillary tool” was suitable in cases of “delayed detection” or 
where  there  were “ limited abilities” to achieve eradication. By late 2005, China 
would embark on a universal mandatory vaccination program.25
Third, the fao also sought to transform the ecol ogy and epidemiology of 
the epicenter over a longer duration.26 To ensure eradication and the more 
permanent transformation of the epicenter, fao position papers called for 
changes to the ways farmers in rural China farmed poultry. At the pandemic 
L I V E S T O C K  R E V O L U T I O N S  71
epicenter, as research moved from viruses to the agro- ecologies that drive viral 
emergence, the apocalyptic framing of  future emergency became entwined 
with a more long- standing orientation to the  future: rural development. In 
what I call a model of biosecurity development, the fao proposed the “restructur-
ing” of duck farming as a long- term approach to pandemic risk. This model 
linked improvements in farm biosecurity with increases in scale and commer-
cial integration, suggesting that a linear trajectory of agricultural development 
would enhance pandemic preparedness.
In a series of position papers on the improvement of farm “biosecurity,” the 
fao charted a new  future for the poultry farms inside the influenza epicen-
ter.27 What did the fao mean by this highly polysemous term?28 Biosecurity 
for avian influenza involves the “implementation of practices that create barri-
ers in order to reduce the risk of the introduction and spread of disease agents,” 
according to a 2008 technical paper.29 The three principal ele ments of biosecu-
rity are segregation, cleaning, and disinfection: each is a technique of separa-
tion.30 Biosecurity regulates the conduct of relations between living beings, 
including  those between  humans and animals, between poultry of diff er ent 
species, and between domestic and wild animals.31 Biosecurity practices range 
across a wide variety of scales. Gloves or plastic shoe covers help to maintain 
barriers between  humans and animals. The construction of enclosed housing 
keeps domestic birds separated from wild birds. Disinfection protocols, includ-
ing the targeted use of disinfectant sprays, keep each shed or farm separated 
from  others.
The poultry shed, in which the flock is enclosed and protected, is the icon 
of biosecurity. One fao report noted that “a well- organized entrance with 
a barrier, used to exclude most  people and objects,” makes for the “single 
most impor tant mea sure that any poultry unit can take to decrease the 
risk of infection.”32 Conversely, the free- grazing flock is figured as the great-
est threat or obstacle to biosecure poultry farming. “While it is feasible to 
tighten biosecurity on commercial poultry farms,” an early paper points out, 
“this may be more difficult, or impossible, in the case of non- commercial 
enterprises, such as back- yard production systems, particularly where flocks 
forage outdoors.”33
In the initial response to the avian flu crisis, the fao situated the pathway 
of biosecurity improvement, including material changes such as housing con-
struction, within a broader model of economic transition. The route  toward 
biosecurity, according to several fao papers, lay in the “restructuring” of the 
poultry sector: “Restructuring of poultry sectors  will play an impor tant part 
of long term prevention. . . .  Successful restructuring  will play a critical role 
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improving biosecurity to prevent spread during the current epidemic and 
reduce risk of outbreaks as a long- term mea sure.”34 Through this model of 
restructuring, pandemic preparedness is synchronized and overlapped with 
developmental models of economic change. Biosecurity at the epicenter brings 
emergency and development into a common space and time.
Indeed, much like classical modernization and development theories, plans 
for restructuring rely on a step- based pro cess of transition and a typology of 
developmental states. What is new is that in the analytic of restructuring, the 
developmental pro cess is now paired with improvements in control or preven-
tion of disease. Each developmental stage is not only an economic transforma-
tion but also a reduction of biological risk. In one of the organ ization’s first 
position papers on the avian influenza crisis, the fao developed a conceptual 
distinction between four diff er ent “production sectors” of poultry farming. 
The sectors are differentiated according to two  factors: level of “farm biosecu-
rity” and “system used to market products.” Yet  these are not treated as two 
in de pen dent variables. Rather, level of farm biosecurity is tied to marketing 
system in the definitions of each model sector:
SECTOR 1   Industrial integrated system with high- level biosecurity and 
birds/products marketed commercially (e.g., farms that are part of an inte-
grated broiler production enterprise with clearly defined and implemented 
standard operating procedures for biosecurity).
SECTOR 2  Commercial poultry production system with moderate to high bio-
security and birds/products usually marketed commercially (e.g., farms with 
birds kept indoors continuously; strictly preventing contact with other poul-
try or wildlife).
SECTOR 3   Commercial poultry production system with low to minimal bio-
security and birds/products usually entering live- bird markets (e.g., a caged 
layer farm with birds in open sheds, a farm with poultry spending time 
outside the shed, a farm producing chickens and waterfowl).
SECTOR 4   Village or backyard production with minimal biosecurity and 
birds/products consumed locally.35
The typology implies that increases in farm scale and industrial integration 
 will inherently bring improvements to biosecurity. As Olivier Charnoz and 
Paul Forster have asked about this typology, “The question  here is how could 
anyone who subscribes to this world- view not see the lower numbered sections 
as being more implicated in the generation and spread of a disease?”36
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In a 2007 paper, Olaf Thieme and Emmanuelle Guerne Bleich of the fao’s 
Animal Production Ser vice define “restructuring” as “change of a production 
system through external interventions,” in contrast with structural change 
“driven by market forces.” The primary purpose of restructuring is “to increase 
bio security in order to help with control & eradication of disease and make 
products safer for consumers.” Indeed, Thieme and Guerne Bleich emphasize 
that the “main purpose [of restructuring] is to make production safer not to 
increase size of operations.” However, in a “plan” developed for a case study 
in Vietnam, they outline three concrete interventions: (1) increase proportion 
of big commercial farms; (2) relocate commercial farms to specific production 
zones, out of urban areas; and (3) redirect market chains  toward selling of pro-
cessed poultry.37 They note that the impact of this plan on farmers, especially 
duck farmers, would be “substantial” and that in the case of duck farming in 
par tic u lar, “planned restructuring  will lead to a completely new production 
system.”
Instead of suggesting a  simple trajectory of increased scale, Thieme and 
Guerne Bleich are proposing a pro cess of integration and standardization that is 
closely associated with larger- scale, capital- intensive poultry farming. Critical 
geographers have documented the ways in which biosecurity and food- safety 
regulation are linked to, or promote the development of, capital- intensive and 
industrialized forms of agricultural economy. John Law, for example, notes 
that the dominant response to the United Kingdom’s foot- and- mouth disease 
(fmd) disaster reflects a hope for “uniformity” in regulation of meat produc-
tion. “The aspiration,” he writes of con temporary industrial agriculture, “is to 
standardize flows and exchanges on a global scale.”38 Hinchliffe and colleagues 
have further highlighted how the “purifying schemes” and “ will to closure” 
of farm biosecurity often support par tic u lar business models of large- scale, 
vertical integration. “In the industry,” they write, “biosecurity is perceived to 
be more effective in tightly coupled, highly integrated production pro cesses, 
where large organ izations can effectively exercise control across the length and 
breadth of the food chain and design-in barriers and buffers to keep the system 
disease- free.”39 More broadly, Elizabeth Dunn has shown how food standards 
 favor large- scale industrial farms and often force consolidation. Writing of the 
introduction of Eu ro pean Union food- safety standards to Poland, she shows 
that the strictness of standards has the effect of driving out small slaughter-
houses that cannot keep up with capital- intensive upgrades needed to meet 
regulatory requirements.40 And other critics have suggested that the infra-
structures and methods of intensive, industrial poultry farming in fact play a 
significant role in the emergence and transmission of avian influenza viruses, 
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precisely due to their high throughput, tight coupling, homogenous breeds, 
and large- scale trading networks.41
When pandemic- preparedness programs first moved into the epicenter, 
fao plans called for the restructuring of the poultry sector. The potential un-
certainty that a  human, global pandemic  will emerge from farm ecologies in 
southern China drove an intensifying effort to enclose and separate relations 
among animals and between species. Further,  these plans proposed that bio-
security interventions— such as construction of enclosed housing— should be 
linked with economic transitions  toward large- scale, integrated farming. They 
synchronized and overlapped two distinct logics of space and time: global 
emergency (the potential uncertainty of a  future pandemic) and rural devel-
opment (a linear transition from “backyard” production to “industrial inte-
gration”). Restructuring rural China’s agriculture, they proposed, would help 
prevent the next global pandemic.
SCALING UP
During my time working with the Emergency Center in Beijing, I found 
that China’s Veterinary Bureau readily  adopted the fao’s biosecurity dis-
course, and even more readily its focus on developmental transformation of 
small- scale and free- grazing farms. Indeed, the officials and state- employed 
veterinarians that I met tended to elide the fao’s four sectors into a simpler 
opposition between “scale” (guimo) and “dispersed” (sanyang) farms. When de-
veloping a mock farm survey during a training program that I attended, for in-
stance, the state- employed vets spent much of their time identifying a suitable 
quantitative boundary to distinguish “scale farms” (guimo chang) from “scat-
tered” or “house hold farms” (sanhu, nonghu), eventually selecting two hundred 
for pigs and one thousand for poultry. They also explained to me that China’s 
poultry industry was distinctive, compared with countries like the United 
States,  because of the concurrence and adjacency of scale and scattered farms. 
For example, one young veterinarian told me that a par tic u lar area of Henan 
Province was suitable for a research proj ect  because it was “representative”: 
“ these areas have both scale husbandry [guimo yangzhi] and scattered [sanyang],” 
he explained.
This typology can be (and often is) loosely correlated with the common-
place English- language classifications of farms as “industrial” and “backyard,” 
but  there are par tic u lar meanings associated with the Chinese terminology. 
First, guimo (“scale”) is used to mean large scale. The term scale is shifted in this 
usage from a mea sure ment tool to a relational position on the ruler itself.42 The 
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implication is that sanyang poultry farms not merely are small scale but, more 
importantly, have not crossed a critical threshold to achieve scale.
Second, by opposing “scale” to “scattered”— rather than merely opposing 
large and small scales— the terminological distinction equates the scale of 
farm size with the form of husbandry practice. Sanyang (literally, “scattered 
husbandry”) means to raise livestock or poultry outside of a pen or enclo-
sure: to  free graze. In this sense, “scale” implicitly refers not only to the size 
of farm or number of animals but also to the built structures and farming 
techniques through which animals are enclosed and managed. The opposi-
tion draws on a model of agricultural modernization based in the Eu ro pean 
and American historical experience, in which poultry  were moved indoors 
and raised  under increasingly controlled conditions as the scale of farms 
grew.43 It also suggests that large- scale farms, associated with infrastruc-
tures of enclosure and containment, are more biosecure and less vulnerable 
to infection.
State- employed veterinarians referred to the objective of agrarian develop-
ment during the post- Mao era as a trajectory of guimohua— a pro cess of “reach-
ing scale” or “scaling up.” Andrew Donaldson and Qian Forrest Zhang helpfully 
distinguish the reform era into two moments of agrarian change. In the first, 
during the late 1970s and 1980s, the state divided communal farms and distrib-
uted land- use rights, as well as production and supply quotas, to  house holds: 
the so- called House hold Responsibility System. Farm sizes  were very small, av-
eraging 0.7 hectares per  house hold.44 At the same time, rural markets opened, 
and  house hold farmers began to undertake sideline— and then specialized— 
farming of cash crops or livestock for market sale. By 1990, however, Deng 
Xiaoping was calling for a second stage of agricultural reform, or what Deng 
called a second “leap”: “The reform and development of China’s socialist ag-
riculture, from the long- term perspective, requires two  great leaps (liangge fei­
yue). The first leap is dismantling  peoples’ communes and implementing the 
House hold Responsibility reform. This is a  great advance and should be kept 
in the long term. The second leap is meeting the needs of scientific agriculture 
and socialized production, properly developing scaled-up operation, and devel-
oping the collective economy.”45
The second leap, as Deng elaborated, involves mechanisms such as col­
lectivization and intensification in order to “industry- ize” (chanyehua) rural 
agriculture— that is, to help transition rural farming from a primary mode of 
production to secondary production that would pro cess agriculture goods into 
products. The goal of government policy in this area is to replace “one  family, 
one  house hold scattered [fensan] production” with orga nizational models that 
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 will “intensify” land use, increase the scale of agricultural production, and re-
duce risk for farmers.
Crucially, however, intensification and increased scale would not replace 
household- scale farms as the “predominant production unit” but would rather 
aim to transform them through what Phillip C. C. Huang has called “new- age 
small farming.”46 China’s agricultural development policies aimed to achieve 
economies of scale through mechanisms of vertical integration. According to 
Huang, the concept of vertical integration “gained the stature of official spon-
sorship” and was frequently used “to represent the pre sent and  future of Chi-
na’s agricultural modernizations.”47 Although  there are several mechanisms 
of vertical integration, all aim to unify a large number of small- scale primary 
producers within an integrated, or centrally managed, supply chain from pro-
duction through pro cessing to marketing.
By far the most significant of  these mechanisms of vertical integration has 
been for- profit agribusiness “dragon- head enterprises” (longtou qiye).48 Dragon 
heads are private agribusinesses that are designated by central and local govern-
ments for their role in vertically leading farmers into pro cessing and marketing 
through the formation of integrated supply chains. By meeting certain criteria 
in terms of size and financial profile, enterprises designated as dragon heads are 
provided with subsidies, preferential tax treatment, and loans.49 Some of the 
most successful dragon heads are in the poultry sector, particularly in broiler 
farming, including Thailand’s cp group and Guangdong Province– based Wen’s 
Foodstuff. Initiated in 2000 with 151 enterprises,  there  were 110,000 officially 
designated dragon heads by 2011. Moreover, at least according to official statis-
tics,  these dragon heads had enrolled 110 million rural  house holds as producers 
and accounted for more than 60  percent of crop production area, 70  percent 
of livestock (pigs and poultry), and 80  percent of aquaculture production.50
In the wake of the pandemic influenza threat, the association of emerging 
disease risks with backyard poultry provided a new justification for scaling up 
poultry farming. Figuring rural China as suffering from an incomplete transi-
tion to scale, veterinarians argued that food safety and animal disease control 
faced unique challenges in con temporary China. “ There are too many small 
farmers,” a dean from the China Animal Health and Epidemiology Center ex-
plained at a conference on food safety in animal products I attended in 2011. 
“The level of intensive farming is too low.” As the director of China’s Veteri-
nary Bureau elaborated in a published interview, China’s livestock husbandry 
is still predominantly “scattered,” with only a small proportion of scale ( guimo) 
farms, rendering state surveillance and management extremely difficult.51 This 
opposition between large- scale (biosecure) and small- scale (low biosecurity) 
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was also applied at Poyang Lake to explain the distinctive pandemic risk of the 
region. In a report on risk  factors at Poyang Lake, a Chinese team conveys what 
they claim to be a description made by a “local veterinarian”: “Local veterinar-
ian told us that commercial farms usually operate on a large scale and poultry 
is generally kept in high density and enclosed housing conditions with high bio -
security mea sures. On the contrary, the majority of backyard poultry  owners 
raises the poultry in open yards in a small scale, and do not apply much bio-
security mea sures. The flocks are raised for  owners’ consumption only.”52
Was China’s livestock revolution following the pathways  toward biosecu-
rity development and increased scale outlined by the fao and the Ministry of 
Agriculture? How was quantitative scale configured with qualitative mode of 
husbandry?
QUANTIT IES AND QUALIT IES
At Poyang Lake, I found that scale  doesn’t always increase according to 
plan. As I traveled across Nanchang, Poyang, and Yongxiu counties, which sur-
round the south side of the Poyang Lake, I saw that scale was often an emer-
gent property of a landscape. Alongside the long irrigation ditches that line 
the roads, duck sheds often perch on the artificial embankments just above. 
In other areas, duck sheds belonging to diff er ent  house holds are located ad-
jacently, sometimes gathered in groups around a common pond, forming in-
formal “husbandry zones” ( yangzhi xiaoqu) that mirror the cluster of  houses in 
the villages. Although each  house hold might raise only two or three thousand 
ducks,  these emergent, loosely coordinated agglomerations can reach scales of 
hundreds of thousands of birds (figure I.2).
Confronted with the  actual landscapes of the livestock revolution, it was 
clear to me that the fao’s typology of sectors did not capture the qualitative 
changes in poultry farming. Searching for a more anthropological analy sis of 
 these changes, I found sociologist Li Huaiyan’s description of transition from 
“sideline” to “specialized” modes of animal husbandry helpful. Drawing on a 
long- term study of a Jiangsu village, Li traced how the distribution of collec-
tive farmland to  house holds drove a social transformation of livestock farming 
practices. Li points out that before the 1980s, most farm  labor was devoted to 
work on collective fields and this work was paid for in shares of the collectively 
harvested crop. At the same time, however, “each  house hold raised a  limited 
number of chickens, pigs, or goats only to augment its primary income from 
the production team.”  Because this was secondary work, done in spare time, “they 
did not care much about . . .  cost and profit.” Li calls this mode of farming the 
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sideline.53 As historian Jonathan Unger has noted, the Maoist state generally 
allowed sideline farming, but certain po liti cal campaigns, such as during the 
Cultural Revolution, “forced through reductions in the size of private plots 
[and] implemented very strict limits on the number of ducks and chickens 
farmers could raise.”54
 After the 1980s, in Li’s historical account, and especially during the 1990s, 
“Raising a large number of such animals became a  family business that gener-
ated most of the  family’s income. Therefore, the  family had to carefully cal-
culate its  labor and capital input to make a profit.” Li calls  these “specialized” 
 house holds (zhuanyehu), adopting a term used in rural development policy pro-
grams during the period to indicate a  house hold that focuses on the produc-
tion of a single crop or livestock breed.
Li’s diagnostic distinction is crucial, and it shows how shifts in farm scale 
 were tied to shifts in mode of production and farmer subjectivity, but its his-
torical narrative is too linear. His account implies a unified historical transi-
tion from sideline to specialized farm that closely resembles the developmental 
model from scattered to scale. In the Poyang countryside, I found that although 
the geography of duck farming does contain an opposition between sideline 
and specialized, the opposition is not structured as a developmental transition. 
For by and large, I found,  those farmers who have begun to “specialize” in rais-
ing ducks as part of a commercial business also continue to raise another flock 
of ducks “on the side.”
Consider Chen, for example, a duck farmer I visited whose  house stands 
beside the main road near the Lian River, south of Nanchang. Chen invited 
us into the front door of his  house and then immediately showed us out the 
back door, where a poured concrete courtyard sloped down into a man- made 
pond. Around forty ducks and geese swam in the pond, ranging across a wide 
variety of sizes, colors, and breeds. Pointing at the birds, I began to ask some of 
the questions I had prepared. Did the  house hold primarily earn money from 
selling eggs or from selling  these birds for meat?
Chen stared at us for a moment, as if not comprehending the question, and 
then burst into laughter. “ These birds?  These birds  aren’t any good to sell! All 
of  these our  family raises to eat, for eating at the New Year!”
As we laughed together at my  mistake, his wife suddenly pointed across the 
rice fields: “But we do raise  those other ducks down  there. . . .” Now I was the 
one who was confused. Chen kindly offered to show us, and brought us to a 
shed about a ten- minute walk across the rice fields.  Here we saw five thousand 
layer ducks, raised by the  family for eggs that they sold at the Xiaolan whole-
sale market. Eventually, when laying productivity began to decrease, they 
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would also sell the ducks to a broker who would bring them to a live- poultry 
market for sale as meat.  Here was a surprising scale boundary, a distinction of 
quantity and quality drawn within a single  house hold. Chen raised two flocks 
of ducks and separated them physically and conceptually: one flock for the 
 family to eat and one flock for the market.
I soon found similar practices at farms across the Poyang Lake region. 
 There are three modes of separation that distinguish the two flocks. The first 
is the physical relationship of the birds to the  family home. As we saw, the 
Chen  family keeps ducks and geese raised for  family consumption immediately 
 behind the  house. The birds freely roam around the small pond  there and are 
allowed into the rice fields that surround the  house on three sides. Notably, 
although plastic fencing surrounds the small kitchen garden to keep the ducks 
out,  there is no fencing to keep ducks in anywhere. In some of the  house holds I 
visited, small sheds are built for ducks to spend the night. In many cases ducks 
are left in the open air. Farmers assured me that ducks huddle together for 
warmth and  will not suffer during the cold winter. During the day, ducks move 
freely. Ducks are famous for their ability to find their own way home at night: 
in one village I stayed in, the ducks returned from the river or rice fields in the 
eve ning, peeling off in twos or threes to return to the  house holds that raise 
them.
By contrast, the Chen  family keeps ducks raised for the commercial market 
at some distance from the  house, where they are enclosed by wire mesh fencing 
and a small duck shed (see figure 3.2). Duck sheds are often built of wooden or 
bamboo poles and partly wrapped with plastic sheeting.  Others are more dura-
bly constructed out of brick or concrete blocks. They are erected next to small 
man- made ponds, canals, and other bodies of  water. A fence encircles a stretch 
of land in front of the shed and a portion of the  water for the ducks to swim in.
The re distribution of land usufruct rights from collectives to individual 
 house holds was a precondition for the emergence of what Li Huaiyan called the 
“specialized” farm  house hold. However, the growth of specialized  house holds 
engaged in farming of ducks for the commercial market has given rise to ad-
ditional transformations of village space. For example, in Shibahu, the village 
I stayed in when I visited the Wang  family’s wild goose farm (to be discussed 
in chapter 4), the commercial duck sheds are separated from each  house hold, 
but they are also located close to the duck sheds of other  house holds. Some-
times this spatial arrangement is formalized in village policy. According to law, 
rural land is divided into three categories: farmland, construction land (i.e., for 
 house hold construction), and unused land. Crucially, “basic farmland” cannot 
be converted from crop cultivation to other uses, such as animal husbandry. In 
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response to the growth in commercial livestock farming, the 2006 Livestock 
Law directs local governments to make comprehensive land- use plans that des-
ignate some land for crop cultivation and other land for livestock farming, re-
ferred to as “husbandry zones” ( yangzhi xiaoqu).55 Villa gers are able to contract 
land in  these zones for raising poultry and even constructing permanent sheds, 
but  after the contracts expire, land must be returned to its original use.
Two distinct spatial patterns emerge: the ducks raised for the market are 
both separated from the space of the  family’s  house and partially enclosed by 
physical structures and fencing. By contrast, the ducks raised for  family con-
sumption are adjacent to the  family  house hold and allowed to roam freely with-
out enclosure.
Feeding is a second axis of separation. The Chen  family feeds the ducks that 
they raise for their own consumption leftover scraps from the kitchen  table, 
along with unshucked and unpolished rice harvested from the  house hold’s 
own rice fields. Chen emphasized that he fed the ducks in the pond by his 
 house exactly the same foods eaten by the  family. By contrast, ducks raised for 
sale in the market are primarily fed manufactured feeds. In the Poyang Lake 
region, farmers often buy feed in large sacks at the  wholesale egg market where 
they deliver their eggs. When Chen took us to see the ducks in the large shed, 
FIGURE 3.2.  A typical duck shed near Poyang Lake.
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he waved around a bag of feed and scattered some grains to attract the birds 
 toward us. By contrast, he reiterated that the ducks he farmed for his own 
 family’s consumption “never eat manufactured feed.”
Practices of eating together, or commensality, are fundamental to the 
formation of social relationships, as well as the marking of social bound aries 
through inclusion or exclusion.56 As Marilyn Strathern has recently pointed 
out, however, feeding practices can produce or break social relations just as 
powerfully as eating practices can.57 In this sense the feeding of leftover scraps 
to the  family ducks enacts a kind of trans- species commensality. Although 
the ducks are not eating at the same  table as the  family, or literally “breaking 
bread” together, they are eating the same foods cooked in the same pots. The 
animal pet provides an insightful model for thinking  here. In a classic essay on 
human– animal relations, Edmund Leach suggested that En glish attitudes of 
friendly familiarity  toward pigs  were partly  shaped by the (historical) status 
of pigs as “commensal associates”: “pigs, like dogs,  were [ until recently in rural 
 England] fed from the leftovers of their  human masters’ kitchens.”58 Fausto 
and Costa have recently drawn attention to Amazonian practices of feeding 
pets as productive of asymmetric, rather than commensal, social relations. In 
some cases, though, when the bond between an owner and her pet becomes 
strong, the “relation of feeding veer[s]  towards commensality.”59
In the Poyang Lake region, the feeding of leftovers and  house hold rice to 
ducks is a semi- commensal practice that increases nearness between ducks and 
their masters. Conversely, the feeding of commercially manufactured feeds 
excludes the market- bound ducks from commensal relations with the  family. 
This is particularly significant  because the rise and growth of commercial duck 
farming are closely, even intrinsically, tied to the growth of the pro cessed ani-
mal feed industry. Manufactured feeds enable the in de pen dence of duck farm-
ing from the constraints of natu ral contexts and local settings, and therefore 
remove limitations on the quantity of ducks raised in a par tic u lar space.60 As 
inputs of feed grow, so can outputs of poultry eggs or meat in an almost linear 
fashion, no longer  limited by the quantity of available surplus grain or forag-
ing opportunities in the surrounding landscape. Ke Bingsheng, a scholar of 
China’s rural economy, argues that “the emergence and development of the 
pro cessed feed industry have played a decisive role in shaping the structure of 
the livestock sector in China.” Indeed, the growth of the feed industry, which 
Ke points out “developed literally from scratch” in the late 1970s, directly par-
allels the growth in poultry production.61 Yet ducks raised for  family consump-
tion are never fed commercially purchased feeds. Instead, they are fed leftovers 
and  house hold rice. Through feeding practices, the ducks raised for  house hold 
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consumption are “brought close” to the  house hold, while ducks raised for mar-
ket sale are “pushed farther” from the  house hold.62
A third mode of separation is reflected in the purpose and outcome of pro-
duction: the ducks raised in the sheds are produced for the market, whereas 
the ducks raised  behind the  house are destined for  family consumption. In 
order to further develop this impor tant distinction, however, we need to look 
more closely at the par tic u lar form and trajectory of the layer- duck market in 
the Poyang Lake region.
 CENTURY EGGS AND OLD  MOTHER DUCKS
Most commercial duck farmers in the Poyang Lake region raise layer ducks, 
that is, egg- laying ducks. Approximately  every week or two, farmers join to-
gether with kin or village associates to rent trucks and deliver eggs to the 
regional Xiaolan  wholesale egg market just south of Nanchang. The Xiaolan 
market is one of the largest  wholesale egg markets in China, and farmers from 
across the Poyang region sell eggs  there. When the Xiaolan market opens 
around six in the morning, the buyers of duck and quail eggs who lease shop 
space begin to set up their scales. Soon  after, farmers pull into the marketplace 
in large trucks. In most cases, four or five farmers engage a driver and a truck to 
bring their eggs to market. The farmers sit with the driver up front in the cab, 
with wooden boxes of eggs piled high on the truck bed. The trucks slowly lurch 
to a stop, unloading their passengers near the center of the market. At this 
central square, farmers and buyers meet in small agonistic clusters to haggle 
the daily price of eggs. Beneath a high plastic and metal roof, open to the air 
at one end, the egg exchange is dim, lit only by indirect, raking sunlight (see 
figure 3.3).
At the Xiaolan market the dominant buyers of duck eggs are the repre-
sentatives from local pidan (“ century egg”) factories.  These factories preserve 
duck eggs in a mixture of clay, ash, salt, quicklime, and rice husks  until they 
become almost black. Even more than the initial market transaction, the pres-
ervation pro cess crystallizes value, confirming the transformation of duck 
eggs into commodities. On the one hand, a rather- poor- tasting duck egg (in 
China, rarely eaten fresh) is turned into a delicacy. On the other, a fresh egg 
with a  limited shelf life becomes a preserved egg, enabling the factories to ship 
 century eggs to consumers across China and even export them internationally.
For  these reasons, it is not surprising that the preserved- egg factory bosses 
wield asymmetric power in the determination of prices negotiated at the 
 wholesale market. Even in the dim light, the factory  owners and reps clearly 
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stand out from the farmers, several driving shiny black luxury sedans into the 
dusty marketplace. Even though I could see that farmers  were prob ably get-
ting a raw deal and had few alternative outlets, I was still confused when I was 
first told that farmers make no money at all from the sale of eggs. Although 
prices fluctuate, on most days farmers only break even once they  factor in the 
purchase cost of manufactured feeds. They purchase feeds in large sacks, from 
stalls located in the same marketplace, and load the sacks onto their trucks 
to bring back to the village. By watching the trucks entering and leaving the 
market, one might  mistake the economy for a bartered exchange of eggs for 
feeds (see figure 3.4). And indeed, some farmers told me they are not even paid 
in cash, but rather in credit slips that must be used to directly acquire feeds 
from vendors at the market.  These farmers suspected that preserved- egg fac-
tory bosses colluded to hold the price of eggs down or conspired with feed 
vendors to ensure profits.
Gradually, I learned that  whether or not the preserved- egg bosses actually 
fixed prices, the sale of eggs was never  imagined to be the only way farmers 
make money from raising layer ducks. Indeed, the farmers earn much of their 
money when the egg- laying productivity of the ducks begins to decline at the 
end of a one- year cycle.  These spent ducks, as they are called in En glish, or lao­
FIGURE 3.3. Trucks inside the Xiaolan Poultry Wholesale Market south of Nanchang.
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muya (“Old  Mother Ducks”) as they are more melodiously named in Chinese, 
are a delicacy that can be sold on the market for a higher price than standard, 
raised- for- meat ducks (rouya, known in En glish as  table ducklings).
The reason for their higher market value is precisely  because of their long 
life, at least one year of age. One of the most significant consequences of inten-
sive poultry production methods, such as  those that accompanied the industrial 
production of broiler chickens and  table ducklings in China, is the shortening 
of time from birth to slaughter. Indeed, the invention of the broiler or “spring 
chicken” industry in the 1930s was initially an incidental outlet for excess juve-
nile males: only a few full- grown roosters had any use. In the U.S. between 1940 
and 1995, the average broiler live weight increased from 2.89 pounds to 4.63 
pounds, while the time required for a bird to grow from chick to market weight 
dropped from over seventy days to less than fifty.63 For  table ducklings,  those 
ducks raised exclusively for meat, industrial feeds and breeding reduced grow- 
out to slaughter time from seventy-five days in 1928 to thirty-five days in 1993.64 
In China’s livestock revolution the same methods of “agro- industrial just- in- 
time” pioneered in the United States— contract  farming, vertical integration 
FIGURE 3.4.  Groups of farmers rent trucks to transport eggs to the Xiaolan wholesale 
market. A truck loaded with manufactured feeds and the now-empty crates used to 
transport eggs is prepared for the journey home.
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of the entire product chain, scientifically controlled breeding— also dramati-
cally reduced the growth times of broilers and meat ducks.65
In this context, Chinese consumers turn to Old  Mother Ducks— because of 
their relatively old age— for tastes and healthful qualities that more rapidly grown 
and slaughtered meat ducks are suspected to lack. Often served in soups with 
a  simple ginger broth, Old  Mother Ducks are a bu (supplemental) cuisine, be-
lieved to transmit medicinal or restorative powers. Resembling the growth in 
artisanal cheese or local pork in the United States, the Old  Mother Duck re-
flects the emergence of consumer food markets in con temporary China based 
around sentiments of place and quality amid worries about food safety and 
homogeneity.66
Farmers are keenly aware of this added value, and many reminded me that 
Old  Mother Ducks can fetch much more money per weight than common 
meat ducks. They are well- known delicacies. Yet I was surprised to find that 
the farmers themselves do not see, or taste,  these qualities in the Old  Mother 
Ducks that they raise. Although they knew the ducks  will become valuable 
food, they insisted that to them  these ducks are unpalatable and bad to eat. The 
poor taste, they explained, is  because  these commercial ducks are raised on 
manufactured animal feeds.
The additional farming of ducks “on the side” is, therefore, a renewed form 
of farming for self- consumption. This farming for self- consumption is nothing 
like a “subsistence ethic” focused on ensuring the means for a basic living.67 
Instead, even as farmers embark on the business of raising thousands of layer 
ducks for sale as eggs and meat, they also continue to raise a separate flock of 
ducks according to a diff er ent value: to have tasty duck meat for their own 
 family’s consumption on special occasions (e.g., the New Year holiday) and 
for gift giving.68 As one farmer explained to me, he raised ducks on the side 
 because only that kind of duck is “good to eat, an au then tic local product [tu 
chanpin].69 They  haven’t eaten commercial feeds;  those that eat commercial 
feeds  aren’t delicious.”
Similar distinctions have been recently noted by a number of anthropolo-
gists studying in rural China. Anna Lora- Wainwright, in an anthropologi-
cal study of cancer in rural China, describes how farmers willingly use farm 
chemicals— such as pesticides and fertilizers—on cash crops destined for mar-
ket sale. Yet they refuse to use  these same chemicals, despite their ready avail-
ability, for “food intended for home consumption.” Although they acknowl-
edge and affirm that  these chemicals lead to higher productivity, they never 
use them on the kitchen gardens and crops they  will consume themselves. This 
difference in practices is associated with a difference in evaluations: the farmers 
86 C H A P T E R  T H R E E
say that crops grown in their kitchen gardens, without farm chemicals, taste 
better. In addition, they attribute cancer to the consumption of cash crops 
treated with farm chemicals or to working in  these fields, suggesting, Lora- 
Wainwright argues, that they favorably appraise the healthfulness of food grown 
in their own kitchen gardens. Lora- Wainwright also notes that villa gers deploy 
similar distinctions in pig farming.70
Gonçalo Santos, discussing a village in Guangdong, remarks on the surpris-
ingly per sis tent use of  human manure, or night soil— and especially urine—as 
a fertilizer in con temporary China. Before the introduction of chemical fertil-
izers during the 1960s and 1970s, night soil was used on most fields in China. 
 Today, by contrast,  human manure is applied exclusively on private kitchen gar-
dens. One farmer cited by Santos explains that “ ‘urine- fed vegetables’ taste 
better than vegetables grown with farm chemicals.” This man pointed out 
that farmers used industrial chemicals on crops grown for “economic” pur-
poses, but most villa gers “producing vegetable for self- consumption use ‘wa-
tered urine’ in their small gardens.”71 Ellen Oxfeld also describes a preference 
for homegrown over market- purchased vegetables among residents of a rural 
Guangdong village, a preference that she finds is associated with the minimal 
use of pesticides and chemical fertilizers in  these kitchen gardens.72
Unpacking the con temporary opposition between “specialized” commer-
cial farming and “sideline”  house hold farming helps show why models of linear 
restructuring, such as  those proposed by fao biosecurity plans, are unlikely to 
be fulfilled. So- called backyard farming is not, or is no longer, a consequence of 
subsistence- based constraints or lack of access to commercial inputs (such as 
manufactured feeds). Rather, small- scale, by- the- side- of- the- house duck farm-
ing persists as a choice based on values of producing a certain quality of food 
for the  family.  These values remain even when the  house hold is engaged in 
commercial husbandry as well. As a result, small- scale free- grazing or “scat-
tered” (sanyang) husbandry is unlikely to dis appear, even if access to capital and 
inputs for restructuring is increased through development plans that extend 
the reach of “dragon- head” corporations.
Perhaps I could end the discussion  there. However, the troubling interac-
tions between the fao’s initial biosecurity plans for restructuring the epicen-
ter and the  actual landscapes of duck farming in the Poyang Lake region go 
further. As I discussed above, duck farmers often  house their market ducks in 
special sheds, frequently at some distance from  human habitations. In many 
re spects, therefore, it appears that  these specialized commercial farms contain 
an incipient kernel of biosecure husbandry.  After all, enclosure is widely 
seen as the core of farm biosecurity. Yet I found that the deep insecurity of 
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commercial duck farming in the Poyang Lake region— structured by what I 
call vital uncertainty— limited the consistency of enclosure. Even when farmers 
raised tens of thousands of ducks in enclosed sheds, that is, they still brought 
them to graze in rice fields. And paradoxically, as I show in the final section, the 
anticipatory discourses that identify Poyang Lake as a pandemic epicenter 
only further increased farmers’ reliance on free- grazing practices.
VITAL UNCERTAINTY
As ducks are excluded from the  house hold and raised in the specialized 
husbandry zones, as they come to stand for their market value rather than 
their edibility, they take on a novel temporal character— they stand as a certain 
kind of  future that might come to be: gain or loss, wealth or ruin. Rather than 
participants in the annual life of the  house hold, the specialized ducks become 
embodiments of  house hold wealth— merely a moment in the transformation 
of money into more (or less) money. The identification of market ducks, raised 
on manufactured feeds, as nonfood (according to the farmers’ tastes)— and as 
stock rather than commensal associates— turns market- oriented ducks into a liv-
ing embodiment of capital risk.73
Of course, all market economy is driven by the uncertainty of invest-
ment. However, the making of living beings into commodities  faces a unique 
mode of vital uncertainty. A farmer once told me an idiomatic expression, 
one that, he said, would help me understand how poultry farmers engage 
with their birds:
家财万贯 jia cai wan guan
带毛的不算 dai maode bu suan
When counting the  house hold’s wealth in strings of cash,
 Don’t include  those with fur and feathers.
This is the traditional view of Chinese farmers, he explained: despite the 
money that can be made from livestock farming, one can never be certain that 
animals count as part of the  house hold’s wealth. Why? I asked him.  Because 
they are vulnerable to die unexpectedly from disease.
 Whether or not the expression accurately represents traditional view-
points, the uncertainty of placing the  house hold’s wealth in the living bodies 
of domestic animals is a useful key to the practices and affects of duck farm-
ers in the Poyang Lake region  today. Alongside the opportunity for gain made 
pos si ble through the business of duck farming has come the threat of ruin. 
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The lowlands around the lake are scattered with abandoned duck sheds, literal 
ruins that exist as vis i ble reminders of farmers who tried out the duck- raising 
business and failed (see figure 3.5).
As we walked with Chen out to his commercial duck shed, we passed a 
series of run- down sheds. “ They’ve all gone broke,” Chen told me. When farm-
ers spoke about what had changed in the farming of poultry over recent years, 
they talked about new challenges, about farmers giving up on duck farming, 
or reducing the size of their flocks, about financial ruin. Almost always they 
blamed disease. “ These days raising ducks is no good,” one farmer told me. 
“Too many diseases. Especially the ‘flu’ (liugan). That liugan, it’s hard to cure. 
For one, it’s hard to cure; for another, it’s dangerous, it’s highly contagious. We 
 really fear that liugan.”
Tang, the duck technician we first met in the Introduction on the embank-
ment of the bird refuge, explained to me that “the one  thing that has changed: 
more diseases. Too many ducks, too much pollution.” He elaborated: “Gener-
ally, if the  water is good, then it’s fine. [The ducks]  won’t fall sick. Only if the 
 water source  isn’t good, if say you raise ducks in a place for five years, or ten 
years? If the ducks, you raise ten batches, or five batches, the place  can’t sup-
port it; it’s too long.”
FIGURE 3.5. A duck shed in ruins.
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South of Nanchang, Ms. T, a small- scale duck farmer, suggested it was not 
so much the  water quality as the density of ducks that brought diseases. Her 
duck shed is directly across a courtyard from her  house, but facing away from 
the  house  toward a large pool of  water. She explained that  every year, between 
the ninth and the eleventh month on the agricultural calendar, her flocks have 
been struck by disease.  Because the egg production drops when the ducks are 
sick, each year she has lost her capital, as feed costs exceeded earnings from the 
sale of eggs. As a result, over the years she has reduced the number of ducks 
she raises from eight thousand to three thousand, and this year only raised 
sixteen hundred. She explained that the diseases arrive  because  there are too 
many ducks farmed in this region. “Density of husbandry is too high. Too 
many ducks.”
Agricultural production contains a distinctive mode of uncertainty  because 
 human  labor is only a partial driver of the production pro cess. The object of ag-
ricultural production is a living being, so production involves a pro cess of natu-
ral growth that is, to a greater or lesser extent, in de pen dent of  human  labor. 
Marx pointed out that not all of “production time” is made up of “working 
time”; that is, the time of production is not completely occupied by  human 
 labor. In addition to  human  labor’s transformation of objects into products, 
many spheres of production also contain times “during which the subject of 
 labor is for a longer or shorter time subjected to natu ral pro cess, must undergo 
physical, chemical, and physiological changes, during which the labor- process 
is entirely or partially suspended.” Marx suggested that this time of production 
played an especially impor tant role where production involved pro cesses of 
fermentation, preservation, or agricultural growth.74
The capital or wealth invested in agricultural production depends as much 
on  these nonlabored growth pro cesses as it does on the transformative work of 
 human  labor. When ducks are designated as carriers of  house hold wealth, this 
wealth is exposed to a mode of uncertainty that goes beyond the characteristic 
risks of capital investment. This mode of uncertainty lies at the intersection 
of biological disease and market institutions. What if the ducks do not grow? 
What if they  will not live?75
To be clear, I am not claiming that sideline duck farms are biologically less 
vulnerable to disease than commercial farms. Many farmers spoke of disease 
afflicting sideline flocks and of duck or chicken “plagues” sweeping across vil-
lages. The novelty of the recent liugan is not that ducks are falling sick for 
the first time, but rather that in the context of specialized farming sick ducks 
carry the threat of ruin. It is telling, therefore, that the sideline farming of 
ducks does not produce the same affect of uncertainty in the face of disease. 
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When sideline ducks sicken or die from disease, farmers simply slaughter or 
butcher and consume the birds.  Because  little or no capital is invested in the 
lives of the sideline ducks, the  house hold’s wealth was never at stake. And 
although the bird’s life might have been shorter than expected, its end was the 
same: food for the  house hold  table. When disease strikes a market flock in the 
“husbandry zone,” on the other hand, the outcome is quite diff er ent. In many 
cases the birds cannot be sold at all, but must be burned, buried, or other wise 
disposed of. In some cases, they are exchanged for government compensation 
but at a severe loss. In other cases, farmers illegally sell them to traders at cut- 
rate prices.76
As farmers aim to mitigate this vital uncertainty, a new domain of prac-
tice has emerged. Anthropologists have long noted that although  labor has no 
material impact during the time of production, this by no means indicates an 
absence of agricultural practices. Algerian farmers frequently visited the fields 
when  there was nothing to do  there, Pierre Bourdieu noted.77 Edmund Leach 
noted that the “customary procedure” of Kachin rice growing involves much 
more than “technical acts of a functional kind.”78 Trobriand gardeners had a 
“surprising care for the aesthetics of gardening,” as Bronislaw Malinowski put 
it.79 Alfred Gell added that Trobriand gardens “are meticulously laid out in 
squares . . .  according to a symmetrical pattern which has nothing to do with 
technical efficiency.”80
Based on  these insights, Malinowski proposed a conceptual distinction be-
tween “the way of garden work,” or technical  labor, and “the way of magic,” 
such as the spells incanted over the garden that aimed to assist the tubers in 
their under ground growth. Malinowski’s “way of magic,” in short, refers to 
 those practices intended to encourage growth without the direct application 
of  labor.81 We should extend Malinowski’s insight beyond what he considered 
the special domain of the magical. What is at stake is the response to a general 
prob lem to vital uncertainty, one that is particularly acute in agricultural pro-
duction. Growth  will always retain a certain heteronomy to direct instrumen-
tal rationalization; the production time of raising ducks is longer and diff er ent 
from the time that the farmer spends in direct husbandry work. Disease, which 
arrives unexpectedly and irregularly, appears as the actualization of the uncer-
tainty inherent when growing living beings for a market. Rather than a distinc-
tion between technical work and magic, we can distinguish two domains of 
technical activity: the first directly encouraging the growth of the ducks and 
the second aimed at mitigating vital uncertainties.
For example, phar ma ceu ti cal treatment of duck diseases is a flourishing 
business. As I walked from the local bus station on my first visit to the Xiaolan 
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poultry egg  wholesale market, I was perplexed to see an enormous, square red 
banner hung outside the entrance, emblazoned with a single white character: 
药 ( yao, medicine). I thought for a moment that I must have arrived at the 
wrong place: maybe this was a medicine market? In fact, the egg market is lined 
both outside and inside with small shops selling medicinal preparations to treat 
poultry diseases— including both Chinese herbs and “Western” phar ma ceu ti-
cals in pill  bottles. The  owners of  these shops act as veterinarians, or what I 
call duck doctors, despite only  limited training and frequent absence of official 
license. As I describe in chapter 6,  these duck doctors diagnose disease, some-
times visiting farms or cutting open dead birds, and prescribe treatments.82
The boom in livestock phar ma ceu ti cals reflects the growth in vital uncer-
tainty experienced by farmers— that is to say, it indexes the emergence of a 
new domain of technical practice above and beyond duck husbandry proper. 
Interestingly, many farmers explic itly marked out the space of phar ma ceu ti cal 
treatment as an area beyond their own experience and practice. Farmers told 
me that for “small diseases” they had enough knowledge and experience to 
respond effectively themselves, but for “new” and “big” diseases they relied on 
the expertise of the duck doctors.
Immunization of poultry is a second new technical practice. In 2005 Chi-
na’s State Council issued a new policy requiring mandatory universal immuni-
zation of poultry, including ducks, against the highly pathogenic avian influ-
enza h5n1. With over 5 billion poultry, the enormous ambition of this proj ect 
is obvious. I discuss the vaccination program in more detail, along with some of 
the scientific controversies that it engendered, in chapter 5. But how have rural 
farmers taken up the vaccination program? The necessity of vaccination— 
although it cannot be said to be exactly universal—is now an everyday and 
widely accepted part of market duck farming in the Poyang region. Indeed, 
almost whenever the topic of disease is broached, a farmer  will assert that he or 
she vaccinated the flocks. Chen, for example, explained that all of his market 
ducks are vaccinated. Tang told me that avian influenza (qinliugan) is not a very 
serious threat  because “you can ‘hit’ [da qinliugan], vaccinate [dazhen]; it’s only 
if you  don’t vaccinate that it’s not OK.”
Along with the material practices involved in the techniques and tech-
nology of vaccination, the policy of universal poultry immunization has also 
transmitted a distinctive mode of uncertainty from the state to the rural farm: 
an orientation  toward the  future based around the idea of prevention. The slo-
gan “Make Prevention the Priority” is painted on walls and printed on posters 
across the countryside. This slogan was popu lar in Mao- era public health, such 
as in the antimalaria and anti- schistosomiasis campaigns of the 1950s.  These 
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campaigns, initially conducted during a time in which biomedical resources 
 were scarce, relied on mass mobilization to transform environments and re-
move dangerous pests. In the Poyang Lake region, for example, collective  labor 
constructed dykes, drained marshes, and removed the snails that  were impli-
cated in the transmission of schistosomiasis.83 By the 1960s and 1970s, a new 
configuration that linked phar ma ceu ti cal innovation, industrial manufacture, 
and  free drug distribution transformed the meaning of prevention and led to 
the successful control of both diseases.84
In the case of avian influenza, prevention has been concretized in the vac-
cine vial and needle, producing a novel integration between biomedical exper-
tise and mass mobilization. The h5n1 vaccines are developed at the Key Labo-
ratory for Avian Influenza in Harbin, one of the most sophisticated animal 
disease research labs in China and a central actor in the state- led response to 
avian flu. The vaccines are manufactured at a series of rapidly growing biotech 
companies.  These vaccines are then distributed to farmers through county- 
level veterinary stations. As a result, farmers in the Poyang Lake region speak 
of vaccination as “ doing prevention” (da yufang or gao yufang) (see figure 3.6).85
When I most recently returned to the Poyang region, I found that a third 
technology for managing vital uncertainty has now emerged. A farmer told 
FIGURE 3.6.  A vial containing vaccine for HPAI H5N1.
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me that he had signed up for “duck raising insurance” ( yangya baoxian). Over 
the past  couple of years, the government had permitted insurance companies 
to sell policies to duck farmers  because of the threat of disease. A payment of 
one yuan per bird, for example, would merit a payout of three yuan if the bird 
died from disease. Duck disease, like the ducks themselves, now circulated on 
a market.
PROB LEM AMPLIF ICATION
Has pandemic- preparedness planning been translated into trajectories 
of biosecurity development in places like Poyang Lake? On the one hand, a 
combination of disease outbreaks and biosecurity interventions such as forced 
culling or market closure did drive a large number of smallholder farmers out 
of business.86 At Poyang Lake the combination of market and disease pres-
sures left  behind the ruined duck sheds that I described above. This collapse 
of smallholder poultry enterprises intersected with China’s policies for scaling 
up production. According to China’s 1996 national poultry census, more than 
104 million  house holds raised poultry, and 96.8  percent raised 50 birds or less. 
By 2005,  after the first wave of avian influenza outbreaks,  there  were only 34.6 
million  house holds raising poultry, and nearly half of all poultry  were raised by 
“scale” farms with more than 1,000 birds.87 By 2009, only 30  percent of poultry 
farmers raised fewer than 2,000 birds, and more than 200 farms raised more 
than 1 million birds per year.88 However, in this chapter I have suggested that 
a closer look at this trajectory in the Poyang Lake region reveals a much less 
linear pro cess of transition. Indeed, abandoning production is not the only way 
that farmers respond to new uncertainties and pressures.
Consider the way that farmers talk about avian influenza. Many farmers 
carefully distinguish between liugan (“flu”) and qinliugan (“avian influenza”). 
Ms. T, for example, complained that her ducks had been afflicted by liugan 
 toward the end of  every year, but she denied that she had ever had a case of 
qinliugan.89 At first this was perplexing to me: ducks are an avian (i.e., qin) spe-
cies, so  wouldn’t any duck liugan be, by definition, qinliugan?
One farmer fi nally enlightened me. In addition to disease and market pres-
sures, he said, farmers strugg led with the impact of what he called “the greater 
environment.” Qinliugan, he explained, exemplified such recontextualizing 
forces. Beyond referring to  actual outbreaks of a specific disease, the term car-
ried additional senses: it also embodied the aura of popu lar fear and state bio-
security interventions associated with the prospects of pandemic flu. When 
qinliugan broke out anywhere in China, he continued, the  actual infection of 
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poultry flocks with the virus was by no means the most devastating impact 
on farmers. Rather, farmers suffered  because of government interventions and 
consumer reactions to the publicity of the outbreak.90 The government legally 
restricted trade in poultry, closed poultry markets, and enforced the massive 
slaughter of birds. Compensation was absent or inadequate. Consumers, for 
their part, suddenly refused to purchase or eat any poultry.91 Many farmers in 
the Poyang Lake region had been ruined when the government closed down 
live- poultry markets and sealed off all poultry trade in response to an out-
break of avian influenza, as a trader at the Nanchang live- poultry market also 
told me.
But unexpectedly, this intensification of vital uncertainty appears to en-
courage, rather than limit, the practice of free- grazing ducks. Recall that it is 
the remainder of production time, its excess over directed husbandry work, 
which opens up the distinctive vital uncertainty of commercial duck farming. 
Further, the scale of that uncertainty is  shaped by the interplay of two forces: 
market prices (for the cost of feed and the earnings from eggs or ducks) and 
disease (causing lower productivity or even death of the birds). As a result, it 
is pos si ble to reduce uncertainty not only by managing the threat of disease 
(through vaccination or drugs, for instance) but also by managing the scale of 
market uncertainty. Duck- raising insurance is a  great example: it does nothing 
to treat the diseases that ducks suffer, but it does manage the uncertainty of 
duck disease by transforming it into a financially insurable risk.
 Free-grazing is a practice that manages uncertainty by reducing market 
exposure rather than directly protecting the health and life of the ducks. 
Duck free-grazing allows farmers to reduce costs spent on feed, reducing the 
amount of  house hold wealth that is staked on the life of the ducks. There-
fore, as duck farming has increased in intensity and scale, and although mar-
ket ducks tend to be held in the semi- enclosed spaces of the husbandry zone, 
free- grazing practices did not dis appear. The only  thing that changed was the 
form and tempo of  free-grazing. Ducks raised in a “specialized” commercial 
mode, unlike sideline ducks, are no longer left to graze throughout the day and 
throughout the year. On the contrary, market ducks are kept in specially built 
sheds and fenced enclosures for most of the year. Then, during intensive graz-
ing phases— usually immediately  after harvest or before planting— the farmer 
drives ducks to rice paddies throughout the region to glean unharvested rice 
and insects (see figure 3.7).92 Farmers rely on  these intensive grazing phases 
to reduce the overhead costs of manufactured feed and ensure that the sale 
of “spent ducks”  will be profitable.93 Unexpectedly, the intensification of vital 
uncertainty caused by the global response to the threat of pandemic influenza 
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may drive poultry farming practices along a trajectory that is at odds with 
plans for biosecurity development.
The identification of rural China as an epicenter of pandemic influenza is 
grounded in the apparent danger of free- grazing ducks, whose promiscuous 
movements and contacts with other species could lead to the emergence of 
new flu viruses. As a result, when new avian viruses such as h5n1 emerged, 
global health agencies declared free- grazing ducks to be a key risk  factor and 
proposed biosecurity interventions, such as culling, market closures, and im-
provements in biosecurity, to manage risk. When  these biosecurity interven-
tions increased the uncertainty of duck farming in the Poyang Lake region, 
however, farmers saw  free-grazing as a crucial mechanism for reducing what I 
have called their vital uncertainties and protecting their investments. A posi-
tive feedback loop began to take shape, a cir cuit in which biosecurity inter-
ventions and farming strategies amplified each other and new uncertainties 
appeared.
By the end of 2011, as I finished my fieldwork in China, the fao was be-
coming aware of  these displacements to its initial biosecurity models. An fao 
report on “lessons learned” from the hpai outbreak featured a discussion of bio -
security planning and its unintended outcomes. “In general,” the authors of the 
FIGURE 3.7.  Grazing ducks in a rice paddy  after the harvest.
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report acknowledged, “considering the complexity of, and variation within, 
the commercial poultry industry throughout the region, solutions developed 
locally through direct engagement with stakeholders have been more effective 
than solutions imported from other regions.”94 In the next chapter I consider 
the additional displacements that took place when scientists did directly en-
gage with the inhabitants of the pandemic epicenter.
C H A P T E R   F O U R
W I L D  G O O S E  C H A S E
On a December day in 2007, an American wildlife veterinarian named Scott 
Newman stood in a rice paddy near the shore of the Poyang Lake. He looked up 
as a flock of swan geese lurched into flight and circled in the sky overhead (see 
figure 4.1). Anser cygnoides, he thought to himself. Swan geese. Newman knew 
 these birds. Both a doctor of veterinary medicine and a PhD in wildlife and 
disease ecol ogy, he had worked for the Wildlife Health Alliance, the Wildlife 
Trust, and the Wildlife Conservation Society. Hired by the fao in 2006 to co-
ordinate international research on the role of wild birds in avian influenza, he 
had brought a team to Poyang Lake to study how long- distance bird migration 
might drive the emergence of influenza pandemics.
Newman and his team planned to surgically attach transponder tags and 
antennas to migratory birds, including swan geese, in order to track them by 
satellite both at Poyang Lake and when they migrated north in the spring. 
The team designed the study to better understand how, where, and when wild 
birds come into contact with domestic poultry. According to their hypothesis, 
contacts across what they called the “wild bird– domestic poultry disease inter-
face” may encourage the reassortment and emergence of pandemic flu viruses. 
Drawing on lengthy traditions in wildlife management and wildlife health, the 
study focused on a boundary that separates two forms of animal life: the wild 
and the domestic.1
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As he watched the flock of swan geese flying above him, Newman felt puz-
zled, he  later recounted to me. Swan geese, he knew, are an endangered species 
of wild waterfowl. But according to what a poultry farmer had just told him, 
the geese above him  were not wild. Indeed,  these swan geese belonged to the 
farmer, who had bred, incubated, hatched, raised,  housed, and fed them in 
preparation for slaughter and sale. Then again, Newman wondered  whether 
the birds could  really be considered domestic. They  were hardly tame. And the 
farmer kept insisting on their wildness, their delicious wild taste. To validate 
their au then tic wildness, the farmer prodded Newman to watch them in flight, 
reminding him—of course he  hadn’t forgotten— that domestic geese  can’t fly. 
Newman agreed that they resembled wild swan geese so closely that even true 
wild birds would be unable to recognize the difference.
Newman had come to Poyang Lake to study the interface between wild and 
domestic birds. But he found that poultry breeders  were actively recompos-
ing the material qualities of wildness and domesticity in their husbandry of 
swan geese. Despite the apparent contradiction in terms, they  were breeding 
wildness.
This chapter explores the displacements to scientific practices that occur 
when scientists move experimental systems into the working landscapes of the 
FIGURE 4.1.  Farmed swan geese (dayan) in flight.
W I L D  G O O S E  C H A S E  99
pandemic epicenter. Despite the universal scope of validity claimed by scien-
tific facts, historical and ethnographic studies of scientific practice demon-
strate that the content of knowledge is  shaped by the local spaces of inquiry.2 
At the same time, the vast majority of historical and ethnographic studies of 
the sciences have focused on one par tic u lar kind of scientific venue: the labo-
ratory. No doubt, the historical emergence of the laboratory is central to the 
rise of modern science and medicine.3 Equally impor tant, the laboratory has 
been a strategic site for studying science in the making  because fieldwork in-
side labs makes vis i ble the concrete devices and equipment that undergird the 
construction of global facts.
Based on specific empirical studies of scientific practice, laboratory eth-
nographies developed a model of scientific knowledge production that Karin 
Knorr- Cetina has aptly characterized as detachment: “Laboratories rarely work 
with objects as they occur in nature”: the epistemological advantage of labora-
tory work lies in “the detachment of the objects from a natu ral environment 
and their installation in a new phenomenal field defined by social agents.”4 De­
tachment is an incisive term  because it captures the spatial movement of mate-
rial objects from their natu ral environments into the lab and it also describes 
how the laboratory reinforces a so cio log i cal separation between scientific ex-
perts (inside) and other lay actors (outside). Scientists work to maintain their 
detachment from laypeople— both defending their distinct professional status 
and protecting themselves from unwanted influences or bias. The laboratory is 
the tool that enables the interrelated detachment of both objects and subjects 
of science. Understanding the lab as a tool rather than a place, anthropological 
and so cio log i cal accounts of science extended the idea of laboratory practice 
beyond the “houses where experiments take place.”5 The procedures and pro-
tocols of detachment that characterize laboratory practice— for instance, the 
collection of inscriptions or standard traces— came to stand for scientific prac-
tice more generally. “For the world to become knowable,” Bruno Latour has 
argued, “it must become a laboratory.”6
As some historians have emphasized, however, the laboratory has been only 
one among many sites of scientific inquiry, and differences of place do  matter 
for the ways in which knowledge is produced.7 One area that has become a 
growing focus of interest is the distinctive epistemological and cultural char-
acteristics of the field sciences. Modern science in the field takes shape in the 
shadow of the historical ascendancy of the laboratory as the dominant form 
of scientific practice. As the laboratory  rose in epistemic status, therefore, “ ‘the 
field’ was si mul ta neously reconstructed as the residuum of messy, complex, and 
uncontrollable nature.”8 Science in the field is distinctive, Henrika Kuklick and 
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Robert Kohler argue,  because “unlike laboratories, natu ral sites can never be 
exclusively scientific domains.”9 Laboratory ethnographies exposed the practi-
cal work conducted by scientists to exclude society or environment from the 
controlled space of the lab. Science in the field, by contrast, necessarily takes 
place amid what environmental historians have called a “working landscape,” 
a setting already being produced and reproduced for a wide variety of  human 
ends.10  Because the objects of field sciences are studied in situ, the work of 
building authoritative knowledge must respond in one way or another to the 
other inhabitants of the field site.
 Because of this residual history of field research,  there is a tendency to 
distinguish and classify the sciences into lab and field va ri e ties. Yet as Robert 
Kohler shows, the boundary between laboratory and field, though often “well 
patrolled,” is highly permeable: “The cultural geography of field and lab is like 
a biogeographic ecotone, an area where two biota intermingle and where nei-
ther has a clear advantage, and where we expect to find the odd hybrid.”11 This 
chapter explores the changing trajectory of influenza research as it moves from 
labs into the fields of the hy po thet i cal pandemic epicenter. It follows Kohler’s 
call to attend to “border crossings” between lab and field spaces, exploring how 
new knowledge is made as experimental systems move out from laboratory 
centers. Extending the model of laboratory detachment to explain all forms of 
scientific practice has resulted in a monomorphism that neglects other forms 
of scientific work and development.  Here I describe a trajectory that I call field 
displacement, in which poultry farmers, the producers of this working envi-
ronment, reshape the form of a scientific research object in unexpected ways, 
creating in the pro cess an “unpre ce dented event” that changes the course of 
scientific knowledge.12
VICTIMS OR VECTORS
A 2005 outbreak of avian influenza a h5n1 on China’s northwestern plateau 
crystallized the movement from laboratory to field around the figure of the 
migratory bird. During that spring, Chinese park rangers found thousands of 
dead birds on an island in the  middle of the remote Qinghai Lake. According to 
Scott Newman’s appraisal, it was “the single largest h5n1 wild bird mortality 
event that has ever occurred.”13 In its sheer scale the Qinghai epizootic indi-
cated sustained transmission of the virus among wild birds.  Later that same 
year, several dead birds, infected with the h5n1 strain, dropped out of the sky 
over Eu rope. Pandemic flu researchers began to won der if wild birds might play 
an unexpected role in the long- distance transmission of highly pathogenic flu 
viruses. As Newman and his collaborators aptly phrased it, every one wanted to 
know  whether wild waterfowl  were “victims or vectors” of the virus.14
As funding for wild bird studies grew, the fao hired Newman to coordinate 
international research on the role of wild birds in avian influenza. In 2006 he 
helped or ga nize a study of wild bird migration at Qinghai Lake, along with 
collaborators from the U.S. Geological Survey and the Chinese Acad emy of 
Science. In  these studies they attached satellite transponders to birds at Qin-
ghai Lake and observed their migratory flight paths across the Central Asian 
Flyway. The team hoped to understand how flu viruses got into the remote 
Qinghai Lake and where they might go next. For example, they tracked ruddy 
shelducks and bar- headed geese as the waterfowl migrated over South Asia. In 
another study they tracked whooper swans to Mongolia, where a second large 
migratory- bird die- off occurred in 2006. Through detailed analyses of “tem-
poral and spatial relationships” between the swans and domestic poultry, the 
team concluded that whooper swans  were sentinel species but prob ably not 
vectors of influenza viruses.
At around this time, several papers published by Chinese and Hong Kong 
virology labs brought attention to Poyang Lake, far to the east in the inten-
sively farmed plains of the Yangtze Delta, and located within the parallel but 
distinct East Asian– Australasian Flyway. In one paper, Guan Yi and colleagues 
from Hong Kong and Shantou reported the isolation of avian influenza a 
h5n1 virus from several living, apparently healthy wild birds during routine 
sentinel surveillance at the lake.  Because infected wild birds  were expected 
to sicken and die quickly when infected with highly pathogenic forms of flu, 
this finding confirmed the hypothesis that migratory birds played a role in the 
long- distance transmission of highly pathogenic flu viruses. The study also did 
something  else, however: for the first time, it identified Poyang Lake as a hy po-
thet i cal pandemic epicenter. As the authors put it, “Migratory ducks at Poyang 
Lake could have survived infection with the hpai h5n1 virus and transmitted 
the virus over long distances during migration. This possibility may provide 
insight into reported h5n1 outbreaks in Mongolia, Siberian Rus sia, and Eu rope 
that have been linked to migratory birds.”15 A second paper, a computational 
work in viral genomics, claimed that the origins of the first h5n1 virus detected 
in China (known as Goose/Guangdong/96) could be traced to pre de ces sor vi-
ruses isolated in the Poyang Lake region.  After reading  these papers, Newman 
and his team de cided to move several research initiatives to Poyang Lake. As 
Lei Fumin, an ornithologist from the Chinese Acad emy of Sciences, explained 
the rationale  behind the move, “Qinghai strains can be traced to one early 
strain from Poyang based on the genomic analy sis.”16
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Newman visited Poyang Lake while attending the 2006 International Liv-
ing Lakes Conference, an environmental conservation meeting held in the pro-
vincial capital, Nanchang, just south of the lake. Speaking on a panel devoted 
to “Avian Influenza, Wildlife, and the Environment,” Newman discussed “in-
tegrated fish farming” in China as a pos si ble mechanism for virus transmission 
from domestic poultry to wild birds.  These integrated fish farms “directly use 
fresh poultry waste as a production input”— that is, as an inexpensive fish feed. 
High quantities of virus are known to be excreted by birds infected with the 
h5n1 strain of influenza. Newman concluded that “in such systems with  little 
or no biosecurity mea sures in place, the likelihood of multiple wild species 
interaction and possibility of disease . . .  transmission could be considerable.” 
The identification of a landscape feature or system— the fish farm—as site of 
“species interaction,” and therefore a pathoge ne tic zone, is worth noting  here. 
In chapter 2 I showed how Kennedy Shortridge’s strictly virological sampling 
of the pandemic epicenter gave way to what Marius Gilbert and  others called 
“eco- virological” approaches to mapping pathoge ne tic landscapes. Newman’s 
work at Poyang Lake was in many ways intended as a “model” of eco- virological 
research, or what he sometimes called a “One Health approach.”17 Rather than 
analyzing and classifying viruses in the laboratory, Newman planned to inves-
tigate the ecological relationships that contributed to the transmission of flu 
viruses into new populations.
At Poyang Lake he joined a team of researchers funded by a grant from the 
U.S. National Institutes of Health (nih) that was developing an “integrated 
pi lot study” that drew together a wide range of disciplinary perspectives. 
The pi lot study included spatial analy sis of landscape and land use derived 
from  satellite imagery, surveys of domestic poultry farming density and market 
chains, tracking of wild bird migration, and sampling of wild and domestic 
birds for viruses. Population ecologists, livestock veterinarians, geo- spatial 
analysts, and socioeconomists joined Newman and other wild bird specialists. 
Participants referred to this informal research collective, in shorthand, as the 
“nih group,” indicating the provisional, temporary (grant- specific), and nonin-
stitutional character of the collaboration.
Members of the nih group, like Newman, stressed the importance of an 
“ecological research perspective.”18 In publications or conversations  these re-
searchers lamented that expertise in the ecological sciences had too frequently 
been missing from existing virology studies of avian influenza, ironically so 
when  these studies made reference to the importance of ecosystem connec-
tions. In a programmatic paper the nih group criticized previous studies con-
ducted at Poyang Lake for a “lack of detail in identifying migratory waterfowl 
to species level [that] precludes analy sis of ecological aspects of the disease.”19 
At issue  were several h5n1 viruses isolated from wild birds during viral surveil-
lance programs at Poyang Lake. As John Takekawa, the lead author on the 
paper and a wild bird migration specialist, explained,
A lot of the [virus] sampling has been done without designation. Now, it’s 
fine if you can get to species level, it’s better than you started; I mean ini-
tially it was just like “duck.” And  there’s like huge differences in species, 
right? And so all this is to us [wild bird specialists] common in that you look 
at a bird and you know that “Well, that’s a diff er ent bird, and it’s diff er ent 
from this one over  here, ’cause it’s  doing this bit of be hav ior, it’s completely, 
it’s not  going to be found in that habitat, all of  those  things you automati-
cally know, and you hardly think about it, you  don’t realize that over  there 
a virologist is thinking, ‘That’s a duck.’ ” You know? A tree’s a tree. And that 
redwood and that oak tree, it’s all the same.
To correct this absence, the nih group designed a pi lot study to “integrate” a 
diverse array of studies underway at Poyang Lake around a common research 
object: what they called the “wild bird– domestic poultry disease interface.” 
They proposed that the transmission of viruses across the wild- domestic inter-
face was a “key  factor integral to the evolution of lpai [low pathogenic avian 
influenza] into hpai [high pathogenic avian influenza].”20 As viruses trafficked 
across the interface, according to this hypothesis, they changed from low to 
high pathogenicity, gaining pandemic potential. By describing the contours 
and pathways of the wild bird– domestic poultry interface at Poyang Lake, the 
nih group suggested they might be able to trace the route along which avian 
flu viruses emerge into pandemics.
At the same time, Newman and his colleagues relied on mechanisms of 
detachment— what I have called laboratory practice—to achieve this integra-
tion of their widely diverse modes of research. Rather than isolating viruses 
and bringing them back to the lab for analy sis, the nih group collected a dif-
fer ent kind of “trace”: spatial and temporal coordinates. Each kind of obser-
vation conducted at Poyang Lake— whether remote sensing of landscape and 
land use, tracking of wild bird migration routes, or surveys of domestic poultry 
populations and movements— was tagged with geospatial and (usually) tem-
poral markers. In  doing so,  every observation could be located within a single, 
standard, spatial and temporal grid.
I first began to recognize the importance of  these spatial marking practices 
in an incidental conversation with Professor Wang, a geographer involved in 
the international flu research program that I was following at Poyang Lake. I 
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had just returned to Nanchang after visiting duck farmers in a rural part of the 
region. Wang, who had helped connect me to the farmers, was waiting in a café 
adjoining my  hotel. I began showing him some pictures and telling him about 
what I’d learned from the farmers, when he suddenly interrupted me: “You 
captured the gps coordinates for  these photos,  didn’t you?” he asked. I replied 
that I  hadn’t. “Ah, too bad,” he smiled, almost forlorn. He explained that all 
of the diverse forms of data that he and the nih group collect, from poultry 
surveys to virus samples, from wild bird tracks to seemingly irrelevant photo-
graphs of wetland landscapes— are stamped with a geo graph i cal coordinate 
and usually temporal marker. Indeed, he noted that they use special cameras 
outfitted with gps devices for precisely this purpose, and urged me to purchase 
one for myself.
I then recalled a story that our van driver, Mr. Xiong, had told me a few 
days  earlier. On one trip, Mr. Xiong took gradu ate student Zhao all across the 
Poyang Lake region, following any roads they could find— including  those not 
on the map—in order to look for poultry farms. Whenever they saw a poultry 
farm, they  stopped and conducted brief interviews with farmers about hus-
bandry practices (How many birds? When and where do you  free graze them?). 
If no one was  there, Zhao would make an eyeball estimate of the flock. Most 
impor tant of all, Mr. Xiong explained, was a portable satellite gps tracker that 
sat between the driver and the passenger seat of the van. At each stop, along-
side the brief handwritten notes that he entered into a notebook, Zhao care-
fully recorded the gps coordinates.
Without  these tags of spatial and temporal position, Professor Wang ex-
plained,  there would be no way to integrate diff er ent forms of information into 
a unified model of the ecol ogy of influenza. But with the coordinates tethered 
to the other forms of data, the ecological models reveal the domain that over-
laps, in space and time, between the wild and the domestic. As the nih group 
explained in one study publication, “The main objective of this [interdisciplin-
ary] synthesis was to characterize the temporal relationships between wild 
and domestic ducks. . . .  We compared the temporal pattern of free- grazing 
domestic duck farming in the Poyang Lake area with the seasonal presence 
of wild ducks in paddy fields to identify a period with potential increased risk 
of aiv transmission.”21 The publication includes a “conceptual model of inte-
grated study components,” a flowchart showing how data from remote sens-
ing, a domestic duck farm survey, and bird telemetry are integrated to pro-
duce an original object of analy sis, highlighted in a gray box with the label: 
“aiv Transmission between Domestic and Wild Ducks in South China Agro- 
ecosystems.”22 In this study, pathogenesis is located not in the virus but in the 
“pattern,” “presence,” and “period” of multispecies interface— a space and time 
of transmission. The concept of the wild- domestic interface, therefore, relied 
on and reaffirmed an interdisciplinary model of work, one in which each dis-
cipline contributes its own specialist data to a common model of overlapping 
movements and presences. Interdisciplinary synthesis aimed to capture and 
represent multispecies interface. But it also relied on the shared mechanism 
of detachment— spatial and temporal coordinates— that enabled  these diverse 
forms of data to inscribe a common object.
In the original formulation of the study, the “interface” was understood as a 
spatial pattern and temporal period in which two distinct species populations— 
wild migratory birds and domestic waterfowl— came into contact. But when 
Newman arrived to conduct his studies at Poyang Lake, he found himself 
watching a group of birds that  couldn’t quite be placed on  either side of the in-
terface:  Were  these wild geese,  because they could fly and  were phenotypically 
indistinguishable from wild swan geese? Or  were they domestic geese,  because 
they  were bred and raised on a farm?
The nih group had derided virologists for their inability to recognize 
the differences between mallard and pintail ducks. They came to realize that 
their own distinction between wild and domestic kinds of bird was equally 
inadequate.
BREEDING WILDNESS
Just inside the large embankments that keep the floodwaters of Poyang Lake 
at bay, Wang Fenglian raises his wild swan geese (dayan). I first visited his farm 
in the summer of 2011, brought  there by one of the nih group’s Jiangxi Prov-
ince collaborators, and visited or stayed with them frequently afterward. The 
farm is located on land belonging to Shibahu (“Eigh teen House holds”), a small 
village nearby that was built on land reclaimed from the lake by earthwork 
dykes and embankments in the 1950s. Wang and his  family formerly lived in a 
much older village about five kilo meters down the road. Born into a  family of 
rice farmers, Wang had risked a wide range of enterprises since the beginning 
of economic reforms: he had raised fish in a small pond; he had bred dogs; he 
had even gone into business in the provincial capital. Some of  these enterprises 
had brought profits,  others  great losses. In 1999, Wang told me, a friend showed 
him an article about somebody in Jiangsu or Zhejiang who was farming wild 
swan geese, and Wang sensed an opportunity. Wang recalled the annual ar-
rival of migratory swan geese in his childhood and knew that they  were highly 
valued as food. Yet this supply relied on hunting, which, as environmental laws 
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strengthened, had now been banned. In 2001 he contracted land from Shibahu 
to begin breeding wild swan geese and incorporated the Po Lake Wild Animal 
Breed Com pany Ltd. The moderately sized plot of land contains a  house where 
Wang, his  family, and employees live; a few sheds for the wild geese and ducks; 
a special building containing an industrial egg incubator; and a pond where the 
birds often swim.  Today, Po Lake ranges among the largest wild bird farms in 
the area (see figure 4.2).
China’s post- Mao reform policies si mul ta neously expanded wildlife conser-
vation and promoted agricultural commercialization, trends that frequently 
came into direct conflict.23 At Poyang Lake a large section of wetland was set 
aside as a migratory- bird refuge in 1983, and other sections  were designated 
as an “agricultural production base” focused on duck breeding. The double 
goal was captured by a slogan I saw written on the wall of a building in the 
migratory- bird refuge: “Protect birdkind, enrich humankind!” (baohu niaolei, 
zaofu renlei) (see figure 4.3). As early as the 1980s, Jiangxi Province officials sug-
gested that wild bird breeding could help resolve conflicts between social and 
ecological interests by meeting demand without poaching from the wild.24 
The breeding of wild swan geese began to grow rapidly about a de cade  later, 
FIGURE 4.2.  Wild  swan goose farm.
 encouraged by expanding elite consumption. An exemplary article, published 
in a Henan Province agricultural extension journal in 1999, promotes the ac-
tivity as a timely response to unpre ce dented markets in the quickly growing 
coastal cities: “Swan goose is a special poultry that our nation has only recently 
begun to breed from the wild [xunyang], and in some coastal cities  there is a 
rather large market for its consumption. . . .  As a result, the prospects are good 
for the development of swan goose breeding.”25
A Chinese newspaper has described the rapid increase in the breeding 
of wild animals in the past two de cades as a con temporary “fever,” drawing 
on a trope often used to depict cultural trends of the post- Mao period.26 
The consumption of wild flavor, or wild- animal food products, grew rapidly 
across China during the 1990s and early 2000s.27 The pursuit of “rarity” and 
wild flavor in food consumption is closely linked with practices of symbolic 
distinction in business, government, and social banqueting.  After the sars 
outbreak was linked to the farming and marketing of live civet cats, China’s 
government implemented several new regulations and restrictions on wild- 
animal farming. However, “wild consumption” remained an impor tant part 
of China’s banquet cultures, as well as a crucial strategy for some smallholder 
farmers.28
FIGURE 4.3.  “Protect birdkind, enrich humankind.”
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As I explained in the previous chapter, the introduction of market mecha-
nisms into the livestock sector during the early 1980s set in motion a transfor-
mation in the social and technical modes of animal production. When “house-
holds” consolidated as economic units in the aftermath of decollectivization, 
livestock farming— and in par tic u lar poultry husbandry— quickly became an 
impor tant source of rural livelihood. The sideline farming of poultry expanded 
and intensified as farm  house holds became “specialized.” During the 1990s, 
however, large industrial poultry enterprises or ga nized as vertically integrated 
“dragon- head corporations” began to increase market share. Dragon heads 
are particularly dominant in broiler chicken and  table duckling production 
 because of the efficiency of feed conversion made pos si ble by special imported 
hybrid poultry breeds. Following the growth of the dragon heads and the emer-
gence of new diseases such as hpai, statistics show a rapid drop in smallholder 
poultry farms.29 Many farmers  either joined industrial enterprises as contract 
farmers or left poultry farming altogether. However, during my fieldwork I dis-
covered a third possibility that could be described as a minor con temporary 
transformation in livestock modes of production.30 Many smallholders did not 
abandon poultry production altogether but instead now specialize in local or 
unusual breeds. One manner of specializing production, which aims to meet 
the growing demand for distinctive foods among wealthy elites, is to breed and 
husband wild animals.
China’s administrative system categorizes wild animal farming as “special 
type husbandry” (tezhong yangzhi). This category defines wild animals bred 
 under  human management as still wild, placing them  under the jurisdiction of 
the State Forestry Administration rather than the Ministry of Agriculture. As 
an article in the newspaper Peasant Daily explains, “Wild animals, even when 
they are  under conditions of human- directed husbandry, no  matter how may 
generations they have been raised, as long as they have not passed through 
human- directed cultivation [dingxing peiyu], nor produced new hereditary 
characteristics, that raised animal still is classified as a wild animal, and cannot 
be called a domestic poultry or livestock.”31
Wild goose breeders take a reflexive approach to the distinction of wild and 
domestic. Indeed, wild goose farms are engaged in a kind of human- directed 
cultivation, but one that aims to reproduce the wildness of their birds rather 
than to tame them. For them, wildness ( yexing) cannot be presumed as a sta-
ble characteristic that would passively maintain itself. Instead, they made the 
traits of wildness into direct objects of hereditary cultivation.
At Wang’s farm I saw the effort the breeders put into demonstrating the wild-
ness to their clients, many of them prospective wild goose farmers themselves. 
When buyers express interest in purchasing chicks, Wang invites them for an 
inspection of the farm, describing the visit as a complimentary course of in-
struction in husbandry techniques. Upon arriving at the farm, the prospective 
buyers first eat a sumptuous lunch prepared by Wang’s wife, often including a 
soup made from wild goose meat. Wang’s wife told me that she boils the soup 
with only salt and ginger to preserve the natu ral “grass flavor” in the meat, a 
result of the geese foraging in the marsh reeds. She noted that when she cooks 
chicken, by contrast, she has to add all kinds of weijing (a flavor enhancer, such 
as msg) to make it even palatable.
The prospective buyers then tour the goose sheds and ponds, where Wang 
shows them how feeds are prepared. Most importantly, Wang points out the 
wild qualities in the birds and makes sure that the prospective buyers see the 
birds in flight. Wang’s son, Haohua, acknowledged that if the prospective buy-
ers did not visit the farm, they might not believe the birds  were actually wild. 
Lack of social or impersonal trust is widespread across China, particularly in 
the food sector, and many consumers fall back on personal trust to ensure food 
quality.32 As Haohua quipped, quoting a popu lar saying about frauds, “Hang 
up a sheep’s head outside the shop, but sell dog meat” ( gua yangtou, mai gourou).
Wildness, according to the Wang  family, is embodied primarily in three 
traits: general external appearance, such as coloring and shape; the absence of a 
growth on the base of the beak that appears on domesticated geese; and, above 
all, the ability to fly. Promotional materials, including the Wang  family’s web-
site, pamphlets, and packaging materials, draw a close symbolic connection 
between the birds’ ability to fly and their wildness. For example, one pamphlet 
praises “wild taste,” while images of bred wild geese in flight are cut and pasted 
over pictures of undeveloped sections of Poyang Lake.
In addition to this symbolic work of marking wildness, though, the Wang 
 family is also careful to ensure that their geese physically embody the traits 
they identify as wild. And this is not as  simple as selecting a species of goose 
from the wild or one broadly categorized as wild and then raising it on the 
farm. Wang found, to his chagrin, that  after four or five generations of  human 
breeding, the geese lose their distinctive wildness, growing knobs on the base 
of their beaks and losing their ability to fly. His son described this loss of wild-
ness as degeneration or regression (tuihua). As a result, techniques of cultivat-
ing wildness lie at the center of the Wang  family’s breeding practice.
First, although the geese are allowed to breed on their own (ziran peiyu), the 
Wangs use netted confinements to carefully manage which birds are breeding. 
They blame the degeneration of the geese in part on inbreeding, that is, the 
reproduction of offspring in sexual relations between individuals too closely 
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related. In explaining their practice to me, Haohua drew on an analogy of the 
incest prohibitions in classical China:  those of the same  family line cannot 
have sexual relations if they are within three generations of relatedness. The 
geese are divided into families, and during breeding seasons the male offspring 
are kept in pens separate from their ancestral  family. Furthermore, a distinc-
tion is made between “pure- breed wild” (chunzhong yesheng) birds, which are 
used for breeding for up to three generations, and the “commodity” birds that 
are sold as meat. Any birds with noticeable imperfections or prob lems are also 
removed from breeding stock (see figure 4.4).
Occasionally, the Wang  family also acquires a small number of wild swan 
geese from the Poyang Lake Migratory Bird Reserve. Using a special license, 
and drawing on connections at the reserve, the Wang  family takes a few geese 
captured or held  there.  These birds contain what they describe as “outside” 
genes (wailaide jiyin) that, introduced into the breeding stock, help protect the 
wildness of the birds.
At the same time, the Wang  family also works to enhance the wildness of 
the geese by managing the influence of the environment. In a promotional 
brochure that I helped hand out at the China International Forestry Exposition 
FIGURE 4.4.  Wild swan goslings, recently hatched from incubated eggs.
in 2011, Wang describes such environmental management as his innovation. 
“Our com pany courageously seeks innovation [chaungxin],” the brochure reads, 
“bravely explores frontiers, in the  whole nation the first to free- graze wild 
geese and wild ducks in the natu ral wild.” In addition to the main farm, the 
Wang  family also established what they call an experimental base much closer 
to the shore of Poyang Lake’s open  waters. In a low wetland near the lake, they 
built four low sheds to  house the geese. In front of each shed is a long pond 
where the geese can swim and graze for insects. A village collective built  these 
ponds for raising fish, and Wang Fenglian reserved rights to them  after fish 
farming declined. Whereas the main farm is on the inside of the embankments 
that keep flood  waters from  human settlement, the experimental base is on 
the outside of the embankment, exposed to the lake’s untempered force. One 
year, rising  waters even flooded the experimental base, causing some geese to 
escape and never return. As Haohua put it, by compelling the birds to accus-
tom themselves to a wild living environment, their wildness  will grow and in-
tensify. Or to quote again from a promotional brochure, “To make the  human 
bred swan geese . . .  freely move in the  waters and wetlands of the Poyang Lake, 
to allow them to graze for wild foods,  will preserve their natu ral wildness [tian­
ran yexing], their ability to fly, and their external appearance.”
For the Wang  family, wildness was not defined as that which was outside 
of  human touch. Neither was it an internal characteristic of certain individual 
birds or bird species, as if wildness persisted in defi nitely in the organism or 
the species, no  matter the context (as tigers born and raised in the zoo are 
sometimes still considered to be “wild animals”).33 For the Wang  family, wild-
ness was a collection of qualities that could be cultivated or lost. The Jiangxi 
Po Lake Wild Animal Breed Com pany was in the seemingly paradoxical busi-
ness of farming wildness. To them, wildness could even be described as an 
innovation.
CREATIVE ECOLOGIES
On his business cards, Wang Fenglian refers to himself as chairman of 
the board of his wild bird breeding com pany. Although the  simple farm house 
where he based his operations may seem discordant with the terminology of 
the corporate firm,  these are not private delusions. Wang has been featured in 
newspapers and tele vi sion news programs, as well as in journals such as Qiyejia 
(Entrepreneur) and Xin Shengyi (New Business).  These journalistic accounts ar-
ticulate the character of a man who “had been a peasant” before beginning to 
experiment with vari ous forms of commercial animal husbandry, frequently 
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referring to his strugg les to innovate. Ann Anagnost has analyzed the develop-
mental narratives of the post- reform period that situate the peasant as a pas-
sive object to be turned into an active subject of the nation.34 Wang Fenglian, 
according to  these published accounts, is advancing on the appropriate devel-
opmental track, although to be precise the metric of advance is not wealth or 
civilization, but creativity.35
I spent most of my time at the farm accompanying Haohua, who or ga nized 
the day- to- day management of the farm. Haohua had graduated from Jiangxi 
Normal University with a degree in athletics a few years  earlier. Upon gradu-
ation he attempted to become a prison warden, following a good friend’s ex-
ample, but did not pass the examination. He then took a job as a fourth- grade 
math teacher but left  after only one year, frustrated by the obsequious social 
world of the school leaders and local officials. He returned home to work with 
his  father hoping, he explained, to construct a life “between city and country” 
as a rural “creative innovator” (chuangyezhe). I was surprised by the way Hao-
hua described his farmwork in language that seemed drawn from the world of 
Silicon Valley and the new spirit of capitalism.36 For him, farming wild birds 
was about branding and marketing, not just tending to animals. Farming wild 
birds was a vocation chosen in order to be in control of one’s time, in order to 
create new  things, new products. Haohua often contrasted this life of inno-
vation with state- based employment, and in par tic u lar the education sector. 
This was not only  because of his own brief stint as a teacher but also  because 
his girlfriend was an instructor at an elite kindergarten in Nanchang. She was 
constantly threatening to break up with Haohua  because she viewed his work 
on the farm as unstable and associated with the “low quality” of peasant life.37 
But Haohua countered her by figuring their diff er ent  careers in other terms. 
For him, his work relied on risk taking and creativity, in contrast to the stifling 
security of government jobs. Indeed, he joked, the walls of his girlfriend’s se-
curity  were literal and physical: she could rarely go out with him, as she lived 
with her colleagues in a work- unit– provided building with curfews and rules 
about visitors.
The ethos of innovation that Haohua and his  father both cultivated, each 
in his own way,  shaped the material practices and economic strategies on the 
farms of the Po Lake com pany. Indeed, they kept making new  things. When 
I returned to Jiangxi in late October 2011  after some time at the Emergency 
Center in Beijing, I found that an entirely new venture now attracted their 
attention. Haohua picked me up in Nanchang in his brand- new Honda Ac-
cord and told me he was on his way to the Quality Inspection Bureau, also in 
the provincial capital. As we set off, Haohua called his  father to get directions 
to the bureau. We took the roads leading out of Nanchang center, while Hao-
hua shouted into the phone, occasionally taking erratic turns. “Be- beep! Route 
currently being replanned” blared incessantly from the gps screen on the 
dashboard. Fi nally confident he was on the right track, Haohua hung up and 
explained that we  were bringing a  couple of wild- duck eggs for the bureau to 
inspect. The eggs  were the product of a new “experiment” at the Po Lake farm, 
he told me. The wild ducks are fed a special concoction of Chinese medicines 
in addition to their normal feed. Wang Fenglian’s idea is that the medicines 
in the feed  will travel through the blood of the ducks and be retained within 
the eggs. When someone eats the eggs, they  will also receive the benefits of 
the medical substances, which include improvements to the blood and heart, 
strengthening of re sis tance to viruses and bacteria, cures for high blood pres-
sure, as well as remedies for dementia, back pains, and even aging skin. Invert-
ing the logic of food- safety campaigns against phar ma ceu ti cal residues in eggs, 
Haohua explained that the benefits of good medicines would be transferred, 
residually, through the eggs. According to early experiments, Wang Fenglian 
 later told me, two  people who had eaten the eggs over six days had significant 
reductions in blood pressure.
 Later that month, I traveled with Wang Fenglian and Haohua to the Sec-
ond Quadrennial China International Forestry Expo, held in Yiwu, Zhejiang 
Province. Yiwu calls itself “the capital of small commodities.” The Expo Center 
was brand- new. Massive balloons of blue, red, and yellow flew above, but rubble 
and dirt appeared only a few feet beyond the far side. We strugg led to find a 
 hotel and settled for a watery noodle soup for dinner. Yet Haohua said money 
flowed through Yiwu as quickly as the more- famous special economic zones. 
“They say  there are more bmws in Yiwu than in all of Germany!” Haohua ex-
claimed to a cab driver.
Inside the Expo Center’s national pavilion, we found a section devoted to 
wild products. In the  middle, ten mink coats hung on a rack. To one side, some 
kind of medicinal plant— long, brown, and bulbous— was displayed  behind 
glass. On the other side, a man hawked snake oil. In the far corner, taxidermy 
birds perched, still as if pausing to watch us, colorful plumage above green 
artificial turf, with price tags as high as ten thousand rmb (around fifteen 
hundred U.S. dollars). In one small corner a sign confirmed the existence of 
a Wild Duck and Goose Zone. The small area was already filled by three or 
four exhibitors and their wares. We ran into the dean of the China Wild Ani-
mal Protection Committee, an organ ization of which Wang Fenglian is also a 
member: he is a vice dean of the China Goose and Duck Breeding Specializa-
tion Committee. Fenglian persuaded the man to make a phone call, and soon 
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we  were setting up promotional materials on a display case next to the other 
wild bird farms.
Back in the  hotel, we sat on Fenglian’s bed with the disassembled card-
board boxes, egg crates, and boxes of eggs around us. I folded the cardboard 
into boxes while Haohua carefully placed eggs into the crates. Then we put 
the crates in the finished boxes. When the expo opened to visitors the next 
day, Wang stood out in front of the  counter, asking every one who walked past 
 whether they had high blood pressure. If they made any hint of response, he 
offered to give them a box of the miraculous eggs, no cost, in exchange for their 
contact information. Within fifteen minutes he had handed out two boxes of 
eggs and many more pamphlets, and had collected ten or so contacts in his 
small black notebook.
I returned one final time to visit the Wang  family and the Po Lake farm 
in 2014. Fenglian and Haohua  were still pursuing new enterprises and experi-
ments. They now received government subsidies, for which they  were required 
to increase the scale of the farm ( guimohua), and had built several new farm 
buildings. Haohua was developing new connections for selling wild goose meat 
to restaurants in nearby provinces. He told me that he focused on marketing 
the distinctiveness of their wild breeds, which he compared to the brand- name 
coat he wore. They had even started selling farmed wild geese to a nature park 
for city  children, where the park man ag ers or ga nize per for mances of geese in 
flight. As Haohua explained, “More and more  people understand that ecol-
ogy is more than mountains and  water [shanshui]. In the  water you need to 
have some fish swimming about, above the  water something should be floating 
around, and in the air you need something flying.” To say this ecol ogy was arti-
ficial is an understatement. For the wild goose farmers, ecological relationships 
of wild and domestic could be better described as the objects of an ongoing 
experimental practice, constantly seeking to create distinctive forms and new 
values.38
FIELD DISPLACEMENTS
Laboratory ethnographies emphasize the role of experimental practice and 
material infrastructure in the production of new scientific knowledge.39 The 
historian of science Hans- Jörg Rheinberger’s concept of scientific displace-
ment, which draws from historical and ethnographic studies of laboratories, 
provides a particularly sophisticated model. Rheinberger argues that “unpre ce-
dented events”— the surprising occurrences traditionally glossed as scientific 
discoveries— are in fact engendered by experimental practice and the laboratory 
apparatus: “They come as a surprise but nevertheless do not just so happen. 
They are made to happen through the inner workings of the experimental ma-
chinery for making the  future.”40 Although made by experimental practice, 
they also “commit experimenters to completely changing the direction of 
their research activities.” The paradoxical “research object,”41 the object of sci-
entific inquiry, is constructed by the experimental system yet remains irreduc-
ibly vague, embodying the unknown rather than the known and enabling the 
concerted creation of the unexpected. Rheinberger describes the production 
of scientific knowledge as a pro cess of displacement rather than discovery, one 
in which the sciences “reshap[e] their agenda through their own action,” but 
without foreknowledge of how their objects  will take shape.42
When situated in the field, however, the scientific research object is also 
the object of other modes of creative practice that already inhabit the field 
site. This chapter articulates how  these other modes of practice rework and 
transform scientific research objects, causing displacements that cannot be at-
tributed to the inner workings of the experimental system. In flu research at 
Poyang Lake, the wild bird– domestic poultry interface constitutes a research 
object whose forms, the wildness and domesticity of the birds themselves, are 
at the same time being transformed by poultry breeders. I argue that displace-
ments, the primary source of scientific change or discovery, can therefore re-
sult as much from an encounter with a poultry breeder’s techniques as from 
the apparatus of the experimental system. In what I describe as “field displace-
ments,” scientific knowledge in the field develops through encounters with the 
outside of the experimental system.
In the design of their research object— the wild bird– domestic poultry 
interface— the nih group presumed that wild and domestic birds are two dis-
tinct populations. The wild goose breeders, on the other hand, engaged with 
the wild- domestic distinction very differently: as a value differential that could 
be practically exploited to create something new. They  were breeding wildness. 
When the nih group encountered the swan goose breeders during field studies 
at Poyang Lake, they quickly saw the limits of their own concepts and devel-
oped new research objects. Yet this pro cess differed from Rheinberger’s model 
of laboratory displacement. For rather than deriving from the infrastructure 
and design of the experimental system itself— Rheinberger’s “machine for 
making a  future”43— the research object was displaced by poultry breeders 
whose breeding techniques and values reconstructed the interface of wild and 
domestic.
During their initial migratory- bird studies at Poyang Lake, Newman and 
other members of the nih group stayed at the migratory- bird refuge in the 
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town of Wucheng, surrounded on all sides by the Poyang wetland. Newman 
recalled that each day they set out to capture and mark wild birds in the 
refuge van: “To drive anywhere, from any point A to point B, you see lots of 
duck farming. We started talking to  people, and then you get to know some 
of the local  people, get to know some of the  people at the wildlife reserve, 
and start talking, in  those broader discussions, asking them about what was 
being raised, what kinds of species? So they started  going into diff er ent spe-
cies of ducks. And some of  these  were pretty unusual species to be raised, so 
we  were wondering.”
 Later,  after they asked their driver to stop by some farms, Newman en-
countered the swan goose breeder and his wild swan geese in the moment I 
describe at the beginning of the chapter. This encounter “led us over to farmed 
wild birds, [a]  whole new level of interest,” Newman told me, explaining that 
the encounter completely transformed the nih group’s understanding of “con-
nectivity and interface between wild and domestic birds.”
The shifting conceptual terms used by the nih group to describe how con-
nections form across the wild- domestic interface make vis i ble the contours 
of this displacement. Before research at Poyang was begun, Newman coau-
thored the fao technical manual introducing field research on wild birds and 
avian influenza. In a section explaining the hy po thet i cal role of wild birds in 
influenza transmission, the authors point to the importance of what they call 
“ ‘bridge’ species”: “Several bird groups without particularly strong ties to wet-
land habitats, but with a high tolerance for human- altered habitats, have also 
been known to become infected fatally from h5n1 [including crows, sparrows, 
mynas, and pigeons]. . . .  These species may serve as links between wild birds in 
natu ral habitats and domestic poultry, acting as a ‘bridge’ in the transmission 
of ai viruses from poultry to wildlife or vice versa.”44
Following the encounter with the wild swan goose breeders, the nih group 
developed a new concept: “farmed wild birds.” Clearly drawing on the  earlier 
notion of bridge species, Newman explained to me in 2012 that farmed wild 
birds “could be the link between wild and domestic birds. They are the perfect 
intermediary.  Because they look identical to their conspecifics, when they are 
foraging, a wild bird would come right up to them,  because phenotypically 
they are the same. But then, they go home at night, and  there are other poultry 
around at the farm. So  there’s your transmission!”
Yet despite resemblance to the  earlier notion, the new concept subtly dis-
placed the form of the nih group’s working object, the wild- domestic inter-
face. In the original design of their pi lot study, the nih group understood the 
interface as a spatial setting in which contacts between wild and domestic bird 
populations took place, such as the fishponds described in Newman’s pre sen-
ta tion at the Living Lakes conference. A diagram of the original plan for the 
pi lot study depicts white boxes marked “migratory birds” and “free- ranging 
ducks/geese” on  either side of a blue oval identified as “Paddy rice fields/Natu-
ral wetlands/Fish ponds.” The bridge species was an existing wild bird species 
that frequented such settings of interface, birds such as pigeons able to tolerate 
both natu ral and human- altered habitats.
With the concept of “farmed wild bird,” on the other hand, the researchers 
transposed the conceptual boundary between wild and domestic from a spa-
tial setting or habitat to the bird itself. In  doing so they drew attention to the 
breeding practices that cultivate birds able to double as  either wild or domestic, 
practices that internalize the wild- domestic interface within the farmed wild 
bird. The subsequent research proj ects the nih group conducted at Poyang 
Lake made the significance of this displacement clear. Following the discovery 
of the farmed wild bird, the nih group focused inquiry on the  human practices 
responsible for breeding wildness: they counted and mapped the  house holds 
that farmed wild birds, conducted surveys to understand vaccination regimes, 
and followed the market chains along which farmed wild birds  were traded. 
And when the nih group updated its diagram of the wild- domestic interface 
to include farmed wild birds, this new vector of  human agency was also added, 
a new white text box containing the words production, market, trade, transport 
systems, vaccine, movement control, culture, be hav ior.45
The field has not entirely replaced the lab in influenza research; indeed, 
laboratory analy sis of viral samples remains an impor tant component of flu 
research at Poyang Lake. Rather, the movement into the pandemic epicenter 
displaces the predominance of laboratory practice as a model for understanding 
the pro cess through which new scientific knowledge is made. For the classic 
laboratory ethnographies, the lab was a tactical site where science could be 
studied as a cultural practice, thereby calling into question the importance of 
theoretical structures and  mental cognition as sources of scientific knowledge 
and change. Yet this focus on experimental practice, the significance of which 
is so evident inside the laboratory, has obscured from view the more- variable 
trajectories of scientific discovery.
Of course, the defining features of laboratory practice could be found in 
the initial setup of the migration study at Poyang Lake. Transponders at-
tached to wild birds sent signals to orbiting satellites, transforming migra-
tory movements into detached “traces,” marked with spatial and temporal 
coordinates, and available for scientific manipulation and analy sis back in 
laboratory centers.46 In the end, however, the traces detached from the flights 
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of birds did not displace the nih group’s research object; an encounter with 
poultry breeders did.
When Newman first told me about farmed wild birds, he laughed and re-
called how he had posed as an American poultry buyer on his first trip to a 
Poyang Lake farm.  Whether or not he was fooled, the breeder went along with 
the per for mance, asking which seaports would be most con ve nient for ship-
ments to the United States. That eve ning, he sent a  whole, fresh- killed swan 
goose to Newman’s  hotel. The insights about the farming of wild birds that 
shifted the nih group’s research objects came not from an extension of his 
laboratory to the lake but rather from Newman’s momentary abandonment 
of the subject position of scientific expert. By taking on the pose of the buyer, 
Newman came to understand the concept of wildness guiding the practice of 
wild goose breeding, an understanding that the “inner workings” of his experi-
mental system could not provide.47
Moving influenza research into the pandemic epicenter constructs research 
objects on “working landscapes,” sites of already ongoing  labor and produc-
tion. This co- labor on the same sites can cause unexpected field displacements 
to scientific research objects. When both scientists and breeders work on the 
same birds, breeding techniques become as impor tant as experimental design 
for the production of novelty and surprise that lies at the heart of scientific 
change. But recognizing  these field displacements, and thereby incorporating 
them in the trajectory of knowledge production, requires putting aside, at least 
for a moment, the laboratory practices of detachment and purification. In his 
encounter with the breeder, Newman relied on techniques more familiar to 
the  human than the natu ral sciences.48 What had once looked to him like any 
other wild swan goose, Anser cygnoides, he now saw as a product of  human prac-
tices. Playing the part of a participant in the breeders’ world of food markets 
and gourmet tastes, Newman strove to understand the ideas and values driving 
the cultivation of wildness.
Influenza research at Poyang Lake describes an anthropological arc of sorts, 
one in which knowledge of natu ral objects first passes through an understand-
ing of  human engagements with the natu ral environment. Many studies have 
shown that the sciences  today are forming new relations with society through 
patients’ organ izations and bioethics regimes, transforming how knowledge is 
made in the pro cess.  Here I argue that the changing sites and objects of con-
temporary influenza research are shifting the epistemological relation of the 
sciences to nature as scientists in the field come to see natu ral sites as  human 
artifacts. Laboratory ethnographies expose the material infrastructure and 
scientific  labor required to construct the spaces where scientists encounter 
nature and take its mea sure. The field displacement of influenza research at 
Poyang Lake reflects a diff er ent epistemological question: How do scientists ac-
count for the practical engagements, such as poultry breeding, that creatively 
transform the natu ral sites where field experiments are undertaken?
REGULATORY WILDS
One day I rode the small fish- boat ferry from the refuge base in Wucheng 
to a small island across the river where I met one of the other wild goose farm-
ers in the region. Dressed in a bright pink shirt, Ye picked me up at the ferry 
landing on his motorcycle, and we rode through town to his farm, perched at 
the very edge of the lake. A series of low sheds for the geese and a freshwater 
pond framed his  house. In the past the village had used the pond for a collec-
tive duck farm, but it was no longer operational when Ye contracted for it and 
surrounding lands in 2003. When I visited, about three thousand swan geese 
swam in the pond.
As we walked around the pond, Ye led us up a small embankment, and 
 there was the lake. Grass sloped down to the shore. Beyond,  water stretched 
as far as the eye could see. Ye said the geese sometimes fly as far as three kilo-
meters away to eat the lake grasses. Pointing at the embankment, he showed 
me the high- water line and told me that the previous year the lake had even 
breached the embankment, flooding his entire farm. As I  later learned, the 
flood had been costly—of the ten thousand swan geese they  were raising at the 
time, more than half had died. Ye explained that the  water submerged all of the 
grass, so the birds had nothing to eat. Ye’s wife also added that pesticides from 
neighboring crop fields flowed into their farm, sickening their birds: “it was 
like an epidemic.”  Because of  these risks, and  because of the instability of the 
market, Ye now raised a thousand sheep and several hundred cows in addition 
to the swan geese. He described this as a strategy of diversification: risk should 
be spread around among diff er ent breeds, he explained,  because if one of the 
breeds completely fails for some reason, then the  others can make up some of 
the losses.
I asked him  whether he thought of the geese as wild ( yesheng) or domestic 
poultry ( jiaqin). “In China, we call this ‘special type husbandry’ (tezhong yang­
zhi),” Ye replied. “In fact, they belong to forestry (State Forestry Administra-
tion), not agriculture (Ministry of Agriculture).” In order to raise swan geese, he 
first needed to apply for a license from the sfa. The sfa sent a team to inspect 
his farm, to see that the conditions are good, and would not cause harm to the 
environment. But Ye acknowledged that sfa was not very experienced with 
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animal husbandry. “They still mostly deal with forests.” The sfa did hold a spe-
cial conference for wild goose farmers, in which Ye got to meet other farmers 
from across Jiangxi and Zhejiang provinces. Even at the conference, though, a 
Forestry official admitted to Ye that the sfa did not know much about raising 
swan geese. “Are they even good to eat?” the official joked.
Ye found the classification especially irritating  because it meant he could 
not apply to the Ministry of Agriculture (moa) for subsidies offered to live-
stock farmers. “I  don’t have to pay their licensing fees, but I  don’t get the subsi-
dies  either.” However, this classificatory logic also had significant implications 
for the ecol ogy of influenza,  because of how it effected the implementation of 
vaccination for h5n1 avian influenza. In 2005, China’s Ministry of Agriculture 
had begun implementing a program for universal mandatory h5n1 vaccina-
tion. The program literally called for immunization of 100  percent of poultry 
( jiaqin)— the domestic chickens, ducks, and geese regulated  under the moa. 
Wild geese, by contrast, despite the fact that biologically they closely resemble 
domestic geese, are not administered by moa, and therefore do not fall  under 
the immunization plan.
When I asked Ye if he had suffered any outbreaks of disease in the geese, 
he explained that he vaccinated all the geese himself, and— combined with the 
good environment and remote location— this kept disease away. But when, in 
response to experimental displacement, fao began to shift their research proj-
ects to look at wild bird farming in the Poyang Lake region, they found some-
thing troubling about vaccination practices. Based on a survey of wild bird 
farms around the lake, wild bird biologist Changqing Ding found that vaccina-
tion for h5n1 avian influenza was inconsistent and irregular. Although most 
farmers did conduct some form of vaccination, the number of shots, intervals 
between doses, and timing in the birds’ life- cycles all varied widely, suggesting 
that immunization was prob ably for the most part in effec tive.49 In addition 
to the risks created by the creative remaking of the wild- domestic interface, 
the regulatory anomaly of the farmed wild bird created risks of its own. The 
ecol ogy of influenza, rerouted along the changing working landscapes of rural 
production, was also reshaped in unexpected ways by the territories of regula-
tory governance.
In part I of this book I argued that the logic of the pandemic epicenter 
produced a spatial displacement  toward the epicenter.  Because the epicenter is 
located within a working landscape, part II showed that scientific inquiry at the 
epicenter moved along a pathway  toward the outsides of the laboratory venue 
and the expert subject. In contrast to laboratory detachment, I have drawn at-
tention to  these centrifugal displacements, explications of the  externalities 
of biosecurity models or experimental systems. In part III, I examine the con-
sequences of the pandemic epicenter’s location in geopo liti cal space or, more 
precisely, its location within China’s national territory. How does the displace-
ment of scientific attention to the epicenter intersect with the sovereign au-
thority of the nation- state? What reconfigurations of geopo liti cal space take 
place when global health goes into the epicenter?
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Just  after Chinese New Year in 2011, as Beijing was slowly returning to work 
following the month- long holiday, I found Vincent Martin in the Emergency 
Center, sharp lines of frustration already beginning to crease the tan acquired 
during a beach vacation in Thailand. He had returned from Phuket to a re-
gional outbreak of foot- and- mouth disease that, he explained, China had so far 
refused to report. I turned the conversation  toward influenza, and Martin kept 
on the theme of China’s lack of “transparency.” He complained that for over a 
year not a single avian influenza outbreak had been reported by the Ministry of 
Agriculture to international agencies. Martin believed China was “in a bind”: if 
they report any outbreaks now, it would seem like the situation is getting worse, 
not better. “ Couldn’t you just report one or two?” he asked rhetorically, a thin 
grin easing the lines on his face. “ There have been outbreaks reported in Cam-
bodia, Vietnam,  Korea, Japan, but none in China?”
Martin’s denunciation of China’s failure to report outbreaks of disease 
reflects an enduring controversy over China’s relationship to international 
health organ izations within an emerging regime of global health.1 Recently 
rooted in the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (sars), especially 
China’s delayed acknowl edgment of the explosive spread of the previously un-
known aty pi cal pneumonia, the affair extends to disputes over the sharing of 
influenza virus samples and the exchange of health information. In the case 
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of the avian influenza outbreak, global health agencies have turned their sus-
picion away from China’s Ministry of Health— increasingly considered a co-
operative global partner— and  toward the Ministry of Agriculture (moa). For 
example, complaints about failures to share samples and genome sequences of 
flu viruses flared up in 2005 and 2006. “We  really  don’t know how many strains 
of bird flu  there are in China,” the who’s coordinator of epidemic response 
in China publicly announced in November 2006, “ because we have  limited 
amounts of information shared with us by the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
virus samples we have asked for have not been shared.”2
Most accounts have described China’s failures to report outbreaks, or re-
fusals to share virus samples, as “assertions” of national sovereignty in conflict 
with global health norms of open- access research and transparent surveil-
lance.3 China’s disputes with global health agencies are compared with affairs 
and incidents elsewhere, especially Indonesia’s well- known refusal to share in-
fluenza samples. Although scholars are divided on how to appraise the justice 
of China’s actions, they have agreed on the basic structure of  these disputes: 
a static normative opposition between global circulation of health knowledge 
and the proprietary claims of nation- state authority.4 Complaints by interna-
tional health civil servants, like Martin’s above, sometimes seem to share this 
perspective that the management of public health information puts the Chi-
nese state at odds with global health norms.
However, I found that international flu experts engaged in diverse trans-
actions with Chinese counter parts despite, and alongside of, their frequent 
criticism of China’s lack of transparency. Many of  these transactions moved 
samples, sequences, or other forms of information across bound aries declared 
in other moments to be impermeable. By drawing attention to concrete situa-
tions, describing  actual practices, and expanding the temporal scale of analy-
sis, polemic disputes and critical accusations no longer appear as the signs of 
a static conflict between China and global health organ izations. Rather,  these 
disputes appear as one part of how affiliations are given concrete form and 
structure, building relationships that regulate exchanges of viral materials and 
information.5
 These borderlands of health knowledge and biological exchange, involving 
multilateral development agencies, nongovernmental organ izations, national 
governments, and  others, have been described as a contested domain of “global 
health diplomacy.”6 In this chapter I provide an account of the everyday prac-
tices of international civil servants who could be called global health diplo-
mats. Rather than presuming a static opposition between national sovereignty 
and global health, I situate disputes within the  actual, uncertain, and dynamic 
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transnational relationships of affinity and exchange. I show how the “inter-
national” and the “national,” far from stable and opposed entities, come to be 
marked and differentiated through a pro cess of transnational affiliation.
Geopo liti cal space has garnered significant attention in studies of humani-
tarian global health interventions, which have highlighted how humanitarian 
interventions may constitute “mi grant sovereignties” and “spaces of excep-
tion” that dispossess certain sites or bodies from national territorial space.7 In a 
study of Doctors without Borders, Peter Redfield provides a nuanced account 
of how humanitarian actors confront ethical and po liti cal dilemmas regarding 
the spatial juxtapositions of national territory and transnational humanitari-
anism. But the geopo liti cal spaces constituted by regimes of global health se-
curity, focused on the control of emerging infectious diseases, thus far remain 
less well mapped.8
By following Vincent Martin’s global health diplomacy, this chapter traces 
an ethical journey into the pandemic epicenter.9 I found that Martin  adopted 
two distinct strategies of access to the epicenter. On the one hand, he  adopted 
a strategy of affinity— that is, he cultivated a network of associations with Chi-
nese state agencies and actors in order to exchange and communicate. Like 
the matrimonial strategies described by Pierre Bourdieu, Martin cultivated 
 affinities in order to set  people, information, and material goods in motion.10 
Affinity was often an indirect strategy of access as it passed through the de-
tour of friendships in order to subsequently access biological materials or key 
information.
Yet in other moments, Martin  adopted another strategy altogether: he 
built equipment that obviated any need for affinity and exchange by moving 
to another plane of reference, a strategy that I call stratification. As we  will see, 
this often entailed supplanting po liti cal space with repre sen ta tions of ecologi-
cal space, surpassing the geopo liti cal strata of territory with concepts such as 
ecosystem or habitat that occupy diff er ent scales and spatial forms. In the dis-
cussion that opened this chapter, for example, Martin’s reference to the known 
occurrence of outbreaks in the region (an ecological unit) juxtaposed with the 
absence of reported outbreaks in China (a geopo liti cal unit) was intended to 
expose the obstruction of scientific observation by politics. In such moments, 
Martin’s claim that an emergency situation justified global health interventions 
into China resembled the logic of exception deployed by humanitarians. Unlike 
humanitarian interventions, however, Martin did not figure planetary human-
ity as an ethical imperative for bypassing nation-state sovereignty. Rather, he 
aimed for a technical demonstration of the insignificance of national scale or 
territorial boundary in the ecol ogy of pandemic emergence.
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 S ILENT CIRCULATIONS
By the  middle of 2011, China’s Ministry of Agriculture had issued several 
statements heralding a remarkable fact:  there had been no outbreaks of hpai 
h5n1 for nearly two years. However, as Martin’s skeptical questions make clear, 
not every one believed that the lack of outbreak reports indicated an absence 
of disease. For one  thing, routine avian influenza surveillance programs con-
ducted by the moa continued to report the isolation of viruses, as well as se-
rological evidence of infected birds, despite the lack of sick birds or outbreaks. 
Martin and  others began to raise concerns about the  silent circulation of h5n1 
viruses throughout the country, which could still cause  human infections and 
drive the emergence of new viruses. Almost every one agreed that the dramatic 
reduction in h5n1 outbreaks, but failure to completely eradicate the h5n1 
virus, was a troubling and unexpected consequence of one state initiative: the 
universal immunization of poultry.
In chapter 3 I noted that the initial fao strategy for responding to hpai 
h5n1 included three prongs: culling, biosecurity development, and vaccina-
tion. The fao was initially reluctant to promote vaccination: the method had 
been applied only in two outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza in 
Mexico and Pakistan, both during the 1990s. Highly pathogenic avian influ-
enza viruses had been eradicated using culling, movement, and trade controls 
in all other outbreaks since the 1950s. However, as fao documents show, the 
organ ization quickly acknowledged that vaccination would be an impor tant 
“ancillary tool”  because h5n1 was becoming endemic across the Southeast 
Asian region.
China’s effort to develop a vaccine for highly pathogenic avian influenza 
began in the 1990s, around the time of the Mexico and Pakistan outbreaks. 
More or less since its inception, the vaccine program has been led by Chen 
Hualan, currently the director of the National Key Laboratory for Animal 
Influenza at the Harbin Veterinary Research Institute (hvri, in Harbin City, 
Helongjiang Province), itself an institute within the umbrella of the Chinese 
Acad emy of Agricultural Sciences (caas). At the time, Chen was a doctoral 
student in preventive veterinary medicine at the hvri,  under supervision of 
the institute’s director, Yu Kangzhen. Yu is credited with initiating the hpai 
research program at Harbin, beginning with the import of several influenza 
strains (representing each of the antigens h1–h15) from the Central Veterinary 
Laboratory, Weybridge, United Kingdom. The strains  were given to hvri by 
Dennis Alexander, who led the Weybridge lab.11 Yu assigned Chen and four 
other colleagues to work on influenza and specifically on the development of 
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a vaccine. In the first years of her research, Chen recollects that “we  couldn’t 
do any basic research  because we  didn’t have too many strains at that time.”12 
Moreover, although  things  were better than in the 1980s, equipment remained 
scarce: for instance, she would have to apply two to three weeks in advance in 
order to run material in a pcr machine.13
 After the Harbin lab isolated the h5n1 highly pathogenic avian influenza 
virus from a goose in Guangdong Province in 1996, the national government 
began to support the development of an h5 vaccine for use in poultry.14 The 
program gained urgent top- level encouragement  after the related, but genet-
ically distinct h5n1 virus emerged in Hong Kong in 1997, causing widespread 
poultry outbreaks on farms; causing seventeen  human cases, including five 
deaths; and prompting predictions that a pandemic could be imminent. In 
1999, in the midst of this vaccine development work, Chen applied to become 
a postdoctoral researcher with Kanta Subbarao, chief of the Molecular Ge-
ne tics Section of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control. For Subbarao and the 
cdc, hiring Chen was a useful opportunity to quickly gain inside knowledge 
on the emerging h5 viruses in China and Hong Kong. Chen, on the other hand, 
gained access to the most advanced techniques of influenza research and vac-
cine development.15
Chen’s most impor tant lesson at the cdc was training in an emerging tech-
nique known as plasmid- based reverse ge ne tics. At a broad level, reverse ge-
ne tics refers to the practice of creating ge ne tic mutants and then examining 
what phenotypes appear, the “reverse” of classical ge ne tics approaches that 
attempted to find the ge ne tic basis for a par tic u lar, known phenotypic trait. 
Since the 1970s, influenza vaccine production has involved the laboratory cre-
ation of reassortant viruses that combined antigenic properties with desirable 
attributes sourced from other strains. Usually, this involved recombining the 
high growth rate from a standard laboratory strain (e.g., h1n1 ao/pr/8), neces-
sary for industrial manufacturing, with the surface glycoproteins of the anti-
genically targeted currently circulating strain. However, the production of re-
assortants by co- infection is “cumbersome and time- consuming”  because each 
co- infection event can “theoretically result in the generation of . . .  254 diff er-
ent progeny viruses,” each of which needs to be carefully screened in order 
to select a suitable seed virus.16 Plasmid- based reverse ge ne tics, an innovative 
technique first developed in labs associated with Peter Palese and Robert Web-
ster in the late 1990s, promised a much faster, and more fine- tuned, pro cess of 
artificial recombination and strain se lection.17
Chen returned to Harbin in 2002. Soon  after, the laboratory developed an 
inactivated vaccine built from a low- pathogenic h5n2 virus, one among the 
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low- path viruses originally sourced from Weybridge. In 2003 the government 
approved the vaccine for use, first in Guangdong Province farms that raised 
chickens exclusively for export to Hong Kong and Macau, and then  later for 
more widespread use. Almost immediately  after the vaccine was approved, the 
h5n1 virus “reemerged” in Hong Kong and spread throughout Southeast Asia.
In response, China’s moa began to conduct “buffer zone vaccination” in 
and around outbreak sites using the inactivated h5n2 vaccine.18 In 2004, 2.5 
billion vaccine doses  were used.19 However, as Chen Hualan noted in a review 
of the vaccine program, the vaccine was “not ideal”  because the “seed virus ex-
hibited antigenic diversity with the prevalent h5n1 strains circulating in China 
at that time.”20 In addition, the seed virus did not grow well in eggs, making it a 
poor choice for large- scale industrial vaccine production.21 In order to produce 
an antigenically better match, Chen and the Harbin lab began building a new 
vaccine from scratch in the laboratory. Using plasmid- based reverse ge ne tics 
techniques, they created a reassortant seed virus that combined the antigen- 
binding genes (ha and na) from the 1996 Guangdong goose h5n1 virus with 
internal genes taken from a high- growth influenza a virus. The technique also 
eliminated the genes for high virulence, making the vaccines safer to use. As a 
published reflection from one of the lab members points out, plasmid- based re-
verse ge ne tics “solved all of the prob lems we had faced in the research on avian 
influenza vaccines.”22 Chen and her team named this vaccine Re-1, meaning 
“first reassortant vaccine.”
China began using the Re-1 vaccine concurrently with the inactivated 
h5n2 vaccine in 2004 for buffer zone vaccination. Production was supplied by 
a  limited number of government- approved phar ma ceu ti cal companies, includ-
ing the Harbin Weike Biotechnology Development Com pany, a “state- owned” 
enterprise partially owned by the Harbin Veterinary Research Institute itself.23 
Although the vaccine was effective in controlling outbreaks, it was soon clear 
that vaccinating in response to outbreaks was not preventing the emergence 
of new outbreaks. Chen remarks in a published reflection that in 2005, “epi-
demiological studies indicated that all the prior outbreaks had occurred in 
farms that did not vaccinate or vaccinated with unqualified vaccines.”24  Under 
pressure from the World Health Organ ization to control outbreaks before 
they seeded a pandemic, China took a dramatic and unpre ce dented step. On 
November 11 the Ministry of Agriculture issued a new policy standard that 
stipulated mandatory universal immunization of all poultry in China against h5 
highly pathogenic avian influenza. By universal immunization, the new policy 
literally required the vaccination of “100  percent” of poultry (including chick-
ens, ducks, and geese)— estimated to be around 14 billion birds.25
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Although supporting vaccination, officials from international agencies 
such as the fao immediately expressed skepticism over the scale of the im-
munization policy: how to get vaccines to so many birds across such a large 
territory, particularly considering that many are “loose” (not raised in enclosed 
housing) on so- called backyard farms?26 A closer look at the policy shows that 
the target of “100 percent” was to be achieved by dividing poultry farms into 
“routine” and “scattered poultry” (sanyang jiaqin) types, a distinction linked to 
broader distinctions in China’s agricultural development programs that I dis-
cussed in chapter 3.27 The distinction between “routine” and “sanyang” immu-
nization reflected two completely diff er ent mechanisms addressed to two diff er-
ent types of farm. On the one hand, so- called scale farms ( guimo yangzhichang) 
 were required to conduct routine vaccination using their own veterinary 
staff and equipment. Routine immunization protocols required vaccinating 
all birds when they  were fourteen days old, then three weeks  later injecting a 
booster vaccine, and vaccinating again  every six months.28 This immunization 
would be recorded by county- level veterinary agencies and in some cases veri-
fied by postvaccination serology. By contrast, government agencies directly 
conducted immunization of all sanyang poultry in annual campaigns each 
spring and fall.29
The impact of what I am calling the geopo liti cal strata of the pandemic 
epicenter becomes clear  here. In the vaccine program, China linked biotech-
nological innovation with industrial manufacturing and a mass campaign in-
tervention model with roots in the Mao era.30 The policy, which made univer­
sal immunization both mandatory and  free of charge, resembles emergency 
health campaigns to control schistosomiasis and sars, but with one crucial 
difference: the campaigns shifted the object of national intervention from 
 humans to birds. By imposing a poultry immunization program at the scale of 
the national territory, China extended the domain of national biosovereignty 
over the living bodies and populations of chickens, ducks, and geese.
In  doing so, this national intervention produced significant effects on the 
landscape and ecol ogy of the epicenter. Widespread, or near universal, vac-
cination transformed the ecol ogy of the h5n1 epidemic in a number of pos-
si ble ways. Most controversially, some Hong Kong scientists speculated that 
vaccination in China may have enabled the emergence of new strains of in-
fluenza through a pro cess of escape and evolutionary se lection.31 Representa-
tives from China’s Ministry of Agriculture and the Foreign Ministry denied 
the accusation and claimed that surveillance programs showed “no distinct 
changes in biological characteristics” of the virus.32 Many observers suggested 
that China’s universal vaccination program had not eliminated the circulation 
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of the virus but only rendered it invisible. What ever the case, China’s poultry 
immunization program undoubtedly remade the biological immunity of avian 
populations, shifting the host ecol ogy of influenza at a national scale.
The global health response to the hpai h5n1 outbreak, and in par tic u lar 
fao’s programs to contain the emerging virus “at source,” directly confronted 
the overlay of China’s national biopolitics upon the cultural landscapes and 
viral ecologies of the pandemic epicenter. In the rest of the chapter I follow 
Vincent Martin’s journey into the epicenter, focusing on his role in establish-
ing and directing the fao Emergency Center in China. I trace how the Emer-
gency Center’s pathway intersected with the geopo liti cal strata of national bio-
sovereignty, leading to displacements of global health diplomacy  toward new 
networks of affinity.
THE EMERGENCY CENTER
Immediately following the reemergence of hpai h5n1 in 2003, as the fao 
began to develop a strategy for controlling pandemic influenza “at source,” Mar-
tin wrote a two- page concept note outlining the design of an Emergency Center 
for Transboundary Animal Diseases (ectad) at the fao headquarters in Rome. 
As Martin described to me, the concept note emphasized new pathways of col-
laboration: “Within fao we also realized that the magnitude of the prob lem re-
quired a diff er ent approach, more coordination, a multidisciplinary approach, 
having a transversal approach to this prob lem, and we  were not or ga nized this 
way within fao; we had our diff er ent departments, and ser vices, working on 
animal health, on animal production, or economics, and we realized we needed 
a platform of experts from diff er ent horizons to work on this crisis.”
The logic of emergency inscribed new lines across the institutional form of 
the fao, bringing together specialists from diff er ent disciplines to analyze in-
formation about the emerging outbreak. Yet the validation and interpretation 
of reports from national governments remained a challenge. As one ectad 
staff member reported, “We quickly reach the limit of our system. We need 
expertise in the corridor to recognise what is  going on.” As this staff member 
complained about one (unnamed) country, “If they report, it’s  because every-
one already knows. The key question, when it gets serious, is the high level of 
expertise we need in the corridor. It is more and more difficult to find good 
 people.”33 As a result, the fao began to shift experimental systems and bio-
security interventions  toward the epicenter, juxtaposing the transversal geom-
etry of collaboration with the long- standing international orderings of the un 
organ ization.
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At first, the response remained framed within the fao policy known as 
technical cooperation. Established in 1976, the Technical Cooperation Pro-
gram (tcp)  shaped largely top- down transfers of technical knowledge and 
aimed for what historian Amy Staples calls “the transfer of expertise” from 
developed to developing nations.34 According to the tcp Manual, “The Techni-
cal Cooperation Programme . . .  aims to provide fao’s technical expertise to its 
Member countries through targeted, short term, catalytic proj ects.  These proj-
ects address technical prob lems in the field of agriculture, fisheries, forestry 
and rural livelihood that prevent Member countries,  either individually or col-
lectively, from implementing their development programmes.” More specifi-
cally, “tcp proj ects aim to fill the critical technical gaps by providing technical 
inputs that are not available locally, or that proj ect beneficiaries cannot access 
through their own means, or through local support systems.”35
This tcp model is rooted in the logic of technical internationalism that 
guides the fao’s developmental work, largely in common with other Bretton 
Woods and un agencies. Indeed, the first director- general, John Boyd Orr, 
once described the fao as “an international extension agency.” He argued that 
“the resources and powers entrusted to fao are woefully  limited in relation to 
[its] far- reaching objectives. It cannot order par tic u lar policies to be  adopted; 
it can only advise, educate, and persuade. It cannot embark on the execu-
tive functions of purchase and procurement in order to stimulate output and 
equalize distribution; it can only recommend, demonstrate, and discuss.”36 In 
part  because of this advisory, rather than executive, function, the fao often 
articulated the international as a technical and humanitarian domain distinct 
from politics.37
In the initial response to the reemergence of hpai h5n1, the fao estab-
lished tcp agreements with many countries in the region. tcps are paid for 
out of fao general funds, rather than by funds from donor countries, which 
enables a more rapid response to events. However, a national government must 
make a formal request for technical assistance in order for a tcp to be autho-
rized. In this regard, most countries made requests for laboratory training or 
laboratory equipment, but China was diff er ent. As Martin explained to me in 
conversation,
[the fao] sent a diff er ent kind of expert [to China]. . . .  For them, strength-
ening laboratory capacity was not a big issue. So we knew  there was a na-
tional reference laboratory in Harbin, we knew they had huge capacity to 
produce vaccines and diff er ent types of vaccine according to the strains, 
so this is not where we put the emphasis. We did put the emphasis more 
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on surveillance and epidemiology, and this is how we realized, during this 
proj ect, but it was also my observation, the weakest link was  really in epi-
demiology. They  were very capable of possibly, well, diagnosing the disease, 
typing the type of virus, sequencing the virus, producing the vaccine, and 
having a sound control strategy. All that was kind of OK, but the missing 
link was  really on the capacity to understand the big picture, of the disease, 
the ecol ogy of the disease, where it is, how does it spread, where are the 
most high- risk areas, how are we to better target our vaccination strategy 
or our surveillance system in live- bird markets.
Most of the initial fao tcp “emergency assistance” donation of $387,097 
to China was earmarked to “gradually strengthen national capacity in epide-
miological investigations,” with a small sum given for laboratory diagnostics.38 
The fao hired one national veterinarian, Cai Haifeng, a  career employee of 
the China Animal Health and Epidemiology Center (cahec, formerly known 
as the Animal Quarantine Institute), to begin early epidemiological work on 
avian influenza in China.
Yet Martin remained frustrated by the top- down vertical lines of technical 
cooperation. By 2005, he began “pushing for having an ectad office also in 
China  because I thought that it was meaningless to work in all the surrounding 
countries, trying to curb the spread of disease, while the epicenter—if we may 
say so— was in China in a way and it was not good just to have remote collabo-
rations with them.” Martin explained that the ongoing tcp proj ect aided his 
request for clearance from the Ministry of Agriculture. However,  because the 
ectad China office would entail the full- time presence of an “international 
expert” (Martin himself ), he still worked for more than a year to successfully 
get this clearance. As he told me, China “was also quite difficult to get in, to 
have such a close relationship . . .  as we had with the other countries.”
The displacement of the Emergency Center to China began to crisscross 
the fao’s structure of technical internationalism with new lines of collabora-
tion. Martin located the Emergency Center office in Sanlitun, Beijing’s inter-
national diplomatic district, at some distance from the fao Repre sen ta tion in 
China, which has offices in the commercial center of Guomao. The Emergency 
Center was on the fifteenth floor of a twin high- rise office tower, surrounded 
by quiet, tree- lined streets that mostly contained older diplomatic compounds. 
The United Nations, the World Health Organ ization, and countless interna-
tional ngos had offices nearby. Martin explained to me that the ectad national 
and regional offices are mostly in de pen dent from the fao country offices, such 
as the fao repre sen ta tion in China. Instead, they are all linked directly to the 
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central Rome headquarters and the ectad office  there. Moreover, their fund-
ing comes almost exclusively from direct, project- based donations by donor 
countries rather than from fao general funds. The Emergency Center office 
in Beijing, for instance, is funded almost exclusively by donations from the 
United States Agency for International Development (usaid). This in de pen-
dence enabled significant flexibility in its proj ects and programs, which skirted 
around some of the diplomatic formalism built into the fao’s international 
structure.
However, the fao’s technical internationalism remained power ful, creat-
ing a very diff er ent context for collaboration compared with university research 
or ngo- led health interventions. Traditionally, the fao has always stressed 
the “international” character of the staff at the headquarters in Rome. Andre 
Mayer, an early chair of the fao Executive Committee, recalled that  after 
one year “of seeking in turn advice from Chinese or Hindu, New Zealander 
or South African, South or North American, or from a Eu ro pean colleague,” 
he came to realize “that their hearts and minds are in agreement on prob lems 
which concern all of them and that they think only of solving them for the 
common welfare, [so] one can look upon the  future with hope.”39 As early as 
1952, the fao employed technical experts from forty- one countries.40
At the same time, the offices located inside member states, including the 
emergency centers, maintain a rigid institutional distinction between “inter-
national” and “national” staff. Aside from Martin,  every staff member of the 
Beijing Emergency Center is a Chinese citizen and is formally referred to as 
“national” staff. When the Emergency Center posted hiring calls for such posi-
tions, it always specified the attribute “national” in the job title, indicating that 
they sought a citizen of the host member state. Cai Haifeng, for instance, held 
the title of “national technical advisor.”
The fao ectad office often invites specialists in a variety of fields to 
 China: coming from as far away as the United States and Australia or as near as 
Thailand. The fao refers to  these visits as “missions” (including assessments, 
lectures, or training courses). The specialists are always identified as “inter-
national experts.” In my own consulting contracts with the fao, I have been 
referred to as an “anthropologist- international expert” and “international con-
sul tant in medical anthropology.” Sometimes the need to insert “international” 
could produce awkward- sounding sentences.  Under the headline “Interna-
tional Health Experts Visiting China,” a 2009 article from China hpai High­
lights (the newsletter published by the Emergency Center) reports that “three 
animal health international experts” visited the Emergency Center in Beijing. 
 These visitors are experts in the field of animal health, but their  expertise 
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is also qualified as having an international source and character, despite the 
strange phrasing that results.
The Emergency Center office layout reiterated this vision of the relation-
ship between national and international in its architectural plan. The “na-
tional” staff all work at computers in small, semi- enclosed cubicles within the 
main office. On the side of the room nearest the entrance, Cai Haifeng, the 
most se nior national staff member, works inside a glass- enclosed office. Next 
to this is another glass room with a conference  table, where meetings with 
visitors typically take place. On the far end of the main room, a small open-
ing leads into Martin’s corner office, separated from the rest of the space by 
a short baffle passage rather than a door. This passageway gives the interna-
tional se nior technical coordinator a physical in de pen dence from the rest of 
the office— both sound and sight are blocked— while maintaining an opening 
for communication. Whenever I was in Martin’s office, staff members would 
enter with a question or a piece of news, or Martin would pass outward to pick 
up a printout or to follow up on an email. The glass walls of the conference 
room expressed an ideal of transparency and public oversight: discussions in-
side could be seen, though not heard, from any point of the main office space. 
The se nior technical coordinator’s office, by contrast, both marked a border 
between international and national status and facilitated movement across 
it. More broadly, although the Emergency Center institutionally inscribed a 
boundary between “international” and “national,” as we  will see this boundary 
was less an impermeable border (or even a solid, but transparent, glass wall) 
than it was a synapse or passage: the distinction between international and na-
tional created transboundary openings that moved expertise into the epicenter 
and virus samples, genome sequences, and research data out.
DETOUR AND ACCESS
 Running along the header of  every document issued by the Beijing Emer-
gency Center is a remarkable logo. On a red ground that resembles a billowing 
Chinese flag, a chicken and a duck stand face- to- face, drawn in white silhou-
ette. In their hand- like wings, the birds hold glasses of red wine aloft and barely 
touching as if only a moment ago each had urged their counterpart to drink a 
celebratory toast (see figure 5.1).
The logo, which Martin crafted himself with the help of a design com pany, 
expresses normative ambivalence  toward relationships of communion and 
communication. To anyone working amid the bird- flu crisis, the clink- clink of 
glasses and sharing of wine by duck and chicken contains an unsettling irony: 
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 after all, research suggests that contact between ducks and chickens plays a 
significant role in the emergence and per sis tence of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza viruses.
Yet on another plane, the logo also evokes Martin’s ideal of collaboration 
and his vision for the ectad office in Beijing. At one of our first meetings, 
Martin told me that he faced two challenges to collaboration, challenges that 
at the time seemed to me incredibly heterogeneous: veterinarians  don’t want 
to work with medical doctors, and China  doesn’t want to share influenza se-
quence data with the fao. As the logo suggests, Martin’s approach to China’s 
unwillingness to share sequence data was not public outrage or critique but 
rather the building of relationships across difference, reframing international 
work in the terms of interdisciplinary collaboration. In this reading the wine 
shared by the two birds stands for the shared work across disciplines or territo-
rial borders. And in the many ectad meetings or events I attended in Beijing, 
often jointly or ga nized with China’s Ministry of Agriculture, this meta phor 
approached the literal, when Martin or the Chinese hosts inevitably stood and 
asked us, in the Chinese phrase, to ganbei (empty our cups).
Drinking alcohol, and especially drinking baijiu (a white liquor usually 
made from sorghum), is an impor tant component of banquets in China’s busi-
ness and bureaucratic circles. Banquets are sites for cultivating ganqing, or sen-
timent relations, among participants, and they help to extend and strengthen 
FIGURE 5.1.  The logo of the Emergency Center.
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guanxi relationship networks. Banquets are efficacious but not strictly instru-
mental: the reciprocal exchange of toasts produces new spaces of shared sen-
timent that can persist long  after the warm glow of the alcohol fades away. 
Although most popu lar culture references to banquets and baijiu focus on 
China’s business worlds, banquets are also common within professional and 
bureaucratic sectors such as medicine and public health.41
Discussions of guanxi and banquets are ubiquitous in the anthropological 
lit er a ture. They are usually depicted as an archetypical Chinese cultural form, 
even if one that has increased in importance during the post- Mao era of rapid 
economic growth.42 Therefore,  little attention has been given to the role of ban-
queting in transnational spaces, beyond a few anthropologists reflecting anec-
dotally about their own experiences as a foreign guest. Yet it soon became clear 
to me that banquets  were an impor tant part of how the Emergency Center got 
its work done in China, even if the actors could in no way be said to share a 
“local moral world” in common.43 By contrast, for Martin banqueting and other 
guanxi- like affinity practices  were precisely about working with difference, or 
strategically engaging with how he understood  things got done in China. Mar-
tin told me, for example, that the Emergency Center logo was partly an allusion 
to what he called “baijiu parties” that he had conducted as he sought to get 
Chinese government approval for vari ous influenza research proj ects. Banquets, 
or baijiu parties, helped break down bound aries of difference, including po liti-
cal bound aries, in order to make new forms of collaboration pos si ble. Through 
 these liquor- filled banquets, the staff from the Emergency Center could trans-
form the transnational relations of communication, increasing the flow of viral 
samples or sequences from China to the international agency, for instance, 
without resorting to the unconditional demand for transparency.
In 2009 Martin or ga nized one of the Emergency Center’s first proj ects in 
China: a research trip to Poyang Lake to collect samples of h5n1 virus. As I dis-
cussed in previous chapters, Poyang Lake had recently attracted attention from 
global health agencies as a pos si ble pandemic epicenter. When Martin put for-
ward his proposal for a sampling study at Poyang, however, the Ministry of Ag-
riculture flatly refused the first request for research clearance. Still, Martin was 
not deterred. “You talk to a few  people, drink a  little baijiu, and all of a sudden 
 you’re among the birds at the lake,” he told me. A report  later published as the 
first issue of China hpai Highlights, the newsletter of the Emergency Center, de-
clared the mission a success, particularly highlighting evidence of collaboration:
The proj ect, funded by Sweden, collected samples from domestic ducks 
farmed near Poyang Lake and was very successful in bringing together 
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mission members with Jiangxi Province veterinary ser vices and local vet-
erinary authorities to work collaboratively in the field. All parties  were ul-
timately able to agree on the methodology; and, proper sample collection 
techniques  were demonstrated and used in executing the proj ect. . . .  The 
working relationships formed as a result of this proj ect are very valuable to 
fao’s continued work in China to combat hpai. This field mission can be 
considered a success on many fronts, and we believe that similar field data 
collection efforts in the  future are more likely to be accepted and successful 
as a result of this proj ect. Approximately 60 epidemiologists and laboratory 
staff  were trained during this mission.44
The Poyang Lake proj ect reflects a mutation in the form of the fao’s model 
of “technical assistance” and, as a result, an impor tant change to how the fao 
structured relations between the “international” and the “national.” As I noted 
above, technical assistance often takes the form of training programs, aiming 
for the “replication of experts.”45 The Poyang Lake proj ect, for example, involved 
the training of sixty epidemiologists and laboratory staff. Yet the hierarchical 
and pedagogical form of technical assistance seems to stand in tension with the 
language of “work[ing] collaboratively in the field” used in the newsletter to dis-
cuss the proj ect. Through this juxtaposition of hierarchical and horizontal re-
lationships, the Poyang Lake proj ect reconfigured “technical assistance” as one 
half of a reciprocal exchange. No longer understood in the mode of aid, training 
was exchanged for access to research sites and restricted materials inside the 
pandemic epicenter (in par tic u lar, viral samples from birds).
As the report in China hpai Highlights makes clear, the movement of data 
or expertise from one hand to another was not the only product of  these ex-
changes. Much like guanxi gifts and  favors,  these exchanges also produced 
relationships— “working relationships,” as the newsletter puts it. In turn,  these 
relationships opened  toward a  future of subsequent exchanges, in which “simi-
lar field data collection efforts in the  future are more likely to be accepted and 
successful.” Rather than technical assistance as a form of development aid, tech-
nical transfer became a tool for building affinity and accessing the epicenter.
NETWORK ANALY SIS
When I first met Martin in 2010, he was in the midst of analyzing the re-
sults from a study he designed that examined the interconnections between 
live- poultry markets in southern China. At this time, many believed that live- 
poultry markets carried particularly high risk for avian influenza, primarily 
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 because of the crowded conditions at the market, the stress caused by travel 
that could lower immune re sis tance, and the mixing of species and sources of 
poultry. Many  human cases of avian influenza had also been traced to markets.
Martin’s proj ect aimed to chart how markets  were linked to one another 
and then, by using tools from social network analy sis, examine  whether the de-
gree of connectivity was correlated with markets where h5n1 viruses had been 
isolated. In order to develop this analy sis, the study needed two kinds of infor-
mation: first, data on the trading connections between diff er ent live- poultry 
markets, and second, data on influenza outbreaks or the isolation of viruses 
in the selected markets. In the first preliminary analy sis, Martin excitedly told 
me, a statistician found correlations between markets where h5n1 viruses  were 
isolated and markets that  were “k- cores” of the network— that is, hubs at the 
center of the network. In subsequent reanalysis, unfortunately, the correla-
tion dis appeared. Still, Martin was convinced that k- core was significant, that 
proximity to core (in this case, several poultry markets in Hunan Province) was 
more impor tant than number of connections in the spread of h5n1.
As I spent more time with Martin at the Emergency Center, I quickly 
learned that networks—or more precisely, the cultivation of qualitative 
networks— played as large a role in the ethical and po liti cal pro cess of data 
collection as they did in the scientific analy sis of results.46 Much as with the 
Poyang Lake study I mentioned above, Martin designed the live- poultry mar-
ket study as an exchange of training for access to biological materials and infor-
mation. The study took place in three provinces of southern China— Hunan, 
Yunnan, and Guangxi— that are included within the ecological region that is 
known as the pandemic epicenter. But  there was a more pressing reason why 
 these par tic u lar provinces  were chosen: provincial Center for Animal Disease 
Control (cadc) leaders agreed to allow the training and research proj ect to take 
place  there, whereas wealthier provinces in the same ecological zone, such as 
Guangdong and Shanghai municipality, which already had well- developed vet-
erinary inspection teams, refused offers of technical assistance.
Cai Haifeng led the data- collection portion of the study, along with the 
Emergency Center’s national veterinary epidemiologist, Gao Lili. Cai and Gao 
traveled to each province, where they selected ten markets based on size, trade, 
and hygiene practices that  were believed to be “representative” of the poul-
try marketing practices in  those provinces. First, the Emergency Center staff 
trained both provincial and municipal (shi)- level cadc veterinarians in a stan-
dard protocol for collection of virological samples. During the following days, 
the Emergency Center staff and all of the trainees went to a local live- poultry 
market in order to demonstrate and exercise the sampling protocol. Typically, 
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one cadc vet would hold a bird with its wings stretched back, in an effort 
to immobilize it, while a second cadc vet took a cloacal and tracheal swab. 
For the Emergency Center, the study design enabled access through aid: the 
training exercise involved the  actual collection of samples from a live- poultry 
market for virological testing. Indeed, as Gao explained to me,  because of 
China’s decentralized bureaucratic authority, the training needed to include 
both provincial- and municipal- level cadc veterinarians: only the lower- level 
municipal bureau has formal authority over the markets within their jurisdic-
tion, and thus including them was the prerequisite for access.
However, the negotiation of networks did not end  there, for access on its 
own soon appeared to be insufficient. Although the training- based study de-
sign successfully accomplished the collection of cloacal and tracheal swabs for 
virological study,  after collection the samples  were moved to provincial cadc 
laboratories for investigation. Unfortunately, the provincial labs reported that 
all samples tested negative for influenza virus. (A similar result occurred in 
a Poyang Lake study conducted by Scott Newman on another occasion. As 
Newman noted about that other study, “I could believe  there  were no h5n1 
hpai viruses, perhaps, but no influenzas?”) Skeptical of the result, Martin then 
negotiated for 30  percent of the samples to be forwarded to the National Key 
Laboratory for Avian Influenza in Harbin. Once  there, Martin noted simply, 
“ There  were quite a few positives.”
In addition to biological samples, the study also collected information on 
poultry trade patterns and hygiene practices in order to describe the “network” 
of live- poultry markets. Gao Lili led this effort, which focused on an interview- 
based survey of market man ag ers and a select sample of poultry traders. A 
lengthy list of questions primarily aimed to track where traders sourced their 
birds and where they sold them, a heuristic for identifying connections among 
diff er ent markets. Although the survey did not involve a training component, 
Gao still brought two or three cadc vets along with her  because she could not 
speak any of the local dialects. Gao was unsatisfied with the results of their 
translation, she told me. Perhaps  because the cadc vets did not completely 
understand the purpose of her questioning or perhaps  because they had their 
own motivations, by the time the answer came back to her, retranslated, it 
was compressed and almost useless. The vendors, to be sure,  were not all that 
forthcoming. Prob ably, Gao felt, they  were afraid that government authori-
ties might close them down or  were afraid about the theft of valuable busi-
ness information. It did not help that the cadc officials accompanied her, with 
white lab coats, clipboards, and the rest. As a result, she had to develop her 
own interpretive strategies for validating the statements that vendors made. 
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When she asked the vendors how many birds had died, many would say that no 
birds died: “If  people said zero, we knew it  wasn’t true. If they said five to eight 
 percent, it meant  there was normal death. If they said twenty to thirty  percent, 
it meant  there was an epidemic.”
Gao started  going to the markets at night, long  after the official survey was 
over, and looking around on her own. One eve ning she encountered a trans-
porter who sold poultry from his truck to the  wholesale vendors at the market, 
who serendipitously happened to be from somewhere near Gao’s own home-
town in the northern province of Henan. Gao told me that she immediately 
began speaking with the transporter in a regional dialect, and as a result the 
conversation took on an intimate and  free character: an intimacy not pos si ble, 
Gao felt, in the Mandarin lingua franca. They  were both far from home. And in 
the course of this conversation, the transporter told her something completely 
unexpected: he purchased his poultry in the far north of China, sometimes as 
far as Heilongjiang Province (more than 3,500 kilo meters away), and sold them 
in the southern cities of Guangxi Province.
The encounter became almost legendary in the Emergency Center. It 
opened up a completely new understanding of the dynamics of poultry trade. 
It stretched the ecol ogy of the so- called influenza epicenter far beyond south-
ern China, where most previous research had located it. Gao’s ability to trans-
late from the dialect to the national and the international made the other wise 
invisible extent of unofficial poultry trade vis i ble. The encounter produced a 
distinctive kind of truth statement, one that constantly circulated inside the 
Emergency Center, guiding the interpretive meaning ascribed to the analytics 
of poultry trade networks. In public pre sen ta tions, Martin often spoke of it 
too. In one public talk, for instance, when Martin presented the results of the 
network study, he explained that even before they conducted the quantitative 
analytics, the team “could see already that  there was some long- distance trade 
 going on in several provinces.” Yet Gao’s finding could never become a true 
scientific fact, in the sense that it would never be included in any published 
articles.
In the previous section I described the boundary between international 
and national inside the Emergency Center. In the live- poultry market study 
this boundary played an impor tant role in the center’s division of scientific 
 labor. The more se nior national staff members, Cai Haifeng and Gao Lili, col-
lected the data “in collaboration,” as they called it, with provincial and mu-
nicipal veterinary ser vices. The Chinese Harbin Key Laboratory for Avian In-
fluenza sequenced the virological specimens and sent digested reports to the 
Emergency Center. Once the sequences and accompanying surveys had been 
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delivered to the Beijing Emergency Center, however, Martin conducted all of 
the analy sis, with the help of Ricardo Magalhães, an “international veterinary 
epidemiologist based in Queensland University.”
Magalhães came to China for only brief visits of five days or less. He ex-
plained to me that he plans  these trips carefully in order to accomplish all of 
the tasks that  will require working with national staff during the short stay. 
Most of the numerical and statistical analy sis he works on by himself back in 
Australia. When I met him on his last day in Beijing, he worked  until six “wrap-
ping  things up”; then we all went to the famous Silk Market in Sanlitun, where 
a national staff member helped Magalhães buy toys and other inexpensive sou-
venir products for his  family before dinner. The lower levels of prestige awarded 
to technical data production, as opposed to analy sis and journal- article writing, 
lies deep in the modern sciences.47 In the proj ects of the Emergency Center, 
this hierarchy of prestige is mapped onto the distinction between national and 
international status.48 When Gao Lili explained the results of the study to me, 
she reaffirmed that a deep separation divided the production of data from the 
methodology of analy sis. She described her experiences at the markets in some 
detail, explaining how she collected virological samples and conducted surveys 
of poultry traders. She confidently explained the results of the study to me. She 
then noted, however, that she “ won’t speculate or comment on the statistical 
methodology employed by Martin and Ricardo.” Moreover, although both Cai 
and Gao are included as coauthors in the resulting publications, the other “col-
laborators” from national, provincial, or municipal veterinary institutes are not.
Gao Lili’s own  career, however, reveals that this boundary between inter-
national and national is not a fixed ascription of status, but rather sets  people 
and  things into motion. Gao was born in Henan and took a bachelor’s degree 
at Henan Agricultural University, graduating in 2000.  After graduation, she 
began working as a lecturer at the Henan Institute of Science and Technol-
ogy. She soon enrolled in a master’s program in preventive veterinary medi-
cine, studying with Chen Hualan at the National Key Laboratory for Avian 
Influenza in Harbin. In 2005, following the reemergence of the h5n1 virus, the 
Ministry of Agriculture sent her abroad to study for a master’s in veterinary 
public health, a degree at that time not offered in China. She attended a joint 
program held in part at the  Free University of Berlin and in part at Changmai 
University in Thailand.
When I worked with her at conferences or training programs, Gao more 
than once remarked on the diff er ent pedagogical style she had discovered 
abroad. In China, veterinary science is taught almost entirely through text-
books. This was a mode very familiar to her, both from her time as a student 
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and through her own teaching experience. But in Berlin, she recalled that the 
professors assigned students to conduct field investigations. In one exercise, 
for example, they asked students to go to slaughter houses to learn about food- 
safety regulations and how they  were administered in practice. In Germany 
each class had fewer students than is typical in China. Classes  were structured 
in a seminar style, with students and the professor seated at a round  table to-
gether discussing the topic of the day. Fi nally, rather than lecturing on facts 
and theories for the students to commit to memory by rote, the professor often 
began with a prob lem and asked the students to come up with a solution.
Gao took this “international” standpoint in order to criticize China’s veter-
inary education, and she sought access to the international domain— through 
special training programs and the like—in order to increase her own abilities 
as a veterinary scientist. At the same time, in proj ects such as the live- poultry 
market study, she also cultivated a distinctive position at the boundary of the 
national and the international that enabled her to produce unique scientific 
values. In Gao’s own  career, the Emergency Center therefore provided two 
mechanisms of value creation. On the one hand, the international stood as a 
source of value for Chinese veterinarians like herself; by  going to Germany to 
study and even by working at the Emergency Center, Gao could increase her 
own value as a veterinary scientist. On the other hand, the Emergency Center 
depended on her to remain on the national side of the boundary line,  because 
it was from  there that she could best translate local situations into globally cir-
culating truths. As a result,  these two mechanisms for mobilizing the bound-
ary between international and national sometimes stood at odds. Having ac-
cumulated enough value through her work of translation, Gao suddenly left 
the Emergency Center in the late summer of 2011, while Martin was away on 
vacation. She had been recruited by another international veterinary expert 
(who had recently visited the Emergency Center on an fao mission) to study 
for a PhD in veterinary epidemiology at a Canadian university. When Martin 
returned to Beijing and found she had left, he was shocked and disappointed. 
In his eyes, he explained to me, Gao had revealed herself to be “opportunistic” 
by moving onward as soon as a better situation appeared. But it was the Emer-
gency Center that had created the opportunities.
FIELD GUIDE TO THE EPICENTER
Some time  after he established the Emergency Center in Beijing, Vincent 
Martin, always mobile, began studying for a PhD in spatial ecol ogy  under the 
supervision of Marius Gilbert at the University of Brussels Spatial Epidemiology 
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Lab. As part of his dissertation research, Martin collaborated with Gilbert to 
develop a spatial risk model for China, comparable to the one Gilbert had de-
veloped for Thailand. However, the invisibility of  silent virus circulation made 
the development of this spatial ecological risk model quite diff er ent from Gil-
bert’s  earlier models.
First, the data necessary for building the models  were much more difficult 
to access. As I describe in chapter 2, Gilbert’s Thailand study was based on 
data collected by the incredibly thorough active- surveillance program known 
as the X- Ray Survey. The data were collected over a one- month period during 
the second- wave epidemic in 2005. Active surveillance means that the teams 
actively sought out cases in  every district rather than waiting for reports of 
outbreaks to trickle in. Moreover, the X- Ray Survey combined laboratory- 
supported surveillance for h5n1 avian influenza with a simultaneous survey 
of poultry populations, another crucial data source. Neither virus surveillance 
nor poultry surveys  were as comprehensive, consistent, or accessible in China, 
particularly in the more recent years when no outbreaks  were reported. Poul-
try population statistics, for example, vary from province to province in terms 
of the how animals are categorized, with some provinces reporting numbers 
that distinguish chickens and ducks, and  others reporting only aggregated 
poultry numbers. As a result, in the China study Gilbert relied on numbers 
from the fao’s global livestock population modeling program, “Gridded Live-
stock of the World,” rather than provincial census data.
On the other hand, the  silent circulation of the h5n1 virus also meant 
that the purpose and utility of making an ecological risk map was quite 
diff er ent. In Thailand, widespread culling of poultry discovered during the 
X- Ray eliminated the h5n1 virus. It did not return. By the time Gilbert began 
his Thailand study, he was working with archival data that represented what 
would best be described as an archival situation. As a result, Gilbert’s study 
was not designed to provide tools for epidemic control in Thailand. Rather, 
Gilbert aimed primarily to produce what he called “generalisable” tools and 
facts about avian influenza risk.49 Through the authority attributed to his 
models by scientific publication, Gilbert hoped to construct scientific facts 
that would be true not only for Thailand but also elsewhere. As Gilbert and 
colleagues state, “The model of hpai h5n1 virus risk developed in Thailand 
with the data from the second epidemic wave maintains its predictive power 
when applied to other epidemic waves or other regions, indicating that the 
model can be extrapolated in space and time.”50 To this end, Gilbert “vali-
dated” the study by using the model to develop and test risk maps of Cambo-
dia, Laos, and Vietnam.
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In the extrapolation of the model to China, although facts could still be 
constructed and articles published, the primary purpose and use of the result-
ing maps  were quite diff er ent. Whereas hpai h5n1 was only a historical, ar-
chival prob lem in Thailand, in China avian flu was becoming more or less an 
endemic prob lem. At the same time, the circulation of viruses was largely in-
visible and unreported. Given this situation, the Emergency Center staff used 
the maps of risk distribution as a heuristic substitute for outbreak reports in order 
to guide the location of biosecurity interventions into the pandemic epicenter. 
In a characteristic shift, the modeling of ecological risks substituted for the 
bureaucratic chain of surveillance and outbreak reporting.
When Martin invited and supported Gilbert’s geo- spatial risk model in 
China, he was not only interested in building models that could lead to general 
facts about influenza risk (for instance, demonstrating the hy po thet i cal impor-
tance of free- grazing ducks). Rather, Martin hoped to locate zones of high risk 
inside China. Along with Gilbert, he hoped to create an analytic device that 
could orient where to conduct scientific research and guide practical interven-
tions on the hy po thet i cal source of pandemic influenza. This was not so much 
a model of the pandemic epicenter as field guide.
The China geo- spatial risk model took risk  factors previously identified as 
significant in the Thailand studies— for example, duck populations and rice- 
cropping intensity— and tested their correlation with archival data on influ-
enza distribution in China. These data come from the Veterinary Bulletin, a 
newsletter published monthly—in Chinese—by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
The data include two types: reported outbreaks of hpai h5n1 for the years 2007 
to 2009, and the positive samples of h5n1 collected by the Harbin lab during 
postvaccination surveillance over the same period.  Because it is published only 
in Chinese, its contents remain  limited to Chinese readers. In the case of the 
risk map study, therefore, a key— but low- prestige— data- analysis role was pro-
vided to the “national” staff members of the Emergency Center, especially Cai 
Haifeng. Their task was simply to translate the data points from the Chinese- 
language charts in the Veterinary Bulletin into an English- language spreadsheet. 
In the final paper, Cai is credited as having “contributed reagents/materials/
analysis tools.”51
Once Marius Gilbert had entered  these data into the models, the results 
revealed a far more heterogeneous terrain than previously  imagined in the hy-
pothesis that southern China is an influenza epicenter. In his original hypoth-
esis, Shortridge had typically emphasized the Pearl River Delta region adjacent 
to Hong Kong, with its “intricate waterways,” as the core of the influenza epi-
center. Based on the risk model, Martin and his colleagues concluded that the 
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epicenter could actually be divided into three distinct zones, each with a dif-
fer ent level of risk. They write that their new model “supports the hypothesis 
of a wider and slightly displaced epicenter of influenza viruses, not only con-
centrated around the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong province but extending 
south of the Yangtze River and including provinces such as Jiangxi province 
where internal segments of the 1996 geese hpai h5n1 virus may have origi-
nated.”52 Indeed, the distributed clusters of red on the map, each indicating a 
zone of elevated risk, suggest a multiplicity of localized epicenters.
But it is the use of the map that I want to focus on  here. In early 2011 I 
helped the Emergency Center or ga nize a bilateral meeting between the agri-
culture ministries of China and Vietnam on the topic of “targeted risk- based 
vaccination.” During the course of this conference, I saw Martin deploy the 
map in a public setting for the first time. In the pro cess, I saw another strategy 
for accessing the epicenter, one that supplanted po liti cal, territorial space with 
repre sen ta tions of ecological space.
In typical style, Martin planned the “China Vietnam Forum on hpai Man-
agement and Control” as a mechanism of persuasion. This was no gathering 
of  free scientific exchange, no symposium to debate vari ous views of a prob-
lem. Martin or ga nized the entire meeting to make an argument: that China 
should replace compulsory universal vaccination with “targeted, risk- based 
vaccination.” The method, previously demonstrated during the rinderpest 
eradication campaign in Africa, aims to identify areas of high risk in order 
to focus scarce vaccination resources. Rather than vaccinating everywhere 
in policy (but likely unevenly in practice), the targeted approach is intended 
to ensure comprehensive vaccination over a more  limited set of high- risk 
areas.
The forum took place at a large international  hotel in Sanlitun. An enor-
mous ballroom with a stage was outfitted with round  tables, around which 
clustered diff er ent groups of participants— international technical experts at 
one  table, fao international staff at another; visiting representatives from 
Vietnam at one  table, and representatives from the diff er ent agencies of Chi-
na’s Ministry of Agriculture at several other  tables, including the Veterinary 
Bureau, the Center for Animal Disease Control (cadc), the China Animal 
Health and Epidemiology Center (cahec), and the Harbin Avian Influenza 
reference laboratory. At the height of the meeting an unexpected controversy 
erupted over the efficacy of the universal vaccination program. At the time 
the controversy surprised me  because it did not take the classical form often 
described in accounts of pandemic flu research, in which international criti-
cism confronts China’s assertions of national sovereignty. Rather, this time the 
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controversy divided two parts of China’s agricultural bureaucracy against each 
other: the Ministry of Agriculture’s cadc, represented by Wang Hongwei, and 
the Harbin lab, led by Chen Hualan.
In his pre sen ta tion on China’s poultry immunization, Wang Hongwei em-
phasized the success of the vaccination program. He explained that each year 
the Ministry of Agriculture issued a national hpai surveillance plan. The plan 
included postvaccination serological surveillance, in which poultry are sam-
pled not for viruses but for the presence of antibodies produced by vaccina-
tion. The provinces or ga nized the implementation of this plan, and laborato-
ries at the province and prefectural level— along with the so- called national 
monitoring station network ( guojia cebao zhan)— carried out the surveillance. 
The results of  every sample  were entered into a central computerized system 
run by the cadc called the “Nationwide Animal Disease Surveillance and Epi-
demic Information System” for integrated analy sis. In 2010, for example, the 
surveillance program collected more than 4.3 million serological samples and 
347,000 viral samples. In conclusion, Wang happily reported that the cadc’s 
serological surveillance showed that China had achieved herd immunity— 
defined as 70  percent positive rate or better—in  every province. As the concept 
of herd immunity indicates, Wang claimed that China had vaccinated enough 
poultry to effectively break the circulation of the virus and prevent outbreaks 
from occurring.
 Later that same day, Director Chen Hualan of the Harbin Key Labora-
tory presented a paper discussing the work of her lab in the development of 
vaccines— a paper that offered a very diff er ent assessment of the vaccination 
apparatus. Postvaccination surveillance, she explained, is an impor tant part 
of their vaccine development program. But its purpose differs markedly from 
the official national surveillance program administered by the cadc. Chen ex-
plained that the Harbin lab conducts surveillance not to assess the coverage 
of the immunization campaign across national space but rather to detect vac-
cine failure— that is, to discover circulating strains that have become antigeni-
cally diverse to the current vaccine formula, rendering the vaccine in effec tive. 
When discovered, such circulating strains typically become the seed virus for 
new vaccine development.
Chen stated flatly that, based on postvaccination surveillance, “vaccina-
tion coverage is definitely not as high as 90 per cent. In broilers over 80 per 
cent  were not vaccinated. In ducks, over 70 per cent  were not vaccinated ac-
cording to our surveillance.” Whereas Wang suggested that at least 70  percent 
of poultry  were vaccinated, Chen seemingly inverted the claim, arguing that 
over 70  percent  were not vaccinated.
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As the dispute unfolded over the course of the day, it became clear that 
the discrepancy was rooted in the diff er ent purpose and design of the surveil-
lance programs. The two surveillance programs are guided by quite diff er ent 
means and ends. The cadc surveillance uses sampling devices to provide a 
representative assessment of the mass vaccination program across the entire 
territory of China. Relying on the hierarchy of the veterinary bureaucracy, the 
acdc sends county- level veterinary offices to conduct or collect the results of 
serological tests from farms, assembling a systematic and regular distribution 
of samples across space. The Harbin lab, by contrast, sets out to find the gaps in 
the vaccination program. Rather than assessing the coverage of the immuniza-
tion campaigns, the Harbin lab aims to detect vaccine failure. As a result, it 
samples for viruses at live- bird markets, not farms. When such antigenic vari-
ants are discovered, the Harbin lab updates the vaccine seed strain to include 
the new antigens and produces new vaccines with the updated seed strain. 
“New strains” are discovered precisely when a virus is found to escape the cov-
erage of existing vaccines; novelty, in this case, is merely the externality of the 
vaccine’s efficacy. And alongside the progressive differentiation of viral varia-
tion, the Harbin lab has produced a similar progression of vaccines: as of 2011, 
Re-1 had been joined seven other vaccines, culminating with the production 
of re-8.
A key exchange took place when the floor was opened for questions. Chen 
acknowledged that “when we went to farmers to collect samples, we see the 
same result [as the cadc]. When we go to markets, we see diff er ent results. 
For me it’s very easy to explain. The local  people in charge of vaccination, they 
know which farmers are vaccinating properly, so they bring us to  those farm-
ers; it’s also where they are collecting samples.”
Chen suggested that the base- level state- employed veterinary workers se-
lectively pick “good” farms— farms they know are “vaccinating properly”— for 
serological sampling, thereby skewing the results. From the audience an official 
from the China cadc offered a diff er ent interpretation, one that focused on 
the challenge of veterinary work amid China’s complex diversity of husbandry 
systems. “Backyard and grazing53 farms, they maybe only get one shot,” he said:
If you have been to Chinese markets, you  will see dozens of chickens, not 
a lot, never over a hundred. Our surveillance rates are also lower than 
that reported by local government. Agriculture ministry is also concerned 
about this. [ There are] diff er ent models of agriculture in China. How do 
you sample? If you sample commercial farms, you might have a high rate, 
but if you sample backyard farmers, the rate  will be lower. In the policies, 
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before the birds go to market,  there is no requirement to [re-]vaccinate. 
The over 70 per cent titer is  because  these numbers are monitored at the 
farms. The birds sampled by Dr. Chen [at markets] prob ably  hadn’t been 
vaccinated for over four months.
Amid this conflict over the comprehensiveness and efficacy of the uni-
versal vaccination program, Martin took a detour. Rather than vigorously 
asserting the failure of the vaccination program or the limitations of surveil-
lance mechanisms, he turned to the risk map as a way to bypass controver-
sies over reporting and vaccination. In his own pre sen ta tion Martin made 
the case for a transition  toward what he called “risk- based targeted vaccina-
tion.” He reminded the audience that the goal of the h5n1 response— stated 
clearly in a formative oie/fao strategy document— was the eradication of the 
highly pathogenic virus. Eradication meant total elimination of the virus, 
not merely control or reduction of outbreaks. And evidence indicated that 
mass vaccination could never eradicate the virus  because of per sis tent  silent 
circulation.
“China is huge,” Martin told the assembled crowd, “and we still  don’t  really 
know where are the main risk zones.” With an image of the China risk map pro-
jected on a large screen hanging from the ceiling, filling the wall  behind him, 
he continued: “The red areas are high risk, and this shows it is not all of south 
China, but that it is associated with par tic u lar risk predictors. . . .  Thanks to 
this analy sis you can concentrate efforts, you can use this map to overlay out-
breaks,  human cases. You can see that lots of parts of China have very  little 
risk.”
In Martin’s hands the risk map could be used to shift vaccination efforts 
from the universal coverage programs designated by state policy, which argu-
ably could never be achieved in practice,  toward distributed terrains of relative 
influenza risk. Perhaps more importantly, the risk map also allowed the Emer-
gency Center to bypass the controversial questions about vaccination coverage, 
the  silent circulation of viruses, and the lack of transparent outbreak reports in 
its planning of research and biosecurity interventions. Answers to  those ques-
tions, or more precisely, the forms in which an answer to  those questions could 
take,  were inevitably tied up with the politics of national sovereignty and the 
hierarchy of administrative bureaucracy. The risk map, by contrast, allowed 
the Emergency Center to focus activities on certain areas and ignore  others 
without relying on outbreak reports or effective surveillance systems. Indeed, 
risk maps of the spatial ecol ogy of the influenza epicenter could now be made 
with data collected from a satellite flying seven thousand kilo meters overhead.
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Unlike in humanitarian renderings of global health, Martin did not figure a 
planetary humanity as an ethical imperative for bypassing sovereign states but 
rather aimed to produce a technical demonstration of the insignificance of na-
tional scale or territorial boundary.54 Put another way, the rooting of risk maps 
in satellite- derived data invoked a “vertical” geopolitics explic itly designed to 
supersede national territorial bound aries.55 One could say he attempted a tech-
nique of stratification that would separate China— understood as a sovereign, 
territorial entity in geopo liti cal space— from the ecological layers of the pan-
demic epicenter.
PREDICAMENTS OF CULTURE
Even as he upheld the technical over the po liti cal, the risk map drove Mar-
tin and his collaborators back into the epicenter and its politics of affinity. For 
one  thing, the validation of the remotely sensed images produced by orbit-
ing satellites constantly required on- the- ground surveys, usually conducted by 
local collaborators. In remote sensing this pro cess is called “ground- truthing” 
and involves calibrating the grid of pixels in a satellite image with on- location 
observations tagged to other rectangular grid systems, such as longitude and 
latitude.56 In 2011, for example, a research team led by the China Acad emy of 
Sciences in conjunction with Jiangxi Normal University traveled across the 
Poyang Lake region. The team mapped the bound aries of fields, using hand-
held gps devices, and interviewed farmers, primarily asking them  whether 
they planted one, two, or three crops of rice per year. With  these surveys the 
research team aimed to demonstrate that the remote sensing “signature” they 
had proposed, based on the temporal dynamics of the normalized difference 
vegetation index (ndvi), could accurately distinguish single from double crop-
ping of rice in Landsat satellite data.57 The vertical perspective orbited over-
head, but its interpretation relied on building affinities with local collabora-
tors, crossing marshy ground in white vans, and exchanging knowledge with 
farmers inside the epicenter.
Moreover, Martin’s per for mance of stratifying ecol ogy from politics relied 
on the strategy of affinity as its foundation, its infrastructural support. When 
I joined several of the invited speakers and international fao con sul tants at a 
Latin- themed bar on a trendy Beijing hutong street  after the China Vietnam 
Forum, every one agreed the meeting was a remarkable success. Two of the fao 
con sul tants from the Vietnam Emergency Center in Hanoi even remarked 
that it was one of the most successful meetings they had ever attended. Know-
ing how Martin had clear objectives for the meeting, I remarked that the  whole 
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 thing must have been orchestrated very effectively to achieve them: almost 
every thing Martin had hoped for had ended up written in the official “recom-
mendations” issued  after the forum, and granted ministerial- level approval by 
both China and Vietnam. Martin then turned to me with a smile and said that 
he wrote the recommendations before the meeting:
I had started thinking about what the recommendations should be when 
S. Y. [a Ministry of Agriculture leader] called me on the phone and said 
“I think you should write some recommendations.” I answered, as if sur-
prised, “ Really, you want me to write them now?” and S. Y. was a bit shy, 
you know, but we agreed to do it. Then I had to work late Monday night to 
make sure I could get it done, and send it around to S. Y. to look over before 
the meeting. Then as soon as the meeting started I sent them around to the 
Ministry of Agriculture, and they made a few changes.
The fao con sul tant from Vietnam chimed in: “Yes, we always do this,  there is 
some kind of moral  thing about waiting  until the meeting has officially begun, 
but once the meeting begins you just send in the recommendations. The Viet-
nam ese and Chinese like it this way; they expect it.”
Strategies of affinity, such as the banquet dinners hosted or attended by 
the staff of the Emergency Center or attempts to do  things the “Chinese way,” 
did more than break down barriers to transnational communion. It is more ac-
curate to say that they marked borders in a way that enabled communication 
across difference. This drawing of borderlines does work of its own, provid-
ing a language through which difference can be understood and worked with. 
And for Martin, what he described as Chinese “culture” was an ambivalent 
but central part of his work, attractive and energizing but also troubling and 
exhausting.
For most of his time working at the Emergency Center, Martin lived in one 
of the oldest sections of the city, in a hutong near the  Temple of Confucius 
and the Yonghe Lama Buddhist  Temple. Along with his wife and  children, he 
lived in what was called a “villa,” a modern construction nestled inside a maze 
of alleys and courtyard homes.  Later he moved to a traditional courtyard  house 
near the North Lake, in the very heart of the old city. An ancient structure, 
the inside had been painted blinding white and the wooden beams varnished 
by the En glish real estate investor who rented it to him. Recently installed glass 
walls closed off the rooms from the inner courtyard. The furniture continued 
the theme of chinoiserie but was juxtaposed with a collection of African sculp-
tures Martin had collected while working on the eradication of rinderpest in 
 Kenya. One eve ning in early December 2011 we sat together enjoying French 
A F F I N I T Y  A N D  A C C E S S  153
wine and cheese in the main room. My fieldwork was coming to an end, and 
Martin seemed tired. “ These hutong buildings are impossible to heat,” he mut-
tered and pulled a space heater closer to us. He told me he was planning to 
leave China for good in June, to take up a position in the fao headquarters in 
Rome. His  family had already returned to Eu rope.
When he reflected on his four years in China, Martin told me, he found 
a “contradiction” ran through all of his work with Chinese counter parts, in-
cluding in his own office. He recollected proj ects like the Poyang Lake virus 
sampling expedition, in which baijiu parties led to unpre ce dented access to 
samples in a key avian influenza site. “In a place like Cambodia and Laos, even 
though at first you might have more open access, you could end up hitting 
barriers, not be able to get as far as  here,” he explained. But in other moments 
he was frustrated that China still did not publicly report certain outbreaks or 
rejected proj ects that he proposed. When Martin returned from Thailand  after 
the New Year, the moment that I began this chapter with, he found a regional 
foot- and- mouth disease (fmd) crisis that China claimed did not exist within 
its borders. Outbreaks had been reported in Mongolia, southeastern Rus sia, 
and even in the highly secretive North  Korea. But China had not reported a 
single case. Despite the fact that the highly contagious virus had been found 
along all of the international borders around China’s northeastern province 
of Heilongjiang,  there was no indication that any cases existed within China’s 
territory. From a regional and ecological point of view, Martin felt, the virus 
must be in China as well. “I think we are  going backwards  here,” he lamented 
at the time.
Martin saw “culture” as a force that  shaped this contradiction. In one email 
exchange, I had pointed out how my research as an anthropologist explored sci-
ence as a cultural practice. In his response, doubtless conscious he was speak-
ing to an anthropologist, Martin picked up the terminology of culture to iden-
tify Chinese “cultural practices” as a blockage to full and  free communication:
I agree with you regarding the cultural practices, and  there was another 
dimension I was thinking about lately, which is the way countries and 
government deals with sanitary information and their own cultural ap-
proach to what we call “transparency.” I am not sure it would lead to 
any sort of in ter est ing findings, but I am  really thinking sometimes (es-
pecially when we talk about China) that this notion of transparency and 
information sharing might need to be revisited in light of cultural practices 
(or maybe it has already been done). In the same vein, the cultural and ethi-
cal approach to science is also of interest: we know that hiding a disease or 
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not sharing virus sequences is easier (in the short term) than  doing it, and I 
was also wondering  whether we are missing a point, as Western countries, 
when we pretend that every body should play the game and be transparent.
Martin employed the notion of cultural difference in order to explain Chi-
na’s seemingly contradictory approach to working with global health agencies. 
The concept of culture enabled him to constitute China as diff er ent but fully 
reasonable. Moreover, he advanced a kind of cultural critique, suggesting that 
China’s difference obligates us to “revisit” our own notions of transparency and 
information sharing. Francois Jullien has remarked on the “indirect” approach 
to meaning in Chinese discourse, which he claims allows us to reflect on the 
bound aries within which Western thought has grown. In par tic u lar, Jullien 
argues that Chinese “detours” in discourse reveal a mode of thinking that does 
not prioritize language as a repre sen ta tion, more or less transparent, of nature 
or being. To be clear, I do not draw on Jullien’s Detour and Access in order to bol-
ster observations of Chinese culture with philosophical antecedents. Rather, I 
aim to elucidate how Martin himself, in a rhetorical move that resembles Jul-
lien’s more than a  little, attempted to make the difference of Chinese culture 
“intelligible.” With the terms of cultural difference, the contradiction Martin 
faced in China no longer was only a blockage but also could be made produc-
tive. Understanding the Other in terms of cultural difference opened an entire 
register of practical work. In fact, by building relationships upon the basis of 
cultural difference,  things could be communicated that  couldn’t be said.58
 After the fmd crisis of March 2011, the eu wanted to develop a training 
program for fmd, but China’s Ministry of Agriculture rejected the proposal 
without explanation. At the request of the eu’s diplomatic representative in 
Beijing, a Frenchwoman who strongly supported the work of the Emergency 
Center, Martin got involved. As he was preparing the materials for the course, 
he told me:
I found that you cannot say “fmd”  here. When you talk about fmd,  people 
just say, what are you talking about? But  there are some  people I know at 
moa that I can talk to sometimes. It is not like  there is simply no possibility 
of  people talking; in certain situations they might speak very frankly. You 
have to talk like it’s a joke or what ever. And so I talked to  these  people I know 
and said, what is it about fmd, what is the prob lem with fmd? And they 
said  there was no prob lem. But the prob lem it turns out was with the train-
ing program,  because they said: we  don’t want to have experts fly in and 
say  things to us we already know, or are too basic. It’s true, the Chinese are 
too polite; they would nod their heads and smile and at the end of it say 
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“Thank you very much,” but at the same time in the back would be saying 
how ridicu lous this was. In fact, I agree; I once saw an eu training where 
I was like, guys, why are you talking at this general level?  There are con-
crete  things that [the] China moa side want[s]. . . .  This is  really my role. 
In other countries, eu  will offer a lot of money for technical assistance for 
fmd without a lot of specifics attached, and  people  will take it. But  here it 
 will be refused. So I first go to the China moa and find out, what is it that 
you can say, what is it that you want? Then I go to the eu and try to get 
them to say and offer exactly that.
Martin’s everyday diplomacy was not  limited to the apparent opposition 
between international objectives and national state interests, or the territorial 
strugg les among global health norms and sovereign powers. Rather, by fol-
lowing him as he established the Emergency Center in China and moved into 
the epicenter, I saw how he worked in, around, together with, and beyond the 
geopo liti cal strata of national biosovereignty: including China’s reluctance 
or inability to report virus surveillance, the efficacies and inefficacies of a uni-
versal poultry vaccination program, and the institutions and norms of veteri-
nary practice. At diff er ent moments Martin employed distinct and even seem-
ingly opposed strategies to access the epicenter: the cultivation of networks of 
affinity with Chinese ministry officials, technical experts, and veterinarians, 
on the one hand; and the split and separation of ecological truth from po liti cal 
interest, on the other. At the beginning of the chapter I noted that Martin’s 
appraisal of China’s willingness to cooperate veered between optimism and 
outright denunciation. Martin’s judgments and critiques are, I now suggest, 
conditioned as much by his choice of access strategy (affinity or stratifica-
tion) as they are by the attitudes of his counter parts in China (cooperative or 
antagonistic). I would also suggest that despite Martin’s occasional and situ-
ational mobilizations of denunciation, the movement into the epicenter relied 
on affinity as the ultimate ground for negotiating the geopolitics of national 
biosovereignty. Now, in the last chapter, I  will turn to discuss Martin’s most 
ambitious effort to cultivate access through affinity: the fao Emergency Cen-
ter’s high- level training programs for China’s state- employed veterinarians.
C H A P T E R   S I X
O F F I C E  V E T S  A N D  D U C K  D O C T O R S
“To understand China’s veterinarians, you need to know po liti cal economy,” 
Cai Haifeng, the se nior national veterinarian at the fao Emergency Center, 
told me. We talked over lunch at an upscale Yunnan- style restaurant filled with 
white- collar professionals and expats near the Emergency Center offices. Be-
fore joining the fao, Cai had spent de cades working as a livestock veterinarian 
battling epizootics, primarily with the Animal Quarantine Ser vice (recently re-
named the China Animal Health and Epidemiology Center). He was among the 
first generation to study veterinary science in the post- Mao period. Although 
his current mode of life found him more often in urbane settings such as this 
restaurant in Sanlitun, his commentary drew on his direct experience with 
treating the pathologies of China’s rural transformations.
Since the market reforms, Cai explained, the production of animals had 
grown rapidly, but veterinary expertise had not kept pace with the livestock 
revolution: “The relations of production and means of production are not 
being reflected at the level of ideology.” Cai’s account differs from  those that 
identify the expansion of livestock production as pathological in itself, such 
as  those that blame industrial broiler operations for the emergence of novel 
avian influenza viruses.1 He points to the dynamic historical relations between 
knowledge and practice, between the science of animal disease and the means 
of livestock production, and locates pathology in their lack of correspondence.
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I heard similar diagnoses from several other veterinarians, including Ning, 
another national staff member of the Emergency Center. China’s livestock dis-
ease crisis emerged  because the “quality” (suzhi) of veterinarians was too low, 
Ning told me one day at the Center. The veterinary “software” was no longer 
adequate to China’s rapid material growth in livestock production, its develop-
mental hardware. To extend this meta phor of code overwhelmed by  matter, he 
compared the veterinary condition with the notorious “ghost cities” of China’s 
real estate boom. Bricks and mortar can be laid very quickly, he said, but too 
often the buildings are left empty; no one lives inside. In much the same way, 
livestock production has grown rapidly but lacks qualified experts to care for 
the animals and their diseases.
This chapter examines the fao Emergency Center’s efforts to improve the 
abilities of China’s state- employed veterinarians through the Field Epidemi-
ology Training Program for Veterinarians (China fetpv— Chinese translation 
zhongguo shouyi xianchang liuxingbingxue peixun). Upon my first arrival at the 
Emergency Center, Vincent Martin had told me that the current focus of his 
work was developing this two- year course in field epidemiology. “Field” epide-
miology aims to cultivate “first responders” for epidemics, providing training 
in epidemiological tools for immediate outbreak investigation and response 
rather than academic research. As Martin explained to me, “ There  were plenty 
of veterinarians [in China], a lot  were trained in laboratory technique, some 
in epidemiology, but epidemiology was  really not the topic that was strong 
in their curriculum.” The fao first created an fetpv program in Thailand in 
2008, adapting the content and form of the course from the U.S. cdc’s Field 
Epidemiology Training Program (fetp) for workers in the  human public 
health sector, which was itself the international export version of the cdc’s 
famous Epidemic Intelligence Ser vice (eis).2 China’s fetpv was to be the first 
veterinary program of its kind or ga nized at a national, rather than regional, 
scale. In a pre sen ta tion to the Ministry of Agriculture in January 2010, Martin 
and Regional fao epidemiologist David Castellan had outlined the “needs, vi-
sion, and goals” for field epidemiology training in China. As they pointed out, 
“China  faces complex geographic and demographic challenges in controlling 
animal diseases. For this reason, capacity building must be based on a proven 
training model, provide minimum standards and also be flexible and adaptable. 
China needs a comprehensive fetpv to bridge the gaps in veterinary epidemi-
ology training in this country.” At our first meeting, Martin had been blunter: 
“Chinese vets are very bad at epidemiology.”
In the emerging global health regime of pandemic preparedness, China has 
been marked out as a double locus of planetary danger: not only a hot spot 
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of emerging viruses but also one of the “weak links in global preparedness.”3 
In the previous chapter I focused on how the fao Emergency Center aimed 
to transform the po liti cal obstacles to outbreak reporting and data sharing 
through the cultivation of new forms of cross- border collaboration. But as pub-
lic policy scholar Joan Kaufman argues, China not only “lacks transparency in 
acknowledging outbreaks,” but also, perhaps more alarmingly, “its health care 
system is not up to the task of putting in place systems to ensure preparedness 
of the capability to contain the epidemic if it begins in rural areas.” A par tic-
u lar “area of concern,” Kauffman notes, “is China’s veterinary ser vice and its 
ability to control” outbreaks of disease.4 In other words, the danger that global 
health agencies attribute to the pandemic epicenter— why this par tic u lar site 
is considered a threat—is rooted not only in the pathogenic landscapes that 
drive the emergence of disease but also in the basic technical capacity of vet-
erinary ser vices to detect and contain a disease that emerges. The resolution of 
this double locus— and indeed the long- term effort to remediate the pandemic 
epicenter— has come to center on the ethical and technical improvement of 
China’s veterinarians.
PROFESSIONAL STRATIF ICATION
The first day of the inaugural fetpv module took place on a frigid Bei-
jing December day in 2010, the kind of day where the city smog blocks out 
the sun and a midnight chill stretches far into the morning. I had trou ble 
finding the offices of the Beijing Animal Hygiene Inspection Ser vice (dongwu 
weisheng jiandusuo), located in an obscure corner of Beijing north of the zoo 
and practically under neath an overbuilt flyover, and was  running late. I hur-
ried up the unheated stairs to the top- floor conference room, passing on my 
right a large poster displaying photos of each of the Inspection Ser vice offi-
cers dressed in crisp, dark- blue uniforms. When I opened the doors, I found 
the sleekly designed conference room, decorated in muted grays and blacks, 
already packed and very warm. The fifteen state- employed veterinarians se-
lected as trainees sat around modular curved  tables outfitted with built-in 
microphones, each staring into brand- new black Lenovo laptops gifted as 
both perks and needed tools for their participation in the training course. 
Most of them worked at Centers for Animal Disease Control (cadc) or hy-
giene inspection offices at the province level, although several came from 
national veterinary research institutes such as the Harbin Key Laboratory 
for Avian Influenza and the China Animal Health and Epidemiology Center 
(cahec).
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At the front of the room, Vincent Martin was just finishing his brief open-
ing remarks in En glish, with a translator nearby. Several Eu ro pean men and 
 women who had flown in to Beijing to teach the training course stood beside 
him, including Dirk Pfieffer, a se nior professor of veterinary epidemiology and 
the lead trainer for the first module. The national employees of the fao Emer-
gency Center sat on folding chairs around the edges of the room, alongside 
several “mentors” from Chinese veterinary institutions such as cahec, as well 
as other Chinese and international observers. I found a seat next to a rail- thin 
American who hardly spoke, whom I  later learned was the Asia representa-
tive from the primary donor, the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(usaid).
 After Martin finished, Pfieffer began to provide a conceptual overview of 
the course. Pfeiffer claimed that across the world, veterinary medicine faced 
an epochal moment. When we think of the vet, he said, we usually imagine 
the kind man or  woman in rubber boots out at the farm, inspecting a sick cow 
or  horse. The vet is traditionally concerned with the health of the individual 
animal. However, the recent increase in emerging zoonotic diseases— from 
mad cow to bird flu— has put this doctor of individual animals at a loss.  Today, 
Pfeiffer suggested, animal disease must be addressed at the population level, 
the only scale at which emerging outbreaks can be identified, prevented, and 
eradicated.5
As I soon found out in conversations during coffee and lunch breaks, the 
Chinese veterinary trainees enthusiastically accepted Pfeiffer’s claims that 
veterinary medicine was in crisis, faced by unpre ce dented disease threats, and 
that epidemiology was the answer that they needed. To them, however, this 
was not  really an epistemological challenge based on the difference between 
individual and population approaches to disease.  After all, the trainees came 
from state veterinary departments that had long been focused on disease eradi-
cation and control of epizootics. Rather, they argued that the specific history 
of modern China’s development and its post- Mao market reforms created a 
distinctive crisis for veterinary governance and the character of the veterinar-
ian. As a result, they understood the fetpv program not only as an instance 
of technical transfer from an international agency but also as an exemplary 
component of a broader pro cess of national veterinary reform.
Although the veterinary trainees all came from elite institutions, at the 
province or national level, they told me that their profession as a  whole com-
pared poorly with the status held by other sciences in con temporary China 
and, in par tic u lar,  human public health. “Very few veterinarians get to study 
epidemiology,” one trainee explained to me. “ We’re still very  behind.” This had 
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not always been the case, as many older vets recalled: during the 1950s the 
new Communist government held up veterinary work as a crucial component 
of rural socialist construction. In  those days the government worked to unite 
and train existing animal health specialists, referred to as “folk vets” (minjian 
shouyi), within institutions of state government such as Animal Husbandry 
and Veterinary Stations (xumushouyizhan, ahvss). By 1959, the government had 
established an ahvs in  every Commune; by 1979, the state employed as many 
as 700,000 veterinary experts and anti- epizootic personnel at the township 
and village level. In the 1990s, however, the ahvs system fell into disarray, 
with many township and village vets seeking income from the private sector or 
abandoning veterinary work altogether.
In the early 2000s, in part  because of requirements impinging on China 
following entrance into the World Trade Organ ization (wto), leading Chi-
nese veterinarians began calling for reforms to the veterinary ser vice.  These 
governmental reforms ranged from establishing a national- level veterinary bu-
reau in the Ministry of Agriculture and appointing a chief veterinary officer to 
the  wholesale structural reform of the veterinary bureaucracy. At its core, the 
veterinary reform aimed to distinguish the massive number of state- employed 
veterinary workers into two groups, selecting a smaller number to retrain and 
recertify as a new kind of “official veterinarian” ( guanfang shouyi) while leaving 
the rest to find their way in private practice. Although already partly underway 
by 2002, the sars and avian influenza outbreaks exposed the failure of the ex-
isting veterinary system and demonstrated the urgency of veterinary reform.
Katherine Mason has described a similar pro cess of reform in China’s 
 human public health sector.6 Beginning in the late 1990s, the U.S. Centers for 
Disease Control began training China’s public health workers, particularly in 
the area of epidemiology, while China embarked on a large- scale reform of its 
disease- control infrastructure based on a cdc model. Although this pro cess 
was already underway before sars broke out, the epidemic played a crucial role 
in shaping and encouraging the pro cess of public health reform.  These simi-
larities between  human and animal health reforms are not coincidental. The 
vets I trained alongside of held up the public health sector as an ideal model 
of reform, and many aspects of the veterinary reform are explic itly based upon 
the reforms in the public health sector. For example, just as in the public health 
sector Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, or cdcs ( jibing yufang kong­
zhi zhongxin), replaced Mao- era Anti- Epidemic Stations ( fangyizhan), so in the 
veterinary sector Centers for Animal Disease Control (dongwu yibing kongzhi 
zhongxin)7 replaced Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Stations (xumu shou­
yizhan). Broadly speaking, this transition reflected a shift from a Soviet to an 
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American model of health governance. In another specific mimesis, the Emer-
gency Center’s Field Epidemiology Training Program for Veterinarians (fetp-
 v) is adapted, as I noted above, from the U.S. cdc’s international outreach 
Field Epidemiology Training Program (fetp), including the Chinese incarna-
tion of the fetp that played a crucial role in China’s response to sars.8
Mason argues that China’s public health reform  after sars repositioned 
local public health in line with global health preparedness, resulting in a trou-
bling “bifurcation of ser vice and governance.” “Local public health in China,” 
she claims, “became geared  toward the protection of global, rather than local, 
interests and  toward the protection of a cosmopolitan middle- class dream 
rather than  toward the betterment of the poor.”9 Mason shows that public 
health professionals increasingly justified their work in terms of what she 
calls the “common,” “an idealized world of modernity, science, and trust” that 
linked workplace objectives and private aspirations in “an imaginary of the 
professional, the scientist, the cosmopolitan Chinese.” In  doing so, she argues, 
they also tended to neglect ser vice and care for the populations that they gov-
erned, particularly certain marginalized sectors such as mi grant laborers.10
In China’s veterinary reform, much like Mason’s description of public health 
reform, global preparedness programs are closely intertwined with trajectories 
of professional aspiration, as the response to the avian influenza crisis encour-
ages the training and advancement of official veterinarians. However, Mason’s 
critical argument must be situated in the somewhat diff er ent conceptual terms 
of the pandemic epicenter that I have developed in this book. Mason argues 
that biosecurity interventions supplant local needs (such as the “betterment of 
the poor”) with global demands for pandemic preparedness. This opposition of 
the global to the local is a critical form widely used in anthropological studies 
of global health. In  these studies the global is figured as a universalizing stan-
dard that disregards the particularities of a local site,  whether that standard is 
a lifesaving humanitarian kit or a pandemic- preparedness plan.11 Ethnographic 
accounts of  these encounters tend to juxtapose the rich specificities of a local 
place to the abstractions of global forms, exposing what is missed in the gap 
between them.
But as I have argued throughout this book, the pandemic epicenter is not 
best understood as a local place. By following movements into the epicenter, 
this book has examined the intersections of global forms with several diff er-
ent strata across vari ous spatial domains and scales, including ecological zones, 
working landscapes, and geopo liti cal territories. Rather than a bifurcation of 
global and local interests, therefore, I observed opposing trajectories of move-
ment and the emergence of multiple new assemblages. On the one hand, 
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training programs such as the fetpv heralded the movement of global health 
infrastructure and proj ects into the epicenter by transferring the techniques 
of epidemic field investigation to China’s veterinarians. On the other hand, 
they also initiated a trajectory of professional detachment that separated state- 
employed vets— now remade as official veterinarians— out from the working 
landscapes of rural China, separating them from the duck farmers, egg traders, 
truck  drivers, and all kinds of animals that inhabit these landscapes. Much like 
the laboratory model of expertise, adopting the new technical tools for investi-
gating epidemiological objects demanded the ethical separation of veterinarians 
from broader society, a pro cess I call detachment by professionalization.12
At the same time, the working landscapes that the official veterinarians 
left  behind did not remain vacant. As the veterinary reform cultivated the 
quality of elite state- employed vets, the structural administrative reforms also 
reduced the quantity of base- level veterinary workers employed within the 
ahvs system. But when the curtailment of base- level ahvs veterinary ser vices 
left a vacuum in veterinary expertise, a new kind of informal, unlicensed vet 
emerged at places like the Xiaolan poultry egg market near Poyang Lake, fig-
ures that I came to call “duck doctors.”  These prac ti tion ers are not the return 
of “traditional” knowledge specialists, suppressed by the state- led veterinary 
modernization of the 1950s. Indeed, duck doctors are innovative for their spe-
cialized focus on bird diseases and predominant use of industrial phar ma ceu-
ti cals, such as antibiotics and vitamins. At the same time, their approach to 
veterinary work is very diff er ent from  today’s official veterinarian. The duck 
doctors who cluster around poultry egg markets and rural county roads, many 
of them only minimally trained, highlight the importance of an ethics of per-
sonal familiarity in their treatment practice, often prizing friendship with 
farmers and trust over specialized knowledge and technique.13
By looking back at the veterinary reform from Poyang Lake, one therefore 
observes something that looks more like stratification than bifurcation.14 As 
official veterinarians are increasingly qualified in specialist knowledge, they 
are at the same time detached from the working landscapes of rural China. 
I observe this detachment in three domains: so cio log i cally (as they become 
middle- class professionals), ethically (as they are authorized  under new li-
censing regimes), and epistemologically (as they are trained in epidemiologi-
cal thinking). But this chapter shows that veterinary reform is a pro cess with 
two sides, driving both the detachment of the official veterinarian and the 
newfound attachments of the duck doctor. This double movement, observed 
synoptically, describes a pro cess of stratification: a separation of veterinary 
practice into an upper layer— the state- authorized veterinary knowledge of 
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the office veterinarian— and a lower layer— the personal familiarity with rural 
working landscapes of the duck doctor— a division into two strata of veterinary 
practice, increasingly impermeable and worlds apart.
COMMUNE AND CRISIS
The control of livestock epizootics was among the guidelines set out in 
the foundational common program ( gongtong gangling) issued by the Com-
munist government in 1949: “Protect and develop livestock industry, prevent 
and control animal epizootics.” However, the government could rely on only 
about 1,800 educated and technically trained veterinary personnel in the en-
tire country at the time, mostly holdovers from the upper administration or 
research institutes of the Republican government. At the rural village level, 
farmers relied on “folk” vets with no regulation by the state, including some 
farmers who conducted veterinary work on the side.15
During the 1950s the government began to consolidate, centralize, and ex-
tend veterinary administration, notably through the establishment of a live-
stock division (xumuke) in many county- level governments. By 1952,  there  were 
967 county- level livestock divisions and around 10,000 veterinary personnel. 
A core Communist strategy during the 1950s was the unification and organ-
ization of folk vets through basic training programs, a strategy also used in 
 human medical and public health sectors.16 Several large- scale mass immuni-
zation campaigns took place during the early 1950s, initially focused on  cattle 
diseases. By 1955,  these campaigns successfully eradicated rinderpest and con-
trolled foot- and- mouth disease, so the focus of campaigns shifted to the con-
trol of pig and poultry diseases, including a 1958 unified national campaign 
against Newcastle disease.17
The formation of  people’s communes in 1958, which grouped farmers into 
several production teams within a township- scale commune, greatly aided the 
extension of veterinary administration across the country. In 1959 the govern-
ment established Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Stations in  every com-
mune, paralleling an  earlier extension of anti- epidemic stations for  human 
public health.18 Each ahvs typically had three to five veterinary workers, with 
responsibilities ranging from vaccination to quarantine of infected farms and 
livestock breed improvement, and with a primary mandate for disease eradi-
cation.19 The ahvs was administered according to what is called a tiao tiao, 
or vertical management structure, meaning that county- level plans allocated 
responsibilities and tasks to the ahvs.20 The commune paid ahvs veterinary 
staff with work points, identical to the work points given for farmwork, and 
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not from fees charged to farmers for ser vices provided.21 As a result, as Zheng 
and colleagues argue, the ahvs built strong linkages between the emerging 
nation- state and the local society, allowing the central state to directly mo-
bilize and guide mass movements.22 By 1967, nearly 40,000 commune- level 
ahvss employed more than 200,000 professional veterinarians, and more than 
500,000 additional farmers had been recruited as brigade- level antiepidemic 
personnel.23
By unifying folk veterinarians and farmers in state- managed stations, and 
providing brief training in veterinary techniques such as immunization, the 
ahvs invoked a characteristic Maoist configuration of anti- expert and antitra-
ditional values. Like their more famous counter parts the barefoot doctors (chi­
jiao yisheng), con temporary reports and other documents often refer to  these 
rural veterinary workers as “barefoot veterinarians” (chijiao shouyi).24 As Fang 
Xiaoping has argued, although barefoot doctors followed in the wake of Mao 
Zedong’s critique of urban- focused professional health expertise, the barefoot 
doctors  were also antitraditional  because they introduced new biomedical 
treatment schemes and phar ma ceu ti cals to rural areas. In the veterinary sec-
tor this extension of modern state veterinary ser vices caused conflicts with 
existing animal healers and providers of livestock ser vices. Sigrid Schmalzer, 
for instance, documents conflicts between a group of young  women, trained in 
basic veterinary care at the county veterinary station in rural Jiangxi Province, 
and “folk vets” and “local boar keepers” in their home village. As Schmalzer 
summarizes, “Even as some  people, including  women, found opportunities to 
learn new skills and acquire scientific knowledge [by extension of state veteri-
nary ser vices],  others found their livelihoods threatened.”25
Beginning in the late 1970s, the initiation of administrative and market 
reforms to the collective economy transformed this veterinary system in two 
ways, a reconfiguration that Zheng and colleagues gloss with the phrase “heavy 
on husbandry, light on epidemic prevention.”26 On the one hand, economic 
reforms stimulated massive growth in livestock production, and on the other, 
administrative reforms led to the withdrawal of state funding for epizootic dis-
ease control.
I have previously discussed the market reforms of the livestock sector, but I 
 will briefly revisit them  here. First, collectively farmed land and livestock  were 
redistributed or contracted to  house holds  under the “House hold Responsibility 
System.” By 1983,  people’s communes  were disbanded. Rather than working col-
lective fields in exchange for work points or ration slips, farmers now farmed 
their own plots, meeting production goals in the form of grain tax responsi-
bilities. In their spare time, farmers could focus on  sideline  enterprises 
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such as livestock husbandry, and sidelines grew to become the primary eco-
nomic activity for some “specialized  house holds.” In addition, market mecha-
nisms (including rural markets, legalization of long- distance trade, and the 
elimination of purchase coupons) gradually replaced the unified procurement 
and supply system of the planned economy. Government policies permitted 
market trading of livestock and poultry long before other agricultural products 
such as basic grains. Soon the growth of a manufactured feed industry, the 
introduction of new imported breeds, and the expansion of transnational ag-
ricultural capital intensified the market- driven growth in animal production, 
setting off China’s livestock revolution. As the veterinary trainees explained 
to me, the livestock revolution meant not only increased numbers of animals, 
but also expanded transport of animals across the country and even interna-
tionally. Until the late 1970s, the husbandry system was “sealed up,” “Teacher” 
Huang, a mentor and instructor from the cahec supporting the fetpv train-
ing, told me. “An animal born in one county would be raised, slaughtered, and 
eaten in that county. But  today, a pig raised in Heilongjiang [the northern-
most province] may be sold and eaten by someone in Guangzhou [a southern 
province].”
During the same period, China also undertook a related and equally dra-
matic reform of administrative governance. The government placed technical 
research and professional expertise at the basis of policy, a turn often described 
as a rebirth of scientific knowledge  after the po liti cal excesses of the Cultural 
Revolution.27 However, I learned from veterinarians that the impact of  these 
reforms was much more ambiguous in the animal health sector. Teacher 
Huang told me that  after the reforms the government did not properly care for 
veterinarians, particularly  those trained in epidemic control. The number of 
university gradu ates in veterinary medicine did not increase, despite the mas-
sive growth in animal production and circulation. More troubling, perhaps, 
some veterinarians began to leave government ser vice to start their own live-
stock enterprises or to work as animal health experts within private livestock 
companies, where pay was better. “In this way they could sell their knowledge 
for money,” Zheng complained, with a hint of moral reprobation. Certainly, 
wages and status stagnated for many state- employed professionals during the 
reform era, including academics, medical doctors, and vets, while market op-
portunities grew.28
In rural areas the elimination of the  people’s commune structure effectively 
withdrew the primary source of funding for institutions such as Animal Hus-
bandry and Veterinary Stations, just as it did for the Rural Cooperative Medical 
System and Anti- Epidemic Stations in the  human health sector.29 Although 
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the state continued to pay part of the salary of vets, the ahvs increasingly 
financed itself by charging fees for vaccinations and other ser vices.30 For exam-
ple, in one Jiangsu county, the veterinary stations shifted their primary work 
from epidemic prevention  toward provision of technical support for livestock 
production, including the establishment of breeding farms and feed mills. This 
paralleled a shift from cooperative financing  toward a fee- for- service, contract 
payment model.31 Following  these reforms, “Although village and township 
Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Stations  were technically base- level sta-
tions of nation- state governance, the vast majority had become completely 
self- supporting.”32 During the 1990s, fiscal policy required the devolution of 
ahvs from county to township- level government, further exacerbating the 
funding crisis.33
Liang Ruihua, in a dissertation on avian flu control policies, offers a damn-
ing assessment of the consequences of 1980s administrative reforms:
 After the village administrative reforms, many town and village govern-
ments did not attach importance to veterinary epidemic prevention work, 
salaries for veterinary personnel  were not included in the bud get, the veter-
inary station had to support itself, veterinary personnel had relatively low 
salary benefits, and in addition it was not always released in a timely fashion, 
forcing many veterinary personnel to change professions. In some places, 
the veterinary station was contracted out to individuals; in other places, it 
was closed down completely. Some veterinary stations  didn’t even have an 
office building, its staff  every year had to find “traveling (borrowed) rooms” 
in order to do their work; some animal husbandry and veterinary stations 
had leaks, walls falling down, broken win dows.  Until recently, across the 
country most veterinary stations lacked examination equipment, and had 
no laboratory machines, so in order to diagnose animal diseases the staff 
depended on their own eyes and experience, truly descending to a “one pair 
of scissors, one pair of eyes” condition.34
CULTIVATING QUALITY
Beginning in the early 2000s, leading veterinarians began to call for a new 
era of veterinary reform that would realign the structure of veterinary admin-
istration to reflect the transition from a planned to a market economy, includ-
ing the requirements of  free global trade that followed from membership in 
the wto. In an article in the journal Meat Hygiene, Cui Yuying articulated the 
reform as a shift from a guanjia (literally, “imperial bureaucracy”) to a guanfang 
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(“official”) veterinary administrative system. For Cui the guanjia system is fa-
tally linked with the excessively centralized management of the planned econ-
omy. In the guanjia system, Cui argues, governance and business enterprise 
are united in the same institutions, and regulatory functions are not separated 
from technical support and extension ser vices. Furthermore, administrative 
governance is divided across a staff of more than 500,000  people, primarily 
rural vets associated with the ahvs system.35 As another commentator com-
plains, most of  these staff are “non- experts” and poor quality (suzhi cha), mak-
ing “local protectionism” a serious prob lem.36 In order to create a guanfang 
system, Cui calls for China’s veterinary staff to be divided into two groups: one, 
smaller part,  will undergo training and examination to competitively become 
“official veterinarians” ( guanfang shouyi), upon which they  will be paid by the 
state and  will represent state authority in veterinary investigations and inspec-
tions, and the rest  will become “professional vets” (zhiye shouyi), who  will earn 
money from market- oriented ser vices and  will not represent state authority.37
The veterinary reform closely linked changes in administrative form with 
changes in professional ethos, reor ga niz ing the structure of bureaucratic office 
along with official vocation. In 2004 moa created a veterinary bureau and ap-
pointed a chief veterinary officer to represent China’s veterinary sector in in-
ternational diplomacy and trade negotiations. County- level governments also 
began to reform the Township Animal Health and Veterinary Stations, often 
by linking them with the County Veterinary Bureau and promoting the town-
ship veterinary workers to “official” status. In some areas, ahvss  were divided 
into three distinct agencies, with autonomous control over personnel, funds, 
and equipment: first, a smaller ahv station devoted primarily to livestock im-
provement and production growth; second, an animal epidemic disease con-
trol center devoted to disease surveillance and epidemic response; and third, 
an animal medicine and feed inspection office.38
Then, in 2005 and amid the height of the avian flu crisis, China’s State 
Council, the country’s highest governing body, issued a directive acknowledg-
ing and calling for extension of the national veterinary reform. The directive, 
titled “The State Council’s Proposals on the Promotion of Veterinary Admin-
istration Reform,” remarks on the ongoing establishment of an “official vet-
erinary system,” including the creation of the Veterinary Bureau. The State 
Council calls for the improvement, through training and licensing mea sures, 
of the new “official veterinarian” ( guanfang shouyi): “An official veterinarian 
is a national state veterinary worker who holds recognized qualifications or 
license,  legal authority or government appointment, and the power to issue 
health certificates. With reference  toward the international common practice, 
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the national state has begun to slowly institute an official veterinary system. 
Currently existing veterinary workers are required to improve all- around qual-
ity [zonghe suzhi] and professional level through professional training, and fol-
lowing recognized licensing or government appointment, to slowly enter the 
official veterinary staff.”
The veterinary reform seeks to reduce the large quantity of veterinary 
workers in the ahvs system— many of whom are considered to be “nonexpert” 
and “low quality” (suzhi cha)—by using training, examination, and licensing 
procedures to select and improve the quality of “official veterinarians.” Dis-
courses of suzhi or “quality” are widespread in con temporary China, and as an-
thropologists have noted, the suzhi concept is power ful  because it is relational. 
According to anthropologist Andrew Kipnis, suzhi “marks the hierarchical 
and moral distinction between the high and the low and its improvement is a 
mission of national importance.”39 In many cases, suzhi discourses are at stake 
in differentiating urban, middle- class elites from rural farmers and mi grant 
workers. With roots in population policy and education reform, suzhi is con-
trasted with an image of vast numbers and rote education associated with the 
collectivist past: reduction in quantity is linked with improvement in qual-
ity. Therefore, the inclusion of veterinary reform and “official veterinarians” 
within suzhi discourse sets in motion several metrics of differentiation. First, 
the veterinary reform opposes the suzhi of the official veterinarian to the large 
cohort of minimally trained village and country vets, who are sometimes even 
directly referred to as “low quality.” At the same time, the discourse intersects 
with veterinarians’ own sense of being backward and  behind in relation to 
the more cosmopolitan sectors of China’s bureaucracy, such as  human public 
health.
Across many domains, suzhi discourses contrast middle- class  children, 
urban residents, and professionals (as sites or objects of suzhi training and ac-
cumulation) with rural bodies and forms of life (lacking suzhi, of “poor” qual-
ity).40 Such a separation is easily configured, perhaps, in situations such as the 
building of gated communities, which are clearly and explic itly separated from 
rural environments and poor neighborhoods of the city. But the articulation 
of the veterinary reform as a pro cess of suzhi improvement raised a specific 
tension. On the one hand, like their counter parts in  human public health, 
the veterinary reform articulated the new “official veterinarian” as a renewed 
middle- class, cosmopolitan professional— one with technical expertise, state 
authority, international connections, and white- collar modes of work, what 
Katherine Mason calls the “common.”41 Yet at the same time the very object of 
veterinary work remained, unavoidably, rural working landscapes. How then 
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would improvements of quality affect the relationship of veterinarians to farm-
ers, farms, and farm animals? How would this changing social relationship af-
fect the production of veterinary knowledge and the provision of veterinary 
governance?
In the next sections I focus on how this tension took shape during the field 
epidemiology training course. On the one hand, the content of the course ad-
vocated an epistemology of the field and a pedagogy of the par tic u lar. On the 
other hand, the form of the course followed a typical format of “trainings” 
( peixun) oriented  toward the cultivation of suzhi: the recruitment of trainees 
from the provinces to centers such as Beijing or Qingdao, perks such as  free 
computers, periodic examinations, contact with international trainers, and 
certificates of completion. Although the training course introduced the con-
cepts of field epidemiology, the course also exemplified a so cio log i cal pro cess of 
professionalization that took the trainees farther and farther from the forms of 
life and landscapes of rural China. Just as the field was coming into view as an 
epistemological object, the social ties to the working landscapes where  these 
field sites are located  were broken.
FIELD TRAININGS
The fao Emergency Center designed the fetpv training course to bring 
China’s official veterinarians into the field. As Vincent Martin and David Cas-
tellan had stated in the proposal to the moa, the first module would focus on 
the application of epidemiological concepts, disease surveillance, and outbreak 
investigation “ under a wide variety of field conditions.”42 During the course I 
observed that the lessons used techniques of simulation to progressively move 
concepts from a classroom setting into field applications. First, a concept was 
introduced through a short lecture (such as the statistical concepts of rate and 
ratio). Then, beginning with the virtual space of a computer game,  these con-
cepts  were brought to imaginary field settings through problem- based exercise 
on fictional outbreaks. Next, we moved out of the classroom to mock outbreak 
investigations on Beijing farms. In the final stage of simulation, drawing from 
the model of “training through ser vice” that is part of the cdc’s standard inter-
national fetp course, the trainees conducted  actual epidemiological investiga-
tions  under the auspices of their home offices and submitted the findings to 
the fetpv instructors for correction, improvement, and assessment.
In the pro cess the field was reconstructed as an epidemiological object— 
that is, using techniques of statistics, the trainees turned working landscapes 
into numerical populations. “Field” epidemiology did not simply mean on- site 
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visits to farms, but rather a new manner of assessing risk and determining ap-
propriate interventions on farms. As the instructor Dirk Pfieffer told the train-
ees, describing his own work on bovine tuberculosis in badgers, “ Every time I 
go to a farm that has tb, badgers also have tb. But this is only an anecdote. It is 
meaningless.” Only by collecting observations into numerical populations and 
assessing them statistically can their true meaning be understood. This statis-
tical accountability of veterinary work was very diff er ent from the substan-
tive rationality of prevention that typified veterinary governance in China, 
exemplified in programs such as the universal vaccination of poultry, in which 
goals  were set without numerical calculation of risks or costs.43 Throughout 
the course I observed the trainees negotiating the remediation of their rela-
tionship to rural farms, animals, and farmers demanded by statistical styles of 
thinking.44
During the second week of the course we woke early to board a bus out 
to the outskirts of Beijing, where we visited a number of large- scale farms in 
order to conduct mock outbreak investigations. Suiting up in white lab coats 
and covering our shoes with blue plastic booties, we interviewed the man ag ers 
of one poultry and two pig farms, following questionnaires developed in the 
classroom the previous day (see figure 6.1). Although we visited  actual farms, in 
the pro cess the farm was reconstituted as an epidemiological field site through 
the use of a formal survey instrument. The veterinarians  were very familiar 
with farms and often joked with the farm man ag ers, particularly about the un-
usually high quality of  these farms, which it turned out  were actually Beijing 
government “model” farms. “ These are prob ably the two best farms in Beijing,” 
one trainee commented with a smile. Certainly, the trainees noted,  these farms 
did not represent the rural countryside as they understood it.
All of this easygoing conversation posed some prob lems for the trainees. 
They strugg led to fit the farm man ag ers’ wide- ranging commentary into the 
confines of the questionnaire, often writing in the margins or even flipping 
the paper over to add notes on the back (figure 6.2). At this point the fetpv 
instructors reminded them that most of this familiar conversation was extra-
neous to the outbreak investigation; they should be consistently administering 
the survey questionnaire in order to produce the kind of data that could be 
statistically assessed. At most, one could include a blank space on the survey 
instrument in the  future for free- text commentary. Field epidemiology and 
statistical surveys  were much more than a new set of techniques that the vet-
erinarian could adopt, I began to realize: as a distinct style of reasoning, it re-
quired adopting new ways of assessing the true and the false. I recalled that as 
we  were designing the survey questionnaires the day before, one trainee had 
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asked the instructors how questioners could ensure that farm man ag ers  were 
telling the truth. The instructors rephrased this concern as “the prob lem of 
data gathering,” “how does one word a question in order to get reliable results,” 
and “quality control.” Moreover, they highlighted how statistical tools, such 
as confidence intervals, could be used to assess the reliability of results. But 
the trainee, I knew, was asking a diff er ent question: what happens if  people 
answering the survey questionnaire are simply lying? At the farms the trainee 
veterinarians had tried to develop rapport with farm man ag ers, hoping that 
the cultivation of personal familiarity could provide a foundation for honest 
speech. The statistical tools provided a completely diff er ent approach to vali-
dation and, along with it, required the veterinary trainees to cultivate a diff er-
ent ethos of engagement with farmers and farm man ag ers.
The effects of the fetpv course  were not  limited to the transmission and 
internalization of epidemiological techniques. Unavoidably, the fetpv course 
also exemplified the form of a peixun, or training course, and therefore so cio-
log i cally fit within what Jie Yang calls the “mushrooming peixun culture” in 
con temporary China.45 Training courses are booming in almost  every sector 
of Chinese society, as documented by anthropologists in domains as diverse 
as psychotherapy and reemployment ser vices.46 Yang points out that peixun 
FIGURE 6.1.  Veterinary trainees visiting a chicken farm to conduct a mock survey.
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is more than simply an educational course, for the term includes a cluster of 
meanings that can be “roughly translated as training, teaching, or cultivat-
ing.” By linking education with ethical cultivation, peixun is one of the key 
mechanisms of individual self- improvement in the pursuit of suzhi quality. As 
Yang puts it, the content of peixun courses tends to offer “practical knowl-
edge or skills that give  people an advantage in the job market.”47 However, in 
many professional or state employment settings, the peixun form itself, rather 
than the specific content of the course, is also an ethical mechanism of self- 
improvement. This is  because participation in peixun courses involves taking 
a holiday from work, or a retreat; traveling away from the office to other parts 
of the city, region, or country; receiving gifts or perks; and, of course, banquet 
dinners and karaoke sessions with fellow trainees. Moreover, the very ubiq-
uity or overabundance of peixun trainings means that for many participants 
the orga nizational means may be more valued than the presumed ends of the 
training course.
The trainee veterinarians stayed in a standard but modest  hotel across a busy 
intersection from the Hygiene Inspection Ser vice offices where they attended 
the course lessons. A scrolling red ticker- tape screen at the entrance to the 
FIGURE 6.2.  Conducting a survey. Farmer at center filling in form, with attentive 
veterinary trainees assisting.
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 hotel welcomed “participants in the first China- fetpv” and also welcomed an 
accountants group for their own training course. In coffee breaks and other time 
we spent together outside of the classroom, trainees constantly discussed what 
aspects of their participation in the peixun would be reimbursed by their office, 
such as travel to Beijing, daily transport, meals, or other expenses.  These conver-
sations  were always comparative, detailing the differences between danwei offices: 
more or less claimable expenses, higher or lower official status within the state bu-
reaucracy, where office funds could be turned to private use, and where the new 
anticorruption surveillance mea sures made careful accounting necessary.
One day when we left the classroom for lunch, Zheng, a trainee who also 
worked at the Hygiene Inspection Office, pointed out the three vehicles— 
station wagons and suvs— parked in the office lot. The trainees began compar-
ing whose danwei office had more cars and  whether leaders could drive office- 
owned cars for their personal use or strictly when conducting office business. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, a trainee from a national- level office located in Beijing 
noted that the leaders in her office  were not allowed to have cars, whereas a 
trainee from a Beijing city- level office laughed and said that the leaders in his of-
fice had seven cars at their disposal, several with private  drivers. Hua Weinong, 
a trainee from the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region cadc, then boasted 
that his danwei had paid for him to take En glish lessons with an American 
teacher and, not only that, also for a car to drive him  there and back. The other 
trainees laughed: “Your danwei must be so rich!” Hua, a bit abashed, dissented. 
“No, no, no,” he said, waving his hands, “my danwei is not rich.” But  because 
Guangxi is considered a likely epicenter of zoonotic pandemics such as influ-
enza, he explained, a lot of international organ izations conduct investigations 
 there. As part of  these proj ects, they provide funds for training and equipment 
to his office— and even En glish lessons. When I visited Hua at his office in Nan-
ning several months  later, he shared a small, cluttered  table with another col-
league, each working on an old pc. Across the danwei courtyard, however, Hua 
showed me a glistening new six- story office building. Although his own desk 
in the new building was not quite ready, someone was already working at the 
bench of the laboratory facilities on the first floor when we walked in to take a 
look. The smell of fresh white paint was almost overpowering.
THE OFFICE AND THE F IELD
During the third week of the training course, Xu, a trainee from the Bei-
jing Animal Center for Disease Control, stood at the chalkboard to pre sent 
his “study design” to investigate Newcastle disease. Xu explained that it was 
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a study of prevalence (number of cases of disease at a given time divided by 
number of  people at risk) and outlined the steps by which he would collect the 
appropriate data. At this point, a trainee from Chongqing asked him what the 
hypothesis of the study was. The instructor agreed: the study is perfect, but 
 there is no hypothesis.
“ There is no need for a hypothesis,” Xu replied calmly.
“Of course you need a hypothesis,” the instructor responded. “ Because de-
pending on what hypothesis you are trying to prove correct, you  will need a 
diff er ent sample size. If you  really have no idea what the prevalence is, you still 
have to have a hypothesis, so you  will hypothesize 50  percent. Moreover, de-
pending on the hypothesized prevalence, the sample size  will vary, and there-
fore the cost of the study  will vary. So when you ask the government official to 
fund your study, you can tell them exactly how large a sample size you need to 
verify your hypothesis. Other wise you may be just wasting money.”
Xu smiled. “But  things  don’t work that way in China! You  don’t ask for 
money; you are simply given a certain amount of money to conduct a study.”
Someone  else agreed. “The leaders (lingdao)  don’t understand  these scien-
tific concepts. Telling them the ‘sample size’ you need is just a waste of words 
and paper.”
 Whether or not the trainees would be able to actually use the field epi-
demiology they learned once they returned to their offices emerged as a core 
concern among organizers of the training course. In referring to “organizers” I 
primarily mean the national staff of the Emergency Center (including Cai Hai-
feng), and the “mentors” from China’s cahec (including Teacher Zheng), who 
 were responsible for the day- to- day management of the course, rather than the 
fao officers such as Vincent Martin who planned and initiated it. As we  will 
see, organizers like Cai and Zheng worried that the technical expertise and 
field- based thinking that formed the content of the course could easily be lost 
in the bureaucratic formalism and hierarchical management of China’s state 
veterinary offices.
Their concerns about the relation between science and the state in mod-
ern China resonate with a long- standing academic lit er a ture. The historiog-
raphy of science in modern China, notes historian Zuoyue Wang, has been 
dominated by concerns about the role of the state.  Until very recently, most 
English- language historical narratives  were rooted in a diagnostic pathology of 
social structure, examining the forms of politics, social order, and the state for 
evidence of distortions or obstructions to valid scientific inquiry.48 As Wang 
notes, this historiography is grounded in Robert Merton’s sociology of science, 
and in par tic u lar its argument that the ethos of modern science is promoted by 
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demo cratic socie ties and constricted by authoritarian ones. As a result,  these 
historical accounts are constantly searching for the “self- contained authority 
of a cosmopolitan science community” to emerge from beneath the oppression 
or influence of state power, as Laurence Schneider once put it.49
For the organizers of the field epidemiology course, the cultivation of 
“official veterinarians” ( guanfang shouyi) was also fraught with the relation-
ship between science and state. However, their concerns  were not about 
state control or censorship of  free inquiry, nor did they suggest that this had 
anything to do with the presence or absence of po liti cal democracy. Rather, 
their more precise and pragmatic warnings articulated a pos si ble tension be-
tween the on- the- ground methods of field epidemiology and the formal sys-
tems and hierarchical structures of the bureaucratic office. In wider debates, 
complaints have emerged that many official veterinarians are more officials 
than veterinarians; for example, being designated an official veterinarian de-
pends on successfully passing civil ser vice examinations, which test for po-
liti cal knowledge and loyalty rather than technical expertise. In the case of 
the fetpv course the organizers worried that the social form of the office— 
and in par tic u lar the hierarchical authority of the leader— would overwhelm 
the epistemological content of the training course. Would the trainees  really 
become a new kind of field epidemiologist, able to remediate field situations 
through statistical concepts such as population? Or would the course be just 
another licensing mechanism, another rubber stamp needed for advance on 
the ladder of the bureaucratic  career, a new ready- made entry on the cur-
riculum vitae, with the impor tant technical content soon forgotten once 
certification was in hand?50
Teacher Zheng raised  these concerns with the trainees one eve ning some-
time  after Xu’s pre sen ta tion. Zheng was one of the more influential mentors. 
Short but stocky, clean- cut, he was always energetic. He often sat at the back 
of the room, translating lectures by the international trainers into Chinese for 
anyone sitting nearby him. Sometimes, frustrated by the apparent lack of un-
derstanding among the trainees, he strode to the front of the classroom, taking 
the podium from the international trainer and  going back over the lecture in 
Chinese, often adding his own insights. On this eve ning, we had returned to 
the conference room  after a meal in the dining hall of the nearby  hotel. The 
international trainers  were  either out to dinner or back in their rooms resting. 
A few trainees had cups of coffee, and  there was a warm feeling in the room as 
they worked (or instant- messaged friends and  family) on their laptops. Zheng 
began to tell a story, and every one looked up, listening intently. Back in 2008, 
he said,
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China was trying to prove that  there was no avian influenza in the country 
 because they wanted to force the United States to lift a ban on chicken 
imports. Chinese officials presented a study, a beautiful study, describing 
laboratory results that showed no positive results. An American official 
asked them: what was the sensitivity of the test you used? The Chinese 
leader presenting the study simply stared straight ahead for a moment, 
 silent, then bent over to his colleagues and muttered: what the hell is sensitiv­
ity? They explained the concept to him, this way and that way,  until fi nally 
he straightened up, adjusted his tie, and said to the audience: I guess it’s 
about 95  percent.
Using this story as background, Zheng redirected the focus of ethical concern 
from the leader to the veterinary trainee. Describing the techniques for con-
ducting outbreak investigations, he asked the trainees: “When does one con-
duct an outbreak investigation?” He then answered his own question: ”When 
the leader says go, you just go; this is also incorrect. In order to conduct a sys-
tematic investigation, a lot of preparation work must be done before heading 
to the field. This  doesn’t mean to oppose the leader but to take the leader’s order 
and make it scientific research.”
At the very least, the trainees strugg led with balancing demands made by 
their office leader with their participation in the course. Often it meant work-
ing overtime. One trainee from the Beijing Animal Hygiene Inspection Ser vice 
was particularly harried.  Because the first module was held in the office build-
ing of his danwei, he usually attended the training program during the day and 
worked overtime at night. Sometimes he hardly slept. Precisely  because 
of  these challenges, the second training module was located in Qingdao, giv-
ing the Beijing- based trainees a modicum of in de pen dence from the demands 
of their leaders.
Another incident reveals the challenges the trainees experienced in negoti-
ating obligations to the training and to the lingdao. Deng is a pathogens expert 
at the Key Laboratory for Avian Influenza in Harbin, a city about twenty hours 
by fast train and several hours by plane north of Beijing. During one part of 
the training, he strugg led to both accomplish the requests of his lingdao and 
fulfill his work in the training program. One week he left early on a Friday 
morning, returning to Harbin for two days, then returned to Beijing for class 
on Monday. The following weekend he again flew back to Harbin before fly-
ing to the southern province of Jiangsu to collect samples from poultry, fi nally 
returning to Beijing on Tuesday. Anticipating the travel, he complained that 
he had submitted the proposal for the study months ago, but his lingdao only 
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that day replied and demanded that the study go forward. “ There’s nothing 
I can do about it; lingdao are like this,” Deng told an fao staff member and 
myself in a low whisper, while a lecture was in pro gress. “Next year  there are 
next year’s  things.”
As it turned out, the first module of the fetpv took place at a particularly 
incon ve nient moment in the cycle of Chinese bureaucratic time. Held in De-
cember 2010, it happened to be just more than a month before the end of a 
five- year plan. All offices throughout the Chinese bureaucracy  were busy com-
piling the paperwork necessary for final reports to be submitted to the higher 
authorities, accounts of the past five years and proposals for the next. All of 
 these reports  were to be finalized and submitted by the onset of the Chinese 
New Year holiday in February. Research needed to be completed: the more re-
sults the better. The veterinary trainees  were caught up in this flurry of paper. 
If they  weren’t working double time during the course itself, a growing pile of 
papers was waiting for them on their desk when they got back to their danwei 
in early January.
Although for the trainees this was experienced as a very immediate chal-
lenge of time management, the organizers felt that deeper concerns about the 
 future of China’s official veterinarians  were at stake. One day, as we sat at a 
common lunch between classes, Cai Haifeng attempted to personally persuade 
the veterinarians to change their engagement and attitude  toward the train-
ing. Cai spoke quickly and curtly, with disgruntled animation. “Is every one un-
derstanding the lectures?” he asked. “Are  there prob lems with language or ac-
cent?” All of the trainees answered that it was better, it was better now,  things 
 were getting better. A few halfhearted jokes  were made about the difficult ac-
cents of the trainers, two of whom spoke En glish with German or French in-
flection. Cai looked up from his noodles to meet the eyes of his audience. “This 
is not like other trainings. It must be taken very seriously,” he said firmly. He 
noted that the fetpv is based on a “training- through- service” methodology, 
which means that the concepts and techniques they learn should be put to use 
in their everyday work. In fact, he reminded them, one of the requirements of 
the training would be to conduct a long- term epidemiological research investi-
gation as part of the work at their home danwei.
A  woman from the China acdc, based in Beijing, spoke up. “How  will we 
be able to do  these research proj ects when we go back to our danwei? We are 
already taking a month off, and  won’t we have to return to regular work when 
we get back?”
Cai’s face tightened. The fao already made agreements with each of the 
danwei, he told the trainees. It had all been made very clear: the danwei must 
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allow them to conduct  these research proj ects. It was very impor tant that the 
training not go to waste.
Leaning forward in his chair, Cai began to relate a story about his own expe-
rience in a training program during the 1990s. At the time he was a young vet-
erinarian working at the Qingdao Animal Quarantine Ser vice, now renamed 
as the China Animal Health and Epidemiology Center. The Ministry of Health 
invited veterinarians to a training program to learn techniques of epidemio-
logical research. The moh spent a lot of money on the training. But when Cai 
returned to work, he was unable to put any of the  things he had learned to use. 
Soon he forgot his new skills. “Now, just this month- long module of the two 
year fetpv program alone is costing over one million rmb [around $150,000 at 
the time]. Let’s not let it go to waste,” Cai concluded.
The problematic ethos of the trainees, their lack of attention or commit-
ment, was also raised in official plans for the program. The meeting minutes 
from the 5th Steering Committee Meeting for the program, held in Janu-
ary 2012 as the first cohort of trainees was nearing completion of the course, 
report that Dr. Sun Yan, head of the Division of Science and Technology and 
International Cooperation, Veterinary Bureau, commented that the fetpv 
training needed to “better motivate/push the trainees to be more committed 
to the training.”51
VETERINARY  CAREERS
In private, Cai told me that he worried that the “management system” of 
the veterinary administration would waste the technical knowledge in field 
epidemiology provided by the training course. He complained that Chinese of-
ficial veterinarians prioritize pleasing their superiors over the conduct of good 
field investigations. “They  don’t care about society; they care about the higher- 
level leaders,” Cai said. “They  don’t care about the common  people; they only 
care about the higher- level.” However, as I got to know Cai better and he told 
me more about his own  career, I began to sense a second, somewhat diff er ent, 
diagnosis of China’s veterinary crisis: rather than an opposition between of-
ficial management demands and the pursuit of scientific knowledge, Cai de-
scribed a pro cess of scientific detachment from rural landscapes, a pro cess in 
which certain forms of professional expertise produced their own myopias.
Cai came from a poor background in Shandong Province. His college de-
gree was paid for by the government on the condition that he would work 
in government ser vice  after graduation. In the late 1980s he got his first job 
at the animal quarantine ser vice in Qingdao, Shandong Province, the main 
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national institution devoted to control of epidemic disease in animals. Within 
a few years, however, Cai found himself working amid the increasing patholo-
gies of an unpre ce dented livestock revolution. According to Cai, it was not 
 until the 1990s, “very late” (by international standards), that the large- scale 
broiler chicken enterprises took off. Many of  these large farms  were established 
in Shandong.
In the past, Cai explained, Chinese farmers had raised chickens in a “back-
yard” manner: small flocks raised in  family courtyards and considered a part 
of the  house hold unit. All of a sudden,  there  were farms raising one hundred 
thousand, five hundred thousand, even a million birds. The rapid increase in 
poultry numbers and density caused many disease outbreaks: Newcastle dis-
ease, parasites, and “diseases you  don’t have in Eu rope and Amer i ca.” Some 
of the farms experienced average annual death rates from disease as high as 
10  percent.
In Cai’s opinion the increase in livestock, in living beings and their ecol ogy 
of pathogens, was not in itself the reason for this increase in diseases. Rather, 
diseases appeared  because of a failure of management and biological security. 
The model of large-scale farms was imported from Eu rope and Amer i ca, but 
Chinese farmers had no experience in husbandry at this scale. “They  didn’t 
know how to raise chickens on a large scale. Nobody did; I  didn’t know how.”
Cai was often assigned to investigate and control outbreaks on large- scale 
poultry farms. The visceral experience of sick and  dying fowl; the red, white, 
green, and yellow excretions; and the pathological appearance of diseased 
internal organs developed into a long- standing repulsion: to this day, almost 
twenty years  later, Cai  will not eat chicken. Therefore, I was surprised that his 
reflections on that era are fond. He prized that time in his  career, he told me, 
 because his knowledge of veterinary care blossomed in close adjacency to the 
practices of production.
Cai was able to conduct full investigations on his own, from the survey of 
farm conditions to the laboratory diagnosis of disease, sharing experience with 
farmers and even developing recommendations for control interventions and 
how to prevent  future outbreaks. Each investigation was distinctive. Cai did 
not have a standard protocol but rather cultivated a nose for the unexpected, 
searching out the trail of contagion.
One day, he told me, he had struck upon a perplexing outbreak of a conta-
gious disease. When he arrived to inspect the farm, every thing looked clean, 
bright, and orderly. Appropriate segregation and isolation mea sures had been 
instituted throughout the farm. Farmers lived in quarters separated by a good 
distance from the birds, the chicken sheds  were carefully walled off from one 
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another, access was restricted, yet disease still kept arriving at the farm. As Cai 
was strolling around, looking for any sign of unreported mixture or contact, a 
truck arrived at the gate. A few workers jumped out, entered one of the chicken 
sheds, and as the truck backed close to the shed, they reemerged carry ing shov-
els full of manure, tossing the contents onto the back of the truck. With a few 
questions, Cai discovered that the truck traveled from farm to farm throughout 
the region collecting manure to repurpose and sell as fertilizer. It could easily 
carry pathogens along with the rich cargo from one farm to the next.
During this period, Cai skirted the lines between roles as an employee of 
the quarantine bureau and as a private individual providing veterinary ser vices 
to the farmers. He told me that the large broiler companies, in par tic u lar,  were 
suspicious of the government, fearful of quarantines or other disruptions to 
their commerce, so they “never told the government anything.” I expressed 
surprise that the companies spoke to Cai openly: he was a government worker. 
Cai explained to me that he had made clear to the industrial farms that he 
would not report what he saw to the quarantine authority. At first, the farmers 
did not believe him, but over time they came to trust his word. They paid him 
for his work, and he earned much more from  these investigations than from 
his regular salary. When Cai spoke with me, he emphasized that this situation 
was far from ideal. Yet the benefits he saw in this work  were not only per-
sonal monetary compensation.  There  were also benefits for epidemic control, 
for China’s rural economy, and, perhaps, even for truth itself. By developing 
trust with the  owners and employees of the com pany farms, by breaking his 
own duty as an officer of the quarantine bureau by refusing to report the dis-
ease outbreaks, he was able to bring the  actual materiality of farm production 
 under the observation of scientific inquiry.
When in  later years, just  after the turn of the millennium, Cai advanced to 
more formally prestigious positions within the Ministry of Agriculture, he was 
brought farther and farther from the farm, and he sorely felt the pathos of this 
advance. His life experience, narrated as an increasing separation of knowl-
edge from its object, embodied a diagnosis of the prob lems afflicting veterinary 
practice in con temporary China. He noted skeptically the recent increase of 
“professors” and lamented that students  today favored laboratory and special-
ized topics such as molecular biology. Only in such specialized sciences could 
you “write a good thesis,” he told me, yet he felt that  these specialized knowl-
edges  were of  little use in the practice of livestock disease control.
The veterinary reform, as I discussed above, intended to distinguish and 
stratify China’s veterinarians into two types: state- employed official veterinar-
ians and licensed but private “professional” veterinarians (zhiye shouyi). Cai 
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argued that, in fact, the reform was actually producing a diff er ent typology: 
 those trained in specialized sciences that have  limited practical applicability 
and  those who lack knowledge altogether.
During the fetpv training program, talk among the organizers and trainees 
frequently returned to the topic of veterinary reform (shouyi gaige).  Whether 
hopeful or pessimistic about the  future of China’s veterinarians, agreement 
is widespread about its direction:  toward the international standard, highly 
specialized, expert scientific, normatively professional “official veterinarian.” 
In this way the veterinarian would not only meet international standards ( yu 
guoji xiangtong), as one text on the reform puts it, but would also join the more 
advanced sectors of China, fulfilling the idealized transition from planned 
to market economy and  toward scientific modernity. For Cai, however, the 
expansion of veterinary knowledge through international- led trainings and 
the veterinary reform threatened to have an ambivalent effect: by cultivat-
ing official veterinarians as subjects of increasingly specialized and elite forms 
of scientific knowledge, the possibility of sharing a social world or way of life 
with poultry farmers would become more difficult. Precisely as communica-
tion with the international scientific community intensified through journal 
publications and outbreak reporting, the lines of communication drawn by Cai 
between government science and poultry production  were rendered so cio log-
i cally unlikely, epistemologically invalid, and morally problematic, even cor-
rupt. Yet the possibility remained that despite all of the survey instruments, 
virus sampling schemes, and computerized epidemiological models, the newly 
formed official veterinarians no longer  really knew what was happening on 
the farms. Certainly, as one trainee had recognized,  there was a good possibil-
ity that farmers might not tell them the truth. Although the epistemology of 
field epidemiology detached scientific facts from rural China’s working land-
scapes, turning farms and livestock into statistical populations, this was not 
what worried Cai. Rather, Cai wondered  whether epidemiological training, 
as one moment in the cultivation of a high- quality (suzhi) official veterinary 
 career, would detach the vets themselves from the social and ecological worlds 
of rural working landscapes. This was an ethical rather than epistemological, 
and subjective rather than objective, detachment.
THE DUCK DOCTOR’S DIAGNOSIS
Although the keystone of veterinary reform involves training courses such 
as the fetpv, the most significant impact of the reform has been an enormous 
reduction of state- employed veterinary workers at the village and township 
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level.52  These two pro cesses of detachment are closely interlinked. As I noted 
above, the large number of base- level state- employed veterinarians was one 
of the crucial prob lems identified in reform policies. In language resembling 
China’s famous “One Child” population policy, government discourses on vet-
erinary reform argue that it is necessary to reduce the quantity of vets in order 
to improve their quality (suzhi).53 However, as the state has withdrawn from 
the local veterinary sector, and poultry production has exploded, informal ani-
mal healers have appeared offering for- profit treatments for animal diseases, 
including phar ma ceu ti cals. As Zheng Hong’e and colleagues point out, “As 
soon as poultry fall sick, farmers  will go to private veterinarians to seek assis-
tance, and  will not seek assistance from village or township animal veterinary 
officials.”54
Out in the Poyang Lake region, I found that the government- employed “of-
ficial veterinarian” was a minority among the duck doctors. Around the Xiaolan 
 wholesale egg market south of Nanchang, the outer walls  were lined with ten or 
so small livestock- medicine shops. More than twenty clustered on nearby road-
ways. The shelves inside  these shops  were filled with brightly colored boxes and 
packets of medicine, produced by factories in Shanghai, Chengdu, and Guang-
zhou. When duck farmers hired trucks to deliver eggs to the market, many also 
 stopped to purchase medicines and preventative supplements, such as vitamins. 
And when ducks fell sick, although it was pos si ble to bring the sick birds for 
examination at the veterinary station, most farmers preferred to seek assistance 
from the duck doctors like  those at the Xiaolan market.
 These shop keep ers are much more than pillbox salesmen. They earn their 
living diagnosing diseases, prescribing medicines, and providing advice to 
breeders—by curing ducks. Just outside a small shop on the outer wall of the 
Xiaolan market stood a small concrete block, rising to just below the waist of 
an average person. On one visit to the market, I  stopped to watch as a farmer 
walked up the two concrete steps to this duck doctor’s shop, a ten- gallon black 
plastic bag slung over one shoulder. Greeting the doctor, she dumped her bag, 
five or six dead ducks, gray and damp, feathers matted, falling to the ground. 
The doctor sprang to work. Moving quickly and with certainty, displaying a 
focused confidence in the movement of his limbs, he flung a duck carcass on 
the concrete block. He reached for a sharp blade and made a long incision from 
mouth to anus, then pulled open the body cavity. He thrust in his bare hands 
and sought the entrails. A string of coiled intestines in his grasp, he again drew 
the knife, slowly this time, incising along the length of the digestive tract. He 
peered intently at the contents exposed, rubbed them in his hands, and looked 
again.  After a minute of inspection, the doctor raised his head and tossed the 
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duck off the pillar to the ground below. He grabbed a second duck and went 
through the same steps, but more quickly, verifying his initial perception. 
 After a third duck was tossed to the growing pile on the far side of the block, 
the doctor straightened up, rinsed his hands with a pail drawn from a bucket 
of  water, and gestured for the breeder to join him in his shop. Once inside, he 
decanted a dark brown- red fluid from a large glass container into a small plastic 
 bottle. With a few words of explanation, he handed the  bottle to the breeder, 
who gave him a few paper bills in exchange.
Hao Weidong, whom I came to know best, owned one of the shops inside 
the marketplace. His shop was  little more than a hastily constructed wooden 
shed squeezed between two of the large cages where egg buyers received and 
stored their wares. Shelves packed full with brightly colored packets of medi-
cine, gold and orange and blue, lined the three inner walls (see figure 6.3). Hao 
proudly pointed out to me the plentiful “Western” medicines (xiyao) filling 
the shop. In a back room, he also stored a wide collection of Chinese medi-
cines (zhongcaoyao), kept out of sight  because they lacked the labels required by 
government inspectors. A strong metal gate blocked off the front of the shop 
when Hao was not  there. A  simple sign above the gate read “Duck and quail 
medicines.”
FIGURE 6.3.  Hao Weidong’s medicines.
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The duck doctors opened their shops each morning when farmers began to 
arrive in shared trucks loaded with eggs. In the morning, Hao opened the shop 
by pulling up the metal grate, then moving a wooden desk to just out front. 
The desk, decorated with a few boxes of medicine and lined on both sides with 
boxes of product, formed a  simple  counter (see figure 6.4).  After farmers sold 
their eggs, they typically went to purchase feeds and other supplies they might 
need, including medicines. Hao often stood on one side of the desk and greeted 
farmers as they passed the shop, offering cigarettes, asking about their birds, 
and inviting them to sit on one of the long wooden benches to talk for a while 
about ducks and quail and medicines.
Hao aimed to cultivate relationships with farmers not only as individuals 
but also in order to gain access through them to relationships with  others. Any 
individual farmer also always represents a position within a web of kinships 
or friendships with other farmers. Hao made the importance of  these webs 
of relations clear to me one day when he talked about the trucks that farmers 
drive to market. He works particularly hard to cultivate friendships with the 
 drivers of trucks, giving small gifts or  favors, or inviting them to eat in a “beef 
specialties” restaurant that is attached to the Xiaolan marketplace. Hao told 
me that farmers  will often follow the recommendations of their driver when 
FIGURE 6.4.  Hao Weidong’s shop.
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purchasing medicines. If the driver is a friend of Hao’s, they  will visit his shop 
instead of another.
This interest in trucks and their  drivers is built on an understanding that 
the truck is a metonym for a web of relationships. The farmers who band together 
to lease a truck do so based on ties of familiarity,  from either common membership 
in a village or literal kinship. Hao’s strategy reflects the fact that a friendship with 
one member of a group that leases a par tic u lar truck almost inevitably brings 
with it a relationship to the other members of the group. The cultivation of 
this friendship with one member quickly flows through and extends into  these 
other relations. A friendship with the truck driver, in par tic u lar, can lead to 
the development of friendships with the other members of the truck group.
On any given day the two wooden benches in the shop hold a revolving 
set of bodies: Hao’s assistant, a  woman whose  family has connections to the 
management of the marketplace; farmers passing by or old customers, as well 
as their companions; and representatives from the phar ma ceu ti cal factories. 
That morning, Hao gave me a  bottle of  water and told me to make myself com-
fortable while he stepped out to run a brief errand. I watched the trucks pull in 
and out of the market, and watched the duck breeders unloading boxes of eggs.
Only a few trucks remained in the market by the time Hao returned. He 
carried a large black plastic bag with him and put it in the back end of the 
shop. At the back of the shop was an open doorway leading to a small back 
storage area. Hao ducked into the darkness and returned with a kilogram scale. 
Untying the large plastic bag, he pulled out six small pink plastic bags that 
exhaled a bittersweet smell. Roots and grasses and herbs: Chinese medicines. 
Looking at a prescription scrawled on a small piece of paper, he asked for his 
calculator and made a few calculations. He began to untie one small bag  after 
another, pouring a percentage of their contents— dark gnarled roots, dried and 
twisted— onto the kilogram scale. He was preparing medicine, he told me. Sat-
isfied with the weights, he then formed two identical piles on  simple cardboard 
sheets. He carefully poured  these phar ma ceu ti cal mixtures in two new plastic 
bags. Fi nally, he pulled some white  bottles of factory- made medicine off the 
shelves and, I noted with surprise, placed them in only one of the plastic bags 
but not the other.
“A farmer had eight quail die in only two days,” he explained. Just then, one 
of his mobile phones rang. I heard a  woman’s voice on the other end. “Hello, 
 little  sister,” Hao said familiarly. “Yes, I am preparing some zhongcaoyao, along 
with some antivirals and wei C [vitamin C].” I expected this  woman was the 
farmer with the eight quail but soon found that the relationship of diagnosis 
and exchange was more complex.
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Hao and I set out with the two plastic bags of prepared medicines, his pre-
scription given substance and weight. At a busy throughway Hao hailed the 
public bus. We rode for some time, passing through the urban center of the 
county seat, then out into open country. The bus came to a stop, the terminal 
station, in an old town that straddled a river, the buildings rebuilt in past years 
with concrete and white tile. Hao waved to a young  woman on a motorbike 
across the street.
Leaving one of the black plastic bags with me, he walked  toward the 
 woman, and they greeted each other with bright smiles.  After a short conver-
sation, Hao handed her the bag of medicine. When she tried to hand him some 
cash, however, he vigorously refused.
“Why  didn’t you accept her money?” I asked when Hao returned to where 
I was standing.
“She introduced me to her  uncle!” Hao said with a laugh. “I earn his money 
this time.”
We walked across a bridge over the river to a small restaurant where the 
 uncle, Old Wu, was waiting. Wu wore a lightweight blue work apron common 
to many of the rural farmers in Jiangxi. Inside the restaurant, Hao unpacked 
the medicines in the bag, explaining how to feed them to the birds.  There are 
three packs of wei C, used over two days, or you could stretch it and use one per 
day. Suddenly, Wu pointed to the Chinese medicinal herbs.
“ These should all be very cheap,” he stated bluntly, suggesting that Hao’s 
prices  were too high. He explained that  until retiring in recent years he had 
worked at the local Chinese medicine clinic and knew all of the herbal medi-
cines and their value.
Hao, surprised, excused his prices. “It’s the Western medicine that’s expen-
sive,” he said, pointing to the white  bottles.
 After some deliberations, the two men de cided that Hao would go to 
Wu’s home to look at the quail (kan anchun), despite the fact that Hao had 
already prepared a prescription based on the symptoms reported to him over 
the phone. We rode in a three- wheel motor- powered cart out into the open 
countryside, which was dotted  here and  there with duck sheds and fishponds, 
crossed by train tracks and by power lines overhead. In the river a number of 
barges  were mining sand, large cranes carving out the riverbed and building 
tall white mountains on the shore. Arriving in a densely built village, where a 
second story had been added to nearly  every home in recent years, Wu led us 
into his courtyard. We walked into the  house, then went up a small flight of 
stairs to the second floor, where Wu kept his quail. Hao commented on how 
clean Wu kept his quail cages, which usually produce a very strong smell.
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Inside the upstairs room the walls  were lined with tall wooden cages, and 
each cage was filled with the small squawking birds (see figure 6.5). Hao looked 
around, scanning the cages, and declared that the birds seemed to lack spirit. 
Wondering aloud about the temperature, he checked a thermometer on the 
wall. It read 28 degrees Celsius. Too hot. Perhaps this was the cause of their ill-
ness.  After a few more words of advice, Hao protested that we needed to return 
to the shop, and in a few moments we  were back in the three- wheel and headed 
back to Xiaolan.
DETACHMENT AND ATTACHMENT
To understand this diagnostic and treatment practice, it is useful to com-
pare the con temporary duck doctor to the Mao- era barefoot veterinarians 
working at the ahv stations. First, Hao Weidong, like barefoot veterinarians, 
had obtained minimal training in veterinary medicine. “When I started,” he 
told me, “I  didn’t understand anything, even about the Western medicines. I 
took a one- month training [provided by a phar ma ceu ti cal com pany] and then 
entered the market. When I started, I only carried a book bag,” he said, point-
ing to his shoulder. “Inside the bag, I  didn’t bring any medicine; I only brought 
FIGURE 6.5.  Hao Weidong looking at quail.
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some brochures [advertising the phar ma ceu ti cal com pany’s products]. If the 
farmer wanted a kind of medicine, I would write an X- mark and order it from 
the factory.” He gave most of  these medicines to the farmers for  free, hoping 
that if they worked, the farmers would buy more. And perhaps more impor-
tantly, they would introduce him to their friends.
Also like the barefoot veterinarian, the duck doctor is not a traditional fig-
ure; he is not a “folk vet,” using age- old methods, but uses cutting- edge phar-
ma ceu ti cal treatments for duck and poultry diseases, including antibiotics and 
antivirals. Many, like Hao Weidong, entered into doctoring  later in life as a 
second or third  career. Several of the diseases they treat, such as avian influ-
enza, are widely understood by farmers to be novel and even unpre ce dented 
challenges. As a result, the duck doctors often develop innovative treatments: 
Hao often boasted of a cure for avian influenza that he had in ven ted by mixing 
herbs and Western pills.55
Fi nally, the duck doctor is also like the barefoot veterinarian  because his 
practice is rooted in the close social relationships he has with farmers. The 
duck doctor shares the same social world with them. For example, Hao Wei-
dong  will often combine diagnostic or treatment visits to farms with meals at 
the farm house, and sometimes invites his clients to meals at a special beef res-
taurant on the outside of the Xiaolan market. In at least one instance a client 
invited him to his  daughter’s wedding. Sometimes Hao even played the role of 
a therapist, listening to long confessions of a farmer’s trou bles that had noth-
ing to do with duck farming at all, and offering suggestions and warm advice.
Yet, despite all of  these similarities,  there is of course one crucial difference: 
the barefoot vet represented the reach of state governance into rural society, 
but the duck doctor appeared in the wake of the withdrawal and detachment of 
state veterinary ser vices, as unofficial economies of poultry disease grew amid 
the vital uncertainties of the livestock revolution. Although I use the term un­
official to indicate the duck doctor’s unlicensed status, this term provides only a 
negative description (“nonstate”) and does not capture the concrete structures 
of the unofficial economy. In order to provide a better description, I suggest we 
might describe the duck doctor as a representative of the growing reach of the 
livestock- medicine factories (shouyaochang) in rural society.
The distributors from the factories often  stopped by Hao’s shop, check-
ing on his inventory and encouraging him to make further  orders. One day 
when I visited Hao’s shop, he received a phone call and,  after listening for a 
minute, used the excuse that he was with a friend to get off the phone. He then 
turned his phone off. “I have been receiving calls all day!” he complained. 
They  were all from the drug factories. Hao was affiliated with two or three 
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livestock- pharmaceutical companies, he explained.  These companies  were 
based in major Chinese cities like Shanghai and Guangzhou. The companies 
shipped medicines at a regular schedule to a nearby shipping ware house. The 
ware house held the medicines  until Hao picked them up.  Because he had to 
pay for the medicines when he picked them up, he tried to leave them at the 
ware house for as long as pos si ble.  After two weeks, however, they would be 
sent back to the drug factory. On another occasion, I accompanied Hao as he 
paid a driver to rush over to the ware house and pick up a few packages that 
 were about to exceed their two- week win dow.  Today the factory representa-
tives had called him  because they believed some of the medicines intended for 
him had been shipped back, and they  were angry. “They are always trying to 
make me buy more  things; it’s  really irritating,” Hao told me.
I once asked the Emergency Center’s Cai Haifeng about  these duck doc-
tors.  Doesn’t the duck doctor represent the antithesis of the official veterinar-
ian? I asked him, describing to him diagnostic scenes like the one above. Might 
the duck doctor suggest an alternative to the prob lem of professionalization 
and social distance from the farm that Cai diagnoses in the official veterinari-
ans, including the field epidemiology trainees? Cai grinned and shook his head. 
 These vets who “sell medicines and feeds,” he replied, are nothing more than 
cheats ( pianzi), quacks, or mountebanks. “They  will say anything in order to 
further their own interests.”
However, in the difference between the barefoot vet and the duck doctor 
we can see something more than the the rise of individualistic entrepreneur-
ship or what Cai saw as self- interested fraud. The increasingly expert, high- 
quality, technically proficient official veterinarians— a select few replacing the 
mass of barefoot vets— are increasingly detached from the working land-
scapes of rural China. The cultivation of official veterinarians is enhancing their 
professional manner and increasing their expertise in epidemiology or other 
veterinary sciences. Yet their ability to communicate with, understand, and 
reach out to rural farmers is not prioritized in the forms of  these trainings. The 
worlds of the official veterinarian and the rural farmer are increasingly distant.
The duck doctor, like the barefoot veterinarian of the past, does share a 
common world with farmers. Yet unlike the barefoot vet, his livelihood de-
pends on the promotion of phar ma ceu ti cal commodities to rural farmers. He 
is something like an informal “extension agent” for phar ma ceu ti cal companies 
rather than for state agriculture bureaus; he draws on familiarity and shared 
experience to increase the flow of for- profit phar ma ceu ti cals and to earn fees 
from each  house hold rather than in order to produce and communicate knowl-
edge about epizootics or eradicate diseases.
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 Today, veterinary reforms have seemingly split the barefoot veterinarian 
in two: the office vet and the duck doctor. Cai Haifeng had told me that  there 
are two kinds of veterinarians in China  today:  those trained in specialized sci-
ences and  those who lack knowledge altogether. But the divergence of the of-
fice vet and the duck doctor is both more complex and more troubling than 
this. The office vet has specialized knowledge but lacks familiarity with rural 
worlds and producers. The duck doctor has familiarity with rural worlds and 
producers but minimal specialized knowledge. The duck doctor’s attachments 
to all of the beings that  people the working landscapes of rural China— duck 
farmers, feed salesmen, chickens, ducks, and quail— contrasts sharply with the 
detachment of the official veterinarians, immersed in their labs and laptops. 
Yet even more troubling is the broader division of technical detachment from 
 human attachment—of specialized knowledge from familiarity with rural 
production—in two separate forms of veterinary practice. In this book, I have 
highlighted the transversal pathways, such as  those taken by Cai Haifeng in his 
investigations of Shandong broiler farms, that cross and connect spaces of spe-
cialized knowledge and poultry shed life, bridge strata of po liti cal governance 
and working landscapes, thereby producing displacements and forming new 
assemblages. But as veterinarians are increasingly separated into two types— 
office vet and duck doctor, detached expertise and enterprising attachment— 
these transversal pathways are blocked. Scientific expertise and working land-
scapes separate into layers like oil on  water.
C O N C L U S I O N
V A N I S  H I N G  P O I N T
A point is always a point of origin. But a line of becoming has neither  
beginning nor end, departure nor arrival, origin nor destination.
— Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 1987
On April 20, 2015, farmworkers at a layer- hen farm in Osceola County, Iowa, 
began the painstaking cull of four million hens living inside cages at the in-
dustrial egg fa cil i ty. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (usda) ordered the 
mandatory depopulation  after isolating a new strain of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza virus known as h5n2 from birds at the farm. Workers pumped a water- 
based foam into the barns in order to suffocate the birds. Then they covered the 
birds with litter and other organic material and left them for several days to 
compost inside their cages. Despite the cull, the outbreak continued to spread. 
By the end of May, more than two hundred outbreaks had occurred across the 
Midwest, requiring the destruction of nearly fifty million birds.
When the U.S. Senate convened a hearing on the crisis on July 7, usda of-
ficials blamed the outbreak on the failure to control the virus at its source. But 
that source, they argued, was not in Osceola County or anywhere  else in the 
United States. That source was in China. Dr. John Clifford, the deputy admin-
istrator of the Animal Plant Health Inspection Ser vice, underscored in Senate 
testimony that the outbreak was “unusual”: “for the first time we had a high- 
path avian influenza virus to cross from Eu rope and Asia into North Amer i ca, 
the first time ever.”1 Drawing on phyloge ne tic comparisons of influenza virus 
genomes, Clifford argued that the “parent” of the virus afflicting the Midwest 
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was the highly pathogenic h5n1 strain that first emerged in southern China 
and Hong Kong in 1997, almost twenty years  earlier: “If you all would go back 
and look at the concerns at the time, it was concern that this would be the next 
 human pandemic. We put some money  toward trying to address h5n1 in Asia, 
but we did not put enough. If the world had put more money  toward that effort 
and addressed  these diseases in the animals at the time, we would not have this 
situation  today,  because that— what occurred in 1997 was the original finding 
of that virus in China— has caused this outbreak  today.”2
The hypothesis of the pandemic epicenter I have explored in this book con-
tains a distinctive notion of causality: a point of origin is responsible for events 
that take place in  future times and at distance places. As Clifford phrased it 
succinctly, if somewhat awkwardly, in his Senate testimony, “the original find-
ing of that virus in China . . .  has caused this outbreak  today.” If the emerging 
virus was contained at its source, then a  future catastrophe would not have 
occurred. The potential would never be realized. The trou ble  there would have 
never gotten  here.
In this attribution of cause to origin, many intermediaries are removed: 
the wild birds that hypothetically brought an h5 virus across the Arctic and 
into British Columbia; the “backyard” poultry and commercial poultry oper-
ations in California or Idaho where viruses apparently reassorted; the hyper- 
biosecure turkey farms and “layer operations”— some eight or ten stories 
tall— that fueled and spread the outbreak; and perhaps even the depopulation 
operations conducted by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Ser vice of 
the usda, which tendered  these duties to poorly trained private contractors. 
By ignoring  these intermediaries, the hypothesis of the pandemic epicenter 
enacts an “erasure of context” in which source and consequence, pathogen 
emergence and global epidemic, are conflated.3 Yet at the same time the pan-
demic epicenter also raises new questions about the context of the source: 
Why did the virus emerge in China? What is it about “ there” that is diff er ent 
from “ here”?
Several months  after the Senate hearings, a journalist from National Public 
Radio contacted me regarding my fieldwork at Poyang Lake. npr’s Marketplace 
was “ doing a story on Avian Influenza in China,” she explained, in response to 
the 2015 outbreak of avian influenza in the American Midwest. “They think 
the flu first emerged in China, then made its way to the U.S.,” she added. I as-
sumed she would want to interview me for my perspective on the  matter, but 
instead she asked if I had any local contacts in the Poyang Lake region. They 
 were “planning on visiting Poyang Lake  later this month” in order to trace the 
emerging disease to its pos si ble source.
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In the broadcast, Marketplace journalist Rob Schmitz highlights Poyang 
Lake’s unusual avian ecol ogy, where “more migratory birds spend their win-
ters” than anywhere  else in Asia, and local farmers are raising “all sorts of 
poultry.”  Because of contacts between wild and domestic birds, Poyang Lake 
is “a cauldron for brewing new strains of flu.” Schmitz visits rice paddies, a 
“backyard- type” duck farm, and a live- poultry market where “ducks, chickens, 
pigeons, and other animals lie in cages next to each other.” Chinese consumers 
“prefer to buy live poultry” rather than slaughtered and butchered meat, so 
Schmitz concludes that China’s growing economy  will only “increase the risk 
for the spread of new strains of avian influenza.” Poyang Lake was, the title of 
the npr broadcast underscored, “the Chinese lake that’s ground zero for the 
bird flu.”
As Schmitz’s on- the- spot report emphasizes, not just any place can be a 
pandemic epicenter. According to historian Nick King, the emerging infec-
tions worldview typically identifies “the postcolonial economic periphery of 
‘developing nations’ as the source of potential and  actual global pandemics.”4 
 These peripheries are marked according to their exotic ecological character as 
much as their distant geographic location. The pandemic epicenter is a place 
of dangerous mixtures, what an older symbolic anthropology might describe as 
 matter out of place.5 Wild and domestic birds, ducks, chickens, pigeons, “and 
other animals,” the meta phors proliferate: perfect storm, mixing bowl, mixing vessel, 
cauldron. The pandemic epicenter condenses the “changing spaces of globaliza-
tion and their intrinsic dangers,” confusing tradition and modernity,  human 
and nonhuman, nature and culture.6
Through the condensation of the pandemic threat into a point of origin, 
the epicenter hypothesis holds out the promise of containment, or even the 
prediction and prevention of pandemics “at source.” The dangerous mixtures 
at the pandemic epicenter invoke the redemptive figure of the virus hunter. 
“ There are two ways to discover new pandemics,” says biologist Peter Daszak 
in a call for expanding virus surveillance. “We can get out  there and look in 
wildlife, discover where the viruses are and block transmission. Or we can sit 
 here and wait, and hope we have the right vaccines and drugs.”7
In this book I have examined what the proj ect for containment at source 
looks like in practice, beyond the hype or hope for pandemic prediction and 
prevention. Rather than experts isolating the virus, blocking transmission, 
and containing the outbreak, I found that the spatial relocation  toward the 
epicenter displaced the model of scientific expertise embodied in the heroic 
virus hunter. The movement into the epicenter drew scientists and other in-
fluenza experts along a line of transformation from laboratory centers in 
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 Geneva, Rome, and Hong Kong into the lakes, rice paddies, and poultry farms 
of southern China. On the way, the journey confronted scientists with local 
inhabitants (the epicenter as working landscape) and po liti cal bound aries (the 
epicenter as geopo liti cal territory), forcing unexpected turns and detours. I 
showed that  these turns caused displacements to the equipment of expertise— 
including epistemological concepts and models of biosecurity, experimental 
practices, and norms of scientific exchange. What changed when scientists 
went into the epicenter?
First, the movement into the epicenter displaced the epistemic condi-
tions of research on pandemic influenza. In his historical reconstruction of 
twentieth- century disease ecol ogy, Warwick Anderson documents a “minor 
tradition” of research on the ecol ogy of infectious diseases, carried forward 
by “holistic” microbiologists such as Macfarlane Burnet and Rene Dubos. 
However, he notes that Burnet and Dubos  adopted ecological frameworks as 
“meta phoric resources” rather than “analytic tools.” Although they frequently 
framed microbes in terms of host– parasite relations and evolutionary develop-
ment, they rarely used tools from postwar ecological sciences such as math-
ematical modeling or systems theory.8 In part I, I documented how the fao’s 
proj ects to stop an emerging influenza pandemic “at source” led to the dis-
placement of ecological meta phors in  favor of the modeling analytics of spatial 
ecol ogy. The colorful invocations of ecol ogy that proliferate in both scientific 
and journalistic texts on the pandemic epicenter— imagistic accounts of “rice/
bird/water/man associations,” of multispecies “cauldrons” for brewing viruses, 
of overcrowded poultry sheds and bloody bird markets— became the object of 
technical analyses using ecological tools such as spatial modeling, landscape 
imaging, and species tracking. Although the term ecol ogy of influenza persisted, 
the concept or meaning of the term was displaced by the shift in “epistemic 
culture”9 from virology to spatial ecol ogy. At stake is a difference between two 
epistemologies of ecol ogy, one might say: on the one hand, a microbe- centered 
ecol ogy that traced connections between the influenza virus and its multiple 
hosts based on methods of virus sampling, laboratory reassortments, and 
phyloge ne tic classification; and on the other, a landscape- scale analy sis of the 
ecological conditions that drive or encourage the emergence of new influenza 
viruses, from farming practices to wild- bird migrations, and from market trade 
networks to environmental topography.
On a second plane, the movement into the epicenter displaced the labo-
ratory models of experimental practice that support the heroic figure of the 
virus hunter. As researchers established experimental systems in places such as 
China’s Poyang Lake, they encountered unexpected objects— such as farmed 
V A N I S  H I N G  P O I N T  195
wild birds— that led them to see natu ral ecologies and environment as artifacts 
of  human work, or what I have called “working landscapes.” I showed how 
biosecurity models adapted from the U.S. poultry industry failed, leading the 
fao to call for “solutions developed locally through direct engagement with 
stakeholders”; how wild- bird specialists posed as poultry buyers to uncover the 
extent of wild swan goose farming at Poyang Lake; and how national veteri-
narians conversed in regional dialect and cultivated friendships with poultry 
traders to expose the unexpected shipments of spent hens. In each case, knowl-
edge of the “ecol ogy of influenza” was rerouted through the understanding of 
 human practices. “It’s in ter est ing how your own mind evolves over time, to 
see how the way you think about  things evolves over time,” Marius Gilbert 
reflected a few years  after leaving China. At the epicenter he visited Poyang 
Lake and was surprised by the “magnitude,” the “sheer numbers of poultry,” 
and unusual practices including wild- bird farming. The laboratory’s mastery 
of scale was tempered by the enormous dimensions and intricate recombina-
tions of the virus’s  actual living environment. He now believed that the ways 
 human beings “work with the environment, for instance through farming,” 
 were the most impor tant  drivers of disease emergence. At stake was more than 
the inclusion of  humans into a broader cultural ecol ogy of influenza. Instead, I 
showed how an ethics of expert “detachment”— the laboratory reconfiguration 
of subjects and objects that, as Knorr- Cetina puts it, “set[s] up a contrast to the 
surrounding social order”— gave way in  favor of efforts to find affinities with 
surrounding practices that might increase understanding. For a moment, at 
least, researchers left the lab  behind and left the protocols of laboratory prac-
tice at the bench.
Scholars have recently pointed to such cracks and fissures in the walls of 
the laboratory, and the authority of scientific expertise once protected inside 
 those citadels, as an impor tant shift in the relations of science and society.10 
In their influential diagnosis of what they call “Mode 2” science, for instance, 
Helga Nowotny and her colleagues observed that the sciences, once exclusive 
and autonomous domains, had now been “superseded by a new paradigm of 
knowledge production, which was socially distributed, application- oriented, 
trans- disciplinary, and subject to multiple accountabilities.”11 Previous studies 
have focused on po liti cal or ethical  drivers of this transformation, such as pa-
tients’ organ izations, risk assessments, and ethics regimes.12  These studies de-
scribe new actors entering into the previously circumscribed space of scientific 
expertise and collaborating in, or contesting, the production of knowledge. 
The story I have told  here is diff er ent. In the search for the origin of influenza 
pandemics, it is the movement of the site or venue of scientific production— 
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from laboratory centers to the fields of the epicenter— that displaced the scien-
tific expert. Making scientific knowledge at the epicenter did not invite society 
into the laboratory in response to a politics of participation but rather pushed 
scientists to exit the laboratory and build new methods for understanding the 
other creative practices transforming the natu ral world.
Although this journey into the epicenter is a singular one, the trajectory of 
centrifugal displacement that I observed is not. Ulrich Beck’s call in 1982 for 
scientific “specializations in the context” as a reflexive response to moderniza-
tion risks is now almost a commonplace of the con temporary sciences.13 In 
fields ranging from genomics, epigenet ics, and toxicology to climate change 
and infectious disease, as well as marine biology and biodiversity conservation, 
the context or environment is becoming a scientific object in its own right. At 
the same time as researchers turn surroundings into objects, however,  these 
fields of study are confronting natu ral environments that are assumed to be 
in some sense anthropogenic, the product of  human works. The contexts spi-
ral outward, along a centrifugal series of displacements, as histories of agri-
cultural and industrial development, the social distribution of technologies, 
po liti cal events such as warfare or revolution, cultures of consumption, and 
much more become relevant to understanding the scientific object at hand. 
In  these moments that increasingly seem to typify our time in the so- called 
Anthropocene, scientists are perched at the doors of their laboratories, look-
ing out.14
Fi nally, at a third level, the movement into the epicenter brought global 
health proj ects for pandemic preparedness onto China’s national territory, 
producing new reassortments of transnational science and “biosovereignty.” 
In contrast to the figure of the virus hunter, who singlehandedly confronts 
unruly ecologies and microbial contamination in order to extract pathogens 
and bring them back to the biosafety of the lab, global health researchers at 
the influenza epicenter found that access to virus samples required po liti cal 
finesse, compromise, and exchange with China’s state agents. Scientists did 
not simply arrive in the field, take what they need, and leave: as I showed in 
chapter 5, it was banqueting, offstage agreements, and training exchanges that 
enabled access through strategies of detour and affinity. Throughout, however, 
the temptation to stratification remained: the rhetorical separation of ecologi-
cal region from po liti cal territory often served as a resource for denunciation, 
a technique that could be used to expose a lack of transparency in China’s 
interactions with global health.
I also found that the pursuit of po liti cal affinities could unintentionally 
drive a broader pro cess of stratification. In chapter 6 I described the most 
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ambitious effort of access through affinity: the fao Emergency Center’s field 
epidemiology training program for state- employed “official” veterinarians 
( guanfang shouyi). By cultivating a modern corps of elite state veterinarians with 
cosmopolitan outlook and international standard technical knowledge, the 
fao hoped to construct a long- term, consistent counterpart for sharing infor-
mation about disease ecol ogy at the epicenter. In practice, however, training 
programs for “official veterinarians” encouraged a pro cess of detachment by 
professionalization, in which cosmopolitan mobility and technical expertise 
replaced familiarity with the practical and moral worlds of rural China. As a 
result, precisely as the fao’s training programs enabled access to the geopo liti-
cal territories of the epicenter through the intermediary of official veterinar-
ians,  these vets  were losing their own affinities with the working landscapes of 
rural China.
I conclude, then, by returning to where I began: the per sis tent repetition 
in scientific and popu lar texts— what, adapting Carlo Caduff ’s phrase, I might 
call the serial localization—of China as a pandemic epicenter.15 China was first 
identified as a pos si ble source of influenza pandemics in 1957, but the attribu-
tion of China as “ground zero” for the flu continues  today in scientific publica-
tions, newsmagazines, and even feature films. As I noted in the introduction, 
anthropologists and other scholars have argued that  these narratives “too often 
consist of allegations of blame and assumptions of cultural shortcoming.”16 
In a critical discussion of a Newsweek article that identifies Guangdong poul-
try farms as a potential source of influenza pandemics, for instance, Priscilla 
Wald argues that the magazine “fostered medicalized nativism,” a stigmatizing 
pro cess in which “disease is associated with dangerous practices and be hav-
iors that allegedly mark intrinsic cultural difference.”17 By following scientists 
along the journey into the epicenter, however, I saw that scientific movement 
displaced static geographies of blame when it encountered the inhabitants and 
territories of the epicenter. By the end of the journey, when scientists arrived 
at the hy po thet i cal location of the epicenter, they found to their surprise that 
it had already been displaced: the identification of China as a pandemic epi-
center was pushed aside by their own trajectory of inquiry.
In chapter 5 I described the Emergency Center’s creation of a risk map 
for h5n1 in China. The map drew on collaborative interdisciplinary research, 
including Marius Gilbert’s spatial modeling, Xiangming Xiao’s satellite imag-
ing, and Vincent Martin’s negotiated access to China’s virus samples, to map 
the potential distribution of avian influenza disease across China based on a 
model of ecological and cultural risk  factors. I clearly remember the first 
time I saw  these maps. In early spring 2011, I was meeting Martin at his office 
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in the Emergency Center to discuss where I might conduct some field trips 
to southern China.  After listening to my research interests, he suddenly got 
up from the couch where we  were sitting, went to the computer at his desk, 
and returned a few minutes  later with two printouts. The printouts contained 
several sections of an early version of the h5n1 risk map in close-up detail, 
focusing on areas around the Yangtze River. The terrain that I looked at was 
mottled from blue to deep red, a range in hue that I learned stood for variation 
in the risk of h5n1 infection predicted by the model. Martin began wondering 
out loud  whether studying poultry value chains in the wetlands near urban 
Wuhan— marked a deep red on the map— might be promising. But as I looked 
at the images, I was struck by how much this map differed from older con-
cepts and repre sen ta tions of the pandemic epicenter.  After the 1957 pandemic, 
as the who and Chinese scientists both traced the origins of the pandemic to 
China, repre sen ta tions took the form of global or regional maps with a “point 
of origin” clearly marked in southern China, somewhere in Guizhou Province 
(see figure I.1). And when Kennedy Shortridge introduced the hypothesis that 
China was an “influenza epicenter”  because of its distinctive agrarian ecosys-
tem, he focused attention and experimental concern on the Pearl River Delta 
region adjacent to Hong Kong. In contrast, the new risk model described a 
“wider and slightly displaced epicenter of influenza viruses” in southern Chi-
na’s agricultural landscapes, including previously little- studied areas such as 
the Yangtze River and Poyang Lake.
In a  later conversation, Martin explained to me that with the ecological 
risk map the “epicenter has become more multifocal by essence”: “Even by the 
end of my stay over  there, even through the publications we had, initially it 
was I think triggered by this idea of epicenter in the south of China, then even 
from my research, it was showing, not only this southern part of China which 
was referred to as epicenter by Shortridge a long time ago, but you could see 
that the south of the Yangtze River was also a very impor tant area for emer-
gence of viruses, so at least the concept of epicenter had evolved even in terms 
of its geo graph i cal coverage.”
Furthermore,  these ecological maps also made pos si ble an extended spatial 
repre sen ta tion of risk no longer tied to long- standing ideas about China as an 
origin point for pandemics. Of par tic u lar importance in this regard is the use 
of new instruments, including satellites, in the mapping of influenza risk. With 
remote sensing for landscape topography and satellite telemetry for tracking 
wild birds, the mapping of risk no longer needed to stop at territorial borders. 
Taking rice- cropping intensity as an exemplary risk  factor for hpai, Julien Cap-
pelle explained to me that remote sensing tools enabled the understanding of 
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the spatial geography of risk to achieve a planetary scale. With remote sensing 
“you had a power ful tool that can map you the rice- cropping intensity over, 
well, the world actually,” Cappelle noted, “ because your satellite images give 
you data all over the world.”
And with this, the concept of a point of origin for pandemic diseases itself 
fi nally begins to fade away, surpassed by new ways of engaging and mapping 
disease emergence that had been developed inside the epicenter. When I spoke 
with Vincent Martin in 2016, he reflected that when he set up the Emergency 
Center in Beijing nearly ten years  earlier, “we had this concept in hq or in our 
animal health program, that we need to tackle the disease at source. I mean 
that was  really something; we had this partnership with oie, and countering 
the disease at source was  really impor tant: where is the source, where is the ori-
gin, and then at some stage when you had such a kind of multifocal emergence 
of viruses then you  were wondering, well, what is a source? Where is a source?”
PANDEMIC PLANET
In 2016 a research group including Marius Gilbert, Scott Newman, and 
Xiangming Xiao published an article comparing the risk  factors that contrib-
uted to the spread of h5n1 and what they called “h5nx” viruses, including the 
2015 h5n2 that struck the midwestern United States.18 The study was based 
on the methodologies of spatial risk analy sis that I discussed in this book. All 
of  these studies have focused on identifying spatial correlations between flu 
outbreaks and par tic u lar risk  factors, including poultry density,  water pres-
ence, and anthropogenic variables (such as population density and distance 
to roads). However, as the authors explain,  there was one crucial difference in 
the new study. All previous studies  were framed within the territorial borders 
of a par tic u lar nation- state, so “studies comparing diff er ent sets of  factors  were 
never carried out at a global scale.” Although techniques such as remote sens-
ing produced data that could be mapped at a planetary scale, in practice the 
objects of previous studies had still remained confined within national territo-
rial bound aries.
The 2016 paper proposes to produce the “first global suitability map for 
h5n1 hpai virus sustained transmission.” In breaking through the confines 
of territorial bound aries, the study displaced the pandemic epicenter onto a 
planet of continuously variable risk. Red and orange zones of high virulence 
spill across borders, clustering in regions including central China, northeast 
Asia, northern Eu rope, and the midwestern United States and Canada. Such a 
planetary map marks differences in levels of risk but does not localize a par tic u lar 
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point as an epicenter. As the authors explain,  these global risk maps identify 
the suitability of a geographic place for “sustained transmission,” not a point of 
origin. By focusing on “poultry outbreak locations,” the study has “ limited use 
in identifying the locations of initial introduction of avian influenza viruses, or 
places where viruses may undergo more frequent reassortment events leading 
to the emergence of new viruses.” Instead, it provides information about the 
configurations of cultural practices and multispecies ecologies that may offer 
affordances, or what they call “suitability,” for outbreaks.
During the 1990s ecologists developed habitat suitability models “to pre-
dict the likelihood of occurrence of species on the basis of environmental 
variables.”19 In a few more- recent studies, suitability models diagrammed the 
 future potential for a disease or invasive species to spread into a par tic u lar hab-
itat rather than predicting  actual occurrence.20 In this way, global suitability 
models invert the form of the pandemic epicenter, approaching the potential 
uncertainty of pandemic preparedness from a new direction. Rather than seek-
ing out the point of first emergence in order to “stop a pandemic  there before 
it gets  here,” global suitability models diagram the geography of affordance 
into which that potential new pathogen would arrive. To which landscapes, 
ecologies, or configurations of human– animal relations would the spread of a 
disease be pos si ble, if it  were to emerge? Would  here be more likely than  there?
At the beginning of this book I showed how the idea of the influenza pan-
demic was linked to the moral pursuit of world health and the monitoring of 
disease across a global scale. In turn, the monitoring of influenza pandemics 
(in 1957 and 1968) as they spread across the planet enabled a “point of origin” 
to come into view, although that point remained unfocused and unexplained. 
As the search for China’s pandemic epicenter progressed, the point of origin 
became defined as an ecological source, both a geo graph i cal place and a species 
reservoir. In chapter 2 I showed how scientific tools such as spatial ecol ogy 
replaced the meta phoric treatment of the ecol ogy of the epicenter, a pro cess 
that I described, following Georges Canguilhem, as the displacement of scien-
tific ideology. The more- recent global suitability maps show that the epicenter 
hypothesis itself was also ideological (in Canguilhem’s specific sense) or, per-
haps more precisely, an example of what Ludwik Fleck called a “proto- idea.” 
For Fleck, proto- ideas are objects of knowledge and concern that guide the 
direction of scientific work, shape its development and passage, yet are subse-
quently displaced by the results of that scientific inquiry. In his study of the 
invention of the Wasserman blood test for syphilis, Fleck notes that popu lar 
ideas associating syphilis with “changes in the blood” or “impure blood,” al-
though they are “somewhat hazy” and “emerging from a chaotic mixture of ideas,” 
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are “undeniably linked” to and “scientifically embodied” in the subsequent de-
velopment of the Wasserman reaction.21 Similarly, a  whole range of scientific 
and popu lar ideas involved in the accusation of China as an ecological “ground 
zero” for pandemics motivated and encouraged experimental research proj ects 
to map the spatial ecol ogy of influenza risk across China’s landscapes. But the 
very creation of  those maps shifted the question away from the localization of 
a point of origin  toward new planetary assessments of suitability, affordance, 
and vulnerability to viral diseases. In the pro cess  these new maps reconfigured 
the relationships between influenza pandemic, global scale, and scientific in-
quiry that had framed the initial search for the origins of pandemics.
But the journey I followed  here also differs in several re spects from the 
scientific displacements examined in historical epistemology and sociology of 
science. Whereas Fleck, Canguilhem, and Rheinberger explore displacements 
within the confines of scientific experiments, I found displacements caused by 
the spatial movement of experimental systems into the landscapes and terri-
tories of the epicenter. “Knowledge,  after all, does not rest upon some substra-
tum,” Fleck notes. “Only through continual movement and interaction can 
that drive be maintained which yields ideas and truths.”22 But  there are impor-
tant differences between taking displacement as a meta phor for conceptual 
movement within experiments, on the one hand, and tracing the consequences 
of the spatial movement of scientists and their experiments, on the other. One 
of  these differences is that the scientific journey into the epicenter caused dis-
placements to the subjects, as well as the objects, of scientific inquiry.
In their report on the 2016 global suitability models, Gilbert and colleagues 
offered a provocative claim about what increased suitability for the spread of 
h5nx avian influenza viruses. According to their results, h5nx outbreaks are “best 
modelled by predictor variables relating to host distribution” rather than “land 
use or eco- climatic variables.” Risk variables such as  human population density 
and density of poultry population, as well as more specific host characteristics 
such as industrial poultry farming, all offered much better predictions of the 
distribution of outbreaks than any tested  factor related to landscape or cli-
mate, such as altitude, wetlands, or temperature variables. In contrast with 
 earlier environmental or ecological theories of disease, such as  those applied to 
vector- borne diseases in twentieth- century tropical medicine, this ecol ogy is 
not rooted in geographic or climatic regions.23 Rather, it is modern infrastruc-
tures that shape the geographic extension and spatial arrangement of  humans 
and their domestic animals, the most impor tant host populations for the virus. 
For example, the production and distribution chains of feed manufacturing 
shape the location and scale of industrial layer farms, not features of the 
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immediate environment such as temperature or humidity. Indeed, feed man-
ufacturing and biosecure poultry sheds are designed to detach poultry from 
 these environmental contexts. As a result, the geography of suitability for h5n1 
outbreaks does not map along with climatic or ecological regions such as the 
tropics, but rather along with the development and distribution of livestock 
economies.
 Here,  these global suitability models map a planetary geography of anthro-
pogenic environmental risk that overlaps other recent diagrams of world risk 
society, threatened Gaia, global climate change, or the Anthropocene age.24 
Scientific accounts of the global environment, Tim Ingold has written, often 
involve a spatial confusion. The concept of environment, he notes, properly 
refers to “that which surrounds, and can exist, therefore, only in relation to 
what is surrounded.” But in the concept of a global environment, the environ-
ment “is turned in upon itself, so that we who once stood at its centre become 
first circumferential and are fi nally expelled from it altogether,” observing hu-
manity, life, and the Earth as if from the outside.25 In Ingold’s rendering, as 
 human forms of life and production change the planet, a gap appears between 
the subject- centered production of working environments and the external 
point of view from which planetary change is observed. Ingold has described a 
contrast between “inhabitant knowledges,” a “way of knowing [that] is itself a 
path of movement through the world . . .  along a line of travel,” and scientific 
or “occupant knowledge” that builds models out of discontinuous points and 
is “founded on a categorical distinction between the mechanics of movement 
and the formation of knowledge, or between locomotion and cognition.”26
In this book I described how accompanied scientists on their journey into 
the epicenter in order to show how, in contrast to Ingold’s figuration of scientific 
work, the mechanics of their movement directly contributed to the formation 
of their knowledge. As they traveled into the epicenter, they made do amid un-
familiar surroundings, interacted with other inhabitants, and encountered the 
outsides of their experimental knowledge. Ingold’s figure of the scientist as 
“occupant” rather than “inhabitant” is based on the laboratory model of expertise, 
in which scientific practice is understood as the detachment of facts. For him, 
scientists and their instruments “drop down” into a “series of fixed locations” 
to collect “facts” and remove them from their contexts: although a fact may be 
“discovered among the contents of a site, where it is, or how it came to be  there, 
forms no part of what it is.”27 But when scientists traveled to Poyang Lake, sev-
eral of their most impor tant findings,  those that displaced their experimental 
systems into new directions, came when they left their laboratory practices 
 behind and sought to understand the sites where they  were standing.
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To be sure, Gilbert and the  others produced the global suitability maps 
long  after they had departed from China and the pandemic epicenter. And at 
a glance,  these maps do appear to invoke a trajectory of stratification—or what 
Ingold describes as “circumferential” knowledge of the global environment— 
that transcends the heterogeneity of cultural practices and po liti cal borders 
through detached ecological repre sen ta tions of the globe. As Bruno Latour 
recently warned regarding the sciences of the Anthropocene more generally, 
“The danger is always the same: the figure of the Globe authorizes a premature 
leap to a higher level by confusing the figures of connection with  those of total-
ity.”28 But if we treat scientific practice as a line of becoming and displacement 
rather than laboratory detachment, the expansion  toward global scale need 
not invoke a fantasy of totality. Rather, global maps inscribe new lines of con-
nection across the surface of the Earth. Knowledge of the global environment 
continues along disparate, forking pathways such as migratory- bird track-
ing, remote sensing indicators, and statistical population models, and relies 
on techniques of “planetary- scale fieldwork” to build new connections across 
scales and ground- truth global repre sen ta tions.29
The identification of anthropogenic  drivers of environmental risk is not 
an end point for inquiry any more than the epicenter was a final destination. 
“We are the most impor tant agent of change,” Marius Gilbert reflected when I 
asked him how the global suitability maps changed his understanding of avian 
influenza risk. “The first place to look is to look at what  people do.” The ques-
tion that remains is the form that such looking  will take: the manner in which 
con temporary global health  will place anthropogenic environments  under ob-
servation and experiment, and the displacements that  will result.
FROM GLOBAL TO PLANETARY HEALTH
 Today,  there is growing agreement that global health must go beyond the 
reactive containment of emerging outbreaks at pandemic epicenters. Yet  there 
are at least two diff er ent visions for what form global health should take in an 
effort to mitigate the ecol ogy of emerging diseases.
One approach is spearheaded by an initiative known as the Global Virome 
Proj ect (gvp), made up of participants from organ izations including the who, 
the fao, the U.S. cdc, the non- profit Ecohealth Alliance, virus hunter Na-
than Wolfe’s private- sector Metabiota, China cdc, and many more. Leading 
researchers from  these organ izations launched the gvp in 2018 as a direct re-
sponse to the failure of outbreak response in global health. “Following each 
outbreak,” write Dennis Carroll and colleagues, “the public health community 
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bemoans a lack of prescience, but  after de cades of reacting to each event with 
 little focus on mitigation, we remain only marginally protected against the 
next epidemic.”30 Designed as a program of “large- scale sampling and viral dis-
covery,” the gvp plans to isolate previously unknown viruses from a wide range 
of animal hosts, sequence them in the laboratory, and then use both wet- lab 
and bioinformatics techniques to assess their risk.31 Rather than monitor viral 
outbreaks, the primary objective of the gvp is to construct a “global atlas of 
most of the planet’s naturally occurring potentially zoonotic viruses,” many of 
which have not caused  human, livestock or even wildlife outbreaks.32 By build-
ing and researching a large collection of viral agents with zoonotic potential, 
the gvp aims to achieve the “preemption” of disease emergence.33 In 2018, some 
of the first pi lot proj ects began in China, where “scientists  will collect virus 
samples from animals such as rats and bats for study using techniques such as 
next generation (dna) sequencing to find  whether new viruses exist,” reported 
Gao Fu of the China cdc.34
The global virome is global in the same sense as  others have described the 
emergence of a “global biology” in stem- cell research, hiv vaccine develop-
ment, and the  Human Genome Proj ect.35 On the one hand, geographic lo-
cations and animal reservoirs are defined as local sources where viruses are 
sampled and extracted; on the other, standard protocols for laboratory analy-
sis and data sharing are used to exchange and research virus samples across 
a transnational domain. A focus of the initiative revolves around developing 
po liti cal protocols and technical infrastructure for data sharing in an effort 
to create “global owner ship,” preempting pos si ble claims of viral or genomic 
sovereignty.36 Once viruses are assembled into a collection (the virome), ma-
chine learning and bioinformatics approaches  will predict risk based on virus 
genotype, enabling the development of countermea sures before any outbreak 
occurs. Viruses become global to the extent that infrastructures of sampling 
and sharing enable their “decontextualization and recontextualization, ab-
stractability and movement, across diverse social and cultural situations.”37 In 
the gvp the global takes the form of a network.38
By contrast, the assessment of “global suitability” for zoonotic pandemics 
proposed by the researchers I accompanied in China provides a very diff er-
ent morphological model for global health. It moves beyond the extraction 
and exchange of viral agents in order to put landscape reconstruction at the 
core of pandemic preparedness. In a recent paper, Marius Gilbert, Xiao Xiang-
ming, and the fao’s Timothy Robinson reflect on the emergence of avian in-
fluenza in China as “a ‘One Health/Ecohealth’ epitome.”39 Like proponents of 
the gvp, they begin by remarking on the failure to predict the emergence of 
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several zoonotic diseases over the last few de cades, including avian flu, but 
they offer a very diff er ent explanation for this failure. First, they argue, predic-
tions and forecasts are typically based on what is known about a disease and 
its risk  factors “where it circulates” but do not consider the range of  factors 
that “could be impor tant in diff er ent areas or  under diff er ent conditions.” In 
many cases, diseases emerged, or caused unexpectedly severe outbreaks, pre-
cisely when the virus suddenly appeared in a new location (for instance, the 
West Africa Ebola outbreak in 2015). Second, predictions or forecasts are often 
poorly equipped to monitor “gradual changes in anthropogenic, environmen-
tal and wildlife  factors” or their interactions and feedback cir cuits. In their 
focus on viral discovery and risk assessment, most pandemic- preparedness ini-
tiatives ignore how changes in social and ecological environments could trans-
form the scale of threat posed by a par tic u lar pathogen.
Gilbert and colleagues identify the industrialization and intensification of 
livestock farming as a pivotal pressure that drove the emergence and spread 
of avian influenza viruses in China. But the role of livestock in changing dis-
ease landscapes is not “specific to parts of Asia,” they add. Growing livestock 
populations across the world are giving rise to new diseases, from goat expan-
sion in the Netherlands driving the emergence of q fever to the outbreak of 
mers that followed from intensification of camel production in the  Middle 
East. In the face of  these landscape pressures, intervention must go beyond 
early warning or even the preemption of virus emergence. Instead, they argue, 
global health should work to reduce the suitability of our planetary ecol ogy 
for the emergence and transmission of zoonotic diseases, including the “de- 
industrialization” of livestock farming in high- income countries and its “sus-
tainable intensification” in poor countries.40
To better understand the implications of this diagnosis for global health, I 
would like to situate Gilbert and colleagues’ proposal in the context of a recent 
initiative known as planetary health.41 Led by the Rocke fel ler Foundation in 
conjunction with the British health journal The Lancet, planetary health differs 
from the many similar- sounding programs— One Health, Ecohealth, ecosys-
tem health—in several impor tant re spects. The planetary health approach is 
based on the idea that  human health must be considered in conjunction with 
the overall health of planetary ecosystems. Arguing that economic develop-
ment has made the  human population “healthier than it has ever been,” plan-
etary health reports also note that economic development has created unpre-
ce dented threats and risks to planetary ecosystems: pesticide accumulation, 
depletion of ocean fisheries, and, of course, global climate change. As Lancet 
editors Richard Horton and Selina Lo elaborate, planetary health highlights 
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how  human health depends on a “safe operating space” defined by “planetary 
existence”: “if the bound aries of that space are breached, the conditions for our 
survival  will be diminished.” But the concept of planetary health also focuses 
on the reflexivity of health threats: “the risks we face lie within ourselves and 
the socie ties we have created,” Horton and Lo claim.42
In  these proj ects, I suggest, global health adopts the form of a sphere rather 
than a network of standards that enable decontextualization and transfer. 
Thinking about the globe as a  spherical form means considering how the 
 whole Earth, the terrestrial planet, is made into a unified object of knowledge 
and intervention. By this I do not mean the seventeenth- century image of the 
Earth as a round globe, a billiard ball in infinite space, but rather the more re-
cent configuration of the Earth as a fragile, bounded sphere within which life 
is pos si ble.43 By considering global health within the context of the biosphere, 
the interconnections of  human and nonhuman health, the feedback loops be-
tween  human actions and ecological reactions, are brought to the fore. As Hor-
ton and Lo put it, global health action must understand both the dependence 
of  human health on its planetary operating space and the  human, reflexive role 
in transforming  those ecological conditions. In  doing so, this  spherical form 
of global health makes vis i ble the planetary- scale risks that we face but also 
reveals the opportunities to condense rather than amplify feedback loops.
Yet despite the promise of the planetary health vision, it remains largely 
utopian without concrete infrastructure for both monitoring and reconstruct-
ing pathogenic landscapes. In the Global Virome Proj ect, as I showed above, 
new transnational and transdisciplinary— global— collaborations are built 
on the foundation of data- sharing protocols and database infrastructures. To 
achieve the objectives of planetary health, I suggest, requires a diff er ent form 
of global collaboration. The most impor tant divisions are not so much  those 
separating the vertical “silos” between disciplines or the borders between 
nation- states, but rather the horizontal stratifications separating lab sciences 
from field sciences, bioscience experts from livestock farmers, and  humans 
from nonhumans.
It would be tempting to argue that anthropology, drawing on field research 
and ever attentive to difference, offers a solution to this prob lem of stratifica-
tion.44 In fact, however, I believe that the figure of the veterinarian offers the 
best opportunity for building transversal connections between the strata where 
life is treated as an object of knowledge and  those where life is treated as a 
means of production. Gao Lili, the national veterinarian of the fao Emergency 
Center, once offered me an impor tant piece of advice. In a conversation at the 
Emergency Center, she noted that China’s poultry trade was sharply divided 
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between an official sector in which formal contracts between farmers and traders 
predominated, and a folk (minjian) sector where contracts remained unwritten 
and supported by trust in personal relationships. I interjected that I was consid-
ering collaborating with social scientists at one of Beijing’s universities to better 
understand  these folk poultry economies. Gao laughed. She said that if I  really 
wanted to know the “details of the field,” I should work with local veterinarians, 
not sociologists. Or even better, find someone who works at a veterinary phar ma-
ceu ti cal or vaccine manufacturer. They  will know the most farmers.
Yet the veterinarian is not a single figure. In China, for instance, the veteri-
nary sector is increasingly stratified by the separation of official veterinarians, 
skilled in laboratory and technical knowledges, and the duck doctors who set 
up their medicine shops at poultry marketplaces. The role of China’s livestock 
industry in the global antimicrobial re sis tance disaster offers an illuminating 
recent instance of the dangers of this stratification. On the one hand, official 
veterinarians in China’s Ministry of Agriculture are attempting to enforce 
new laws prohibiting the use of antimicrobials as growth promoters (including 
as additives to manufactured feeds). According to recent accounts, however, 
farmers continue to misuse antimicrobials, including “the in effec tive and in-
appropriate use of the drugs, timing, dosage, and duration, . . . .  [and] the use 
of counterfeit and substandard products.” As Ziping Wu explains, this misuse 
is primarily  because “the advisory role commonly played by veterinarians is 
increasingly taken over by salespersons of companies that sell their products 
directly to farmers.”45 Duck doctors—in addition to the obvious profit- seeking 
motivations— lack the ability to see the antibiotic re sis tance prob lem, which 
demands observations at a longitudinal, multispecies, and perhaps even plan-
etary scale. Yet the official veterinarians apparently lack something equally 
troubling: the ability to understand what farmers are  doing and the capacity to 
advise farmers on better practices.
The collaborations needed for planetary health are not  those that enable 
better data- sharing platforms among disciplines but rather  those that in-
crease alliances across heterogeneous domains of knowledge and production. 
New assemblages, as Deleuze and Guattari proposed, are always initiated by 
displacements— movements of deterritorialization and decoding— that cross 
and reconnect diff er ent strata.46 But I would reiterate that  there are multiple 
trajectories of displacement. In an era of planetary health, the next generation 
of health workers and veterinarians needs something more than the laboratory 
devices that, like power ful levers, displace natu ral and social environments, 
enabling scientists to “raise the world.”47 What they most urgently need is re-
ceptiveness to the outside, a capacity to be moved by the world.
This page intentionally left blank
P O S T S C R I P T
On December 31, 2019, China sent a report to the who documenting a cluster of 
cases of severe respiratory pneumonia at a  wholesale market in the central city 
of Wuhan (Hubei Province), and linking the cluster to the emergence of a novel 
coronavirus. As I write less than two months  later, the disease— now officially 
known as covid-19— threatens to cause a global pandemic.1
As the outbreak grew, international media began to refer to Wuhan as the 
“epicenter” of the coronavirus outbreak.2 By the end of January, with the New 
Year holiday approaching, China responded with intensive mea sures in an 
effort to control transmission. Wuhan city was “locked down,” with no trav-
elers permitted to leave or enter. Soon  after, other secondary cities in Hubei 
 were also locked down. Workers built two makeshift hospitals in a  matter of 
weeks. Cities across China mandated residents to wear surgical face masks 
in public. Still, the virus spread, reaching countries across Asia, Eu rope, and 
North Amer i ca. Some experts warned that the virus could infect as many as 
two thirds of the world’s population, and could even become a new seasonal 
scourge like influenza. Yet only a few months before, the virus had never in-
fected a  human being.
Once again, global attention focused on the hy po thet i cal source of a 
dangerous virus: geo graph i cally, in China; and ecologically, in animals. The 
first cluster of cases primarily involved stall  owners at the Huanan Seafood 
Wholesale Market in central Wuhan, who developed severe pneumonia and 
 were warded at hospital intensive care units. Reports soon emerged that the 
market sold much more than seafood, including a variety of “wild” animals. 
In samples taken from patients, the Wuhan Institute of Virology isolated a 
virus with ge ne tic resemblances to sars- coronavirus and another coronavirus 
previously isolated from bats, suggesting a wildlife reservoir.3 Then, research-
ers from China cdc reported that they isolated covid-19 virus genes in envi-
ronmental samples taken from the Huanan market. The virus spilled over into 
 humans from “wild animals at the seafood market,” declared Gao Fu, director 
of the China cdc.4
A backlash against the farming, trade, and consumption of wild animals 
quickly followed in both international and Chinese publics. In the international 
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press, vivid descriptions of “omnivorous” wet markets depicted the sale of civet 
cats, snakes, and wolf pups in dense crowded stalls covered with  water, feath-
ers, and blood.5 Reiterating the “Orientalist” responses to sars and avian flu, 
the emergence of the virus was blamed on “unruly” Chinese consumers who 
mixed nature and culture in unacceptable ways.6 But many  people in China 
have also called for a permanent ban on wildlife trading, farming, and con-
sumption in the country. Nineteen scientists from the China Acad emy of Sci-
ences, including se nior virologists from Wuhan, published an open letter on 
social media calling for the elimination of illegal wildlife trade. “Regulate the 
illegal wildlife trade at the source, by completely banning the illegal consump-
tion of wild animals,” the letter demanded. On January 26, China instituted a 
temporary national ban on wildlife trading, and in the weeks that followed, 
police raids led to the arrests of over 700 for violations of the ban. A compre-
hensive, permanent ban is being considered by the National  People’s Congress, 
China’s top legislative body.
In ways reminiscent of the responses to pandemic influenza and sars, 
scientists transposed laboratory research with viruses onto the landscapes of 
southern China. Phyloge ne tic accounts of viral kinship— particularly the re-
semblance of the covid-19 virus (isolated from  humans) to BatCoV RaTG1 
(isolated from  horse shoe bats in Yunnan)— were transformed into historical 
narratives of how the virus emerged from wild animal to  human populations. 
Under lying the dramatic tales of wild animal markets, therefore, is an equally 
dramatic story about laboratories and international data- sharing. In early Jan-
uary, Chinese labs posted a complete sequence of the covid-19 virus genome 
to the EpiFlu database platform managed by the Global Initiative to Share 
All Influenza Data (gisaid), a database designed to balance wide accessibility 
with the distribution of credit and other benefits to the originating laborato-
ries without relying on  legal claims to viral sovereignty.7 Teams in Austria, the 
United States, and Singapore quickly began posting research findings based on 
bioinformatics modeling that showed the relationships to other viruses, as well 
identifying pos si ble vaccine and phar ma ceu ti cal targets.
In order to develop  these comparative inferences, researchers relied on a 
large archive of coronaviruses previously sampled from bats and other animals 
in China. Since 2009, the usaid’s Predict program and the Global Virome Proj-
ect have sampled viruses from “bats and rats” in south China. Led by Chinese 
laboratories, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology,  these viral discovery 
programs collected at least fifteen novel coronaviruses from bats, including 
eleven isolated from a single bat cave in south China’s Yunnan Province.8 More 
broadly, the sequencing skills and capacity demonstrated in the response to 
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the outbreak built on China’s enormous investment in laboratory sciences— 
including the construction of a biosafety level 4 laboratory, capable of work-
ing with the most dangerous pathogens, at Wuhan. Fi nally, international shar-
ing of the genome sequences drew on China’s previous negotiations with the 
gisaid database, and contrasted with the “competitive global coordination” 
that characterized the sequencing race during sars.9 The response to the coro-
navirus outbreak demonstrated the success of what I called a network model of 
global health, in which large- scale collection of viruses and data- sharing across 
borders enable rapid response to emerging viruses—if not, in this case, their 
prediction and prevention.
Yet just as the outbreak demonstrated the success of the global health pro-
grams devoted to collecting and sequencing viruses, it also exposed the rela-
tive paucity of cultural and ecological knowledge of the context of viral emer-
gence. Detailed models of the molecular structure of the covid-19 coronavirus 
have been published on the gisaid website; thickly branching phyloge ne tic 
trees showing the relatedness of hundreds of virus samples sequenced since 
the onset of the epidemic are widely circulated; but a basic fact like the num-
ber and variety of animal species sold at the Huanan  wholesale market is still 
unknown. Crucial questions that would enable understanding how a virus 
that previously infected bats “spilled over” into other animal and then  human 
populations are hardly asked, let alone answered: where are wild animal farms 
located and distributed across China’s rural landscapes?; where do farms over-
lap with the ranges of wild bats?; what new or changing farming practices may 
have increased contacts across the domestic– wild interface?; which formal 
and informal trading networks moved animals from farms to Wuhan? As 
Marius Gilbert and colleagues wrote, viral discovery leads us to identify vi-
ruses with the location of their host reservoirs—in this case, bat caves in south 
China— but we ignore the “gradual changes in anthropogenic environmental 
and wildlife  factors” that could lead one of  these viruses to emerge rather than 
 others, often in locations far from their original reservoir.10 We need better 
diagnostics of the ecological suitability for spillover, maps of the highways and 
bridges of viral traffic between wild animals and  humans, and not only archives 
of viruses collected from wildlife reservoirs.
The widespread calls to permanently ban all wildlife trade, including wild-
life farming, may be useful in the immediate context of the outbreak, particu-
larly since the relevant host species is still unknown. Ironically, however, calls 
for a permanent ban also reflect our  limited cultural and ecological knowl-
edge of human– wildlife relations. A comprehensive ban would encompass an 
enormous variety of species farmed and traded  under China’s “special- type 
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husbandry” (tezhong yangzhi) rules, including every thing from frogs, turkeys, 
and quails to civet cats, bamboo rats, tigers, and bears.  There is no doubt that 
some of  these species do pose zoonotic disease risks, and a few have even been 
linked to the emergence of viral diseases (such as civet cats, suspected to play 
a role in the sars outbreak). But  others (frogs, turkeys) are not considered sig-
nificant health threats at all.
Banning wildlife markets is also likely to drive them under ground, lead-
ing to other unexpected risks. In 2013, several cities in eastern China closed 
live poultry markets  after the emergence of a novel strain of avian influenza 
a(h7n9) in  humans. Although the closure of the markets did reduce  human 
cases in the cities in the short term, an fao study showed that it also led to the 
expansion of the outbreak by disrupting the typical poultry trade flow, causing 
the emergence of new trade network patterns and spreading the virus to previ-
ously uninfected areas.11 Two years  after live poultry markets  were banned in 
Guangzhou, under ground black markets  were thriving.12
Fi nally, a comprehensive ban on wildlife economies could further expand 
the stratification of knowledge and production that I diagnosed in this book, 
making the forms and patterns of wild animal farming and consumption even 
less transparent to veterinary governance than they are now. Cultural practices 
and ecological changes need to be spotlighted with as much care as viruses are 
examined  under the microscope, and this  will require ground-up collaboration 
with farmers, traders, and consumers rather than a social pro cess of scapegoat-
ing and exclusion. If  there is any hope in predicting and preventing the next 
emerging viral pathogen, it  will rely on inventing new instruments of ecologi-
cal and social research that are capable of tracing the links between viruses 
and their environments, reimagining the classificatory oppositions of wild and 
domestic, and, most difficult of all, working across the stratigraphic divide that 
separates virological and veterinary experts from rural farm producers.
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